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ABSTRACT

A central debate in the Comparative Foreign Policy literature concerns the role of government
composition on the international behavior of parliamentary democracies. For the past two
decades, a multitude of studies have discussed whether single-party governments were more or
less constrained than multiparty coalitions in their international behavior, yet they have failed to
reach conclusive empirical findings. This dissertation responds to this puzzle by unpacking
coalitions: as it captures the variation among coalition governments along mathematical and
ideological dimensions, the dissertation introduces a nuanced ‘government composition’
approach to explain the international commitments of European parliamentary regimes during
the post-Cold War period.
To undertake this project, the dissertation utilizes the Comparative Politics literature on
coalition theories, legislative politics and economic voting. Specifically, it introduces the veto
players and clarity of government responsibility theories to frame the debate and to demonstrate
that both theories remain inadequate in explaining commitment intensity unless two key
variables are accounted for: (a) the types of multiparty governments that emerge in
parliamentary systems and (b) the extent of ideological differences inside these coalitions, or
their 'policy incongruence.’ Furthermore, the dissertation challenges the existing understanding
regarding the constrained nature of minority coalitions by bringing in the policy viability and
fragmented opposition explanations into the analysis of foreign policy behavior.
The dissertation employs a multi-method research strategy to comprehensively evaluate
the analytical capacity of the ‘government composition’ explanation by (a) revealing the
statistical relationships between government composition and international commitments, (b)

uncovering the mechanisms that link the composition of governments to international
commitments, and (c) testing the explanatory power of the ‘government composition’ approach
against a series of alternative explanations at the individual, domestic and international levels.
To these ends, the dissertation first utilizes a post-Cold War foreign policy events dataset
to test the effects of government type and ideological cohesion by using multilevel regression
techniques. Next, it complements these analyses with structured-focused case studies of the
Danish decisions to join the 1990 Gulf and 2003 Iraq wars and the Dutch decision to support the
2003 Iraq war. The case studies evaluate a series of alternative explanations including public
opinion, logrolling dynamics among political parties, threats to national survival and the role of
political leadership as well as the domestic and international political contexts of these states to
explain how they have decided to provide political and material support for these international
military operations.
The project firmly concludes that the dichotomous understanding of government
composition that has long prevailed in the foreign policy literature is not only inadequate but
misleading to explain the international commitments of parliamentary democracies. Quantitative
and qualitative tests suggest that the type of multiparty governments and their ideological
diversity together affect commitment intensity in different directions, through diverse
mechanisms. Specifically, oversized coalitions engage in more intense commitments compared
to single-party majority governments through responsibility diffusion. Minority coalitions
engage in stronger commitments so long as their ideological setup leaves the parliamentary
opposition fragmented, through policy viability. Finally, minimum winning coalitions can
overcome their ideological fragility and increase their international commitments when the
political parties engage in logrolling relationships with each other. The dissertation situates these

findings within the context of factors that pertain to the motivations of key political leaders,
domestic political norms and public opinion, as well as the broader historical foreign policy
orientations of the states.
With the conclusions of the statistical and case analyses, the dissertation ultimately offers
a ‘coalition politics framework’ to explain foreign policy behavior in parliamentary regimes. In
the end, the dissertation contributes to the literature on foreign policy analysis as the first study
to introduce a multilevel, multicausal framework to evaluate the international behavior of
parliamentary democracies.
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CHAPTER 1

MORE THAN A DICHOTOMY:
GOVERNMENT COMPOSITION IN THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

In an effort to introduce “a sound military strategy and external political dialogue to lessen EastWest tensions” (Kugler 1999: 11) during the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) proposed a ‘dual-track’ solution that stipulated the deployment of 572 nuclear missiles
in Western Europe, 48 of which were planned to be stationed in the Netherlands (Van Dijk 2011:
1). The Dutch Defense Minister, Willem Scholten expressed his hesitation at the 1979 NATO
summit in Brussels, arguing that “his government cannot commit itself yet to deploy its share of
the new missiles” and that the Netherlands would arrive at a decision in December 1981 (Van
Dijk 2011: 1, emphasis added).
The deployment of the NATO cruise missiles turned into a severe foreign policy problem
by the early 1980s. The center-left coalition that came to power by 1981 “with the CDA, the
Labour Party (PvdA), and Democrats ’66 (Left-liberals) which lasted barely a year” (Hagan,
Everts, Fukui and Stempel 2001: 184) postponed the decision for the second time (Van Dijk
2011). In the six-year period since 1979, the Dutch decision was postponed three times by
consecutive coalition governments until the minimalist Christian Democrat (CDA) and Liberal
(VVD) coalition finally allowed deployment in 1985 (Hagan et al. 2001).
Belgian re-engagement with a former colony, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
climbed to the top of this country’s foreign policy agenda by the end of the 1990s. “The policy
platform on Belgian-Congolese relations…deviated from that of the previous coalition” with the
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incoming oversized coalition government of Liberals, Socialists and Greens in 1999 led by Guy
Verhofstadt, which set out on “a more active intervention policy on the ground in the DRC”
(Kelly 2007: 73, emphasis added). To mark this change in Belgian-Congolese relations, Kelly
(2007: 75) explains that the premier himself paid an official visit to the DRC in 2000 for the first
time any government had since 1990: “the trips set the Verhofstadt government apart…indicated
that the ‘rainbow’ coalition was in favor of increasing Belgian involvement in its former colonies
[sic]” (Kelly 2007: 75, emphasis added). Verhofstadt’s visit to the Congo was a sign of
commitment on the Belgian government’s part towards building a closer relationship with this
state.
“A coalition is a coalition is a coalition” in international politics. Clearly, the Dutch and
the Belgian cases suggest otherwise: not only do the structures of these coalitions vary across
countries, but they also act significantly different than their predecessors in each case, regarding
the relations with NATO and the DRC. And yet, the existing literature continues to consider
coalition governments in parliamentary systems to be a “homogenous” (Clare 2010: 967)
category vis-à-vis single-party governments when explaining foreign policy behavior.
This dissertation challenges this viewpoint by unpacking coalitions. It asks: how does the
mathematical and ideological composition of parliamentary governments affect their foreign
policy behavior—specifically, their international commitments?
Take Kaarbo’s most recent contribution on coalition foreign policy choices (2012), for
instance. She asks (2012: 2): do coalitions suffer from the multiplicity of parties in the
government which impede their foreign policy, or do these governments enjoy greater room to
pursue more “aggressive” foreign policy behavior due to “the institutional and political dynamics
of coalition politics”? This dichotomy not only disregards the variation among coalition
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governments as exemplified above, but it does injustice to the invaluable work by Kaarbo
(1996a, 1996b) and Clare (2010), who have demonstrated that coalitions are more complicated
than it is implied by the ‘one v. many parties’ distinction. Indeed, these scholars have
demonstrated that the critical junior parties, which are so indispensable to the arithmetic setup of
their coalitions that they can single-handedly bring them down by threatening to withdraw from
them, can have an overwhelming influence on the international behavior of these governments.
The evidence suggests, in other words, that the mathematical organization of parties in
coalitions matters in explaining foreign policy behavior. The dichotomous understanding of
government composition, however, remains central to the empirical studies in the literature
(Kaarbo and Beasley 2008), leading to a series of inconclusive findings over whether multiparty
governments are more or less constrained than single-party governments in international politics.
Let us push this inquiry even further. The Dutch and the Belgian governments mentioned
above were majority coalitions, commanding sizeable seat shares in parliament—but what about
minority coalitions? Why did the minority coalition in Denmark, for instance, fail to strengthen
its relations with NATO for six years during the Cold War? If this was a result of the
government’s size vulnerability in the parliament, then how did the next minority government
that came to power in 1988 manage to turn that policy around, ultimately joining other NATO
countries in the 1990 naval blockade in the Gulf? In other words, are minority coalitions always
at a disadvantage due to their seat share in the parliament as the existing literature claims, or can
we think of other structural factors that allow them to circumvent these vulnerabilities and make
stronger commitments in international politics?
The literature has argued time and again, for instance, that the “partisan sources of
preference” (Kelly 2007: 75) is an important factor in explaining the international behavior of
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democracies. “Political ideology and partisanship are important and overlooked sources of policy
disagreement,” Kaarbo (2012: 7) contends, alluding to their influence on a government’s foreign
policy behavior. Rathbun (2004: 8) concurs that “parties articulate and implement very different
policies…due to their different ideological fundamentals”—a phenomenon that “calls into
question the assumption of consistent national approaches in international affairs that has long
been the dominant tradition in the policy literature” (also quoted in Kaarbo 2012: 7). These
studies are correct to problematize the role of ideological differences in governments in
explaining their foreign policy behavior. However, this is a puzzle that has not yet received
systematic treatment. With the exception of a handful of studies that have tested the effects of
relative party positioning (Clare 2010, Kaarbo 2012) or the coalition’s ideological location along
the political left-right spectrum on international conflict behavior (Palmer, London and Regan
2004, Schuster and Maier 2006), the role of a coalition’s ideological differences on international
behavior has been understudied.
The Dutch, Belgian and the Danish examples are therefore illustrative precisely because
they compel us to ask new, more nuanced questions about the role of government composition
on foreign policy behavior: Is the ‘single-party versus coalition’ dichotomy emphasized by
Kaarbo (2012) and others enough to capture the variation in parliamentary governments to
explain their international behavior; or is it time to further dissect this dichotomy? Is ‘the
multiplicity of parties’ enough to define coalitions, or is there something more critical about the
mathematical organization of parties in coalition governments that could influence their actions
at the international level? It seems inevitable that when there are multiple parties in a
government, there are multiple ideological camps—how do these differences influence the
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government’s international behavior? Can ideological differences explain the change in
Belgium’s foreign policy behavior toward Congo, or Denmark’s toward NATO?
Despite the breadth of the literature on the domestic sources of foreign policy behavior
in parliamentary democracies, the discussion above implies that our knowledge on the effects of
government composition on international behavior is far from complete. Most critically, we still
do not know the structural factors that drive foreign policy behavior in coalition governments.
This is a significant gap in the literature since coalitions are the predominant institutional
outcome in parliamentary regimes (Gallagher, Laver and Mair 2006, Kaarbo 2012), where “the
authority to make foreign policy and to respond to the international developments lies with the
cabinet” (Kaarbo 2012: 3). Especially in Europe—the regional focus of this study—70 per cent
of all governments have been coalitions since the end of the Second World War (Gallagher,
Laver and Mair 2006). This number increases to 80 per cent in the period between 1994 and
2004, which is the focus of this study. The dramatic frequency of coalitions among European
parliamentary democracies compels one to expect variation in the ways in which political parties
come together mathematically and ideologically to form them, and consequentially, influence
their international behavior. Thus, from an institutional perspective, dissecting the composition
of coalition governments should also contribute to our broader understanding of parliamentary
regimes and how they act at the international level.
This dissertation therefore argues that to answer this puzzle, it is time to move beyond the
dichotomous conceptualization of government composition. With a focus on Europe in the postCold War period, the dissertation introduces a novel approach that scrutinizes the foreign policy
behavior—more specifically, the commitment behavior—of parliamentary regimes based on the
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ways in which political parties are organized along mathematical and ideological dimensions in
the executive branch.
To undertake this puzzle, the dissertation utilizes the rich Comparative Politics literature
on legislative politics, the theories of coalition politics and economic voting. Specifically, it
offers to explain foreign policy behavior by refining two major theories in Comparative Politics:
veto players (Tsebelis 1995) and the clarity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten 1993). By
introducing two “principal theoretical” dimensions—(i) “the size perspective” and (ii) “the
policy distance” between the parties that make up the government (Hagan et al. 2001: 174175)—the dissertation fine-tunes these theoretical approaches to explain the variation in the
intensity of international commitments. Furthermore, this dissertation contributes to the study of
minority coalitions in foreign policy analysis by offering a new perspective to test the effects of
their ideological composition as theorized by the ‘policy viability’ (Laver and Budge 1992) and
‘fragmented opposition’ (Hagan 1993) explanations.
To demonstrate the empirical vigor of the ‘government composition’ explanation, the
dissertation adopts a multi-method approach. It first tests this explanation on a large-N foreign
policy events dataset of European parliamentary regimes from the period between 1994 and
2004. As it will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, the multilevel regression analyses show that the
‘government composition’ explanation not only challenges the existing understanding in the
literature that coalitions are constrained in their foreign policy behavior, but the analyses also
illustrate that these behaviors vary significantly along the type of coalition and its ideological
cohesion—what the dissertation calls its ‘policy incongruence.’ In other words, the large-N
analyses reveal the correlations between government composition and international
commitments.
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Certainly, correlations are not enough to prove a theory. Even though the large-N
analyses do a good job providing the big picture, it is equally important to show why those
correlations exist by uncovering the mechanisms that link the composition of governments to
their international commitments. How does a minority coalition circumvent its size vulnerability
in the parliament to join war coalitions, for instance? Or, how is it possible that a minimum
winning coalition that suffers from deep ideological splits still manages to increase its
commitment intensity at the international level, such as contributing to international military
operations? Furthermore, given the breadth of the literature on the domestic sources of
international behavior, how does the ‘government composition’ approach perform against
alternative explanations such as logrolling dynamics among political parties in the parliament,
threats to national survival, public opinion, or political leadership?
To respond to these questions, the dissertation also introduces a qualitative research
component. Specifically, it offers structured-focused comparative case studies of the Danish
decision to join the Gulf War of 1990 as well as the Danish and the Dutch decisions to support
the 2003 war in Iraq. Through these case studies, the dissertation contextualizes the correlational
findings, uncovers the linkage mechanisms between government composition and international
behavior, and evaluates the hypotheses regarding minority (Denmark) and minimum winning
coalitions (the Netherlands) further by analyzing the role of alternative explanations that the
large-N analysis cannot address.
Ultimately, this dissertation intends to contribute to the existing literature on coalition
foreign policy in International Relations scholarship by unpacking coalitions and introducing a
dynamic ‘coalition politics framework’ in the study of foreign policy behavior, particularly with
a focus on international commitments.
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The preceding discussion has alluded to the significance of studying coalition foreign
policy by highlighting the need to unpack the structural characteristics of these governments. The
next question concerns the other side of the equation: what is it that we explain when we discuss
foreign policy behavior? In other words, now that the explanatory factors are spelled out, what is
it about foreign policy behavior that needs to be explained—what do we mean by ‘commitment’?
The next section turns to answer these questions.

Foreign Policy Behavior: Moderate, Extreme, Aggressive, Peaceful…or just ‘Committed’?
Holsti (1992: 82) defines foreign policy as “ideas or actions designed by policy makers to solve a
problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states, in
non-state actors, in the international economy, or in the physical environment of the world.”
It is argued that to make sense of foreign policy, one must study it like the meteorologist
studies the weather. Brady argues (1982: 17), for instance, that:
“The meteorologist describes the weather according to a number of
dimensions: temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, wind
direction and velocity, and precipitation probability, to cite a few
examples. We learn little about the weather by knowing only one
of these dimensions. Similarly, with foreign policies, describing
these phenomena without anchoring them to a set of dimensions
makes discussion and understanding difficult.”
Like meteorology, several dimensions characterize foreign policy: these include (a) the
predecisional context (that is, inputs of the system), (b) the foreign policy processes (also known
as the ‘black box’), (c) the output of decision making process, and finally, (d) the outcome
properties, or the feedback mechanism, which begins when the policy is implemented (Brady
1982: 26).
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This dissertation focuses on the dimension that concerns the outputs of the decisionmaking processes, defined as the foreign policy behavior.1 Operationalized also as the foreign
policy “event,” the dissertation utilizes foreign policy behavior as its main unit of analysis.
While ‘foreign policy’ concerns the general framework of principles or activities that the
state adopts to organize its international relations, foreign policy behaviors “refer to the
observable acts of individuals serving in an official governmental capacity” (Callahan 1982b:
293).2 As such, they have also been compared to the “individual vote” in the field of electoral
studies: focusing on the behavior “enables us to have a basic unit of analysis” (Brady 1982: 12)
to study the foreign policy activities of the state, similar to the ways in which we use the vote to
study the political activities of the individuals.
Foreign policy behaviors encapsulate the specific moments of government action, either
with a cooperative or conflictual tone, towards an international counterpart. In effect, while
‘foreign policy’ provides the framework for state behavior at the international level, ‘foreign
policy behavior’ becomes its primary indicator that gets “at those decision ‘process’ outcomes”
such as the Belgian premier’s visit to the Congo in 2000 or the Dutch decision to provide
political support for the US-led war in Iraq in 2003 “that are most likely affected by domestic
politics” (Hagan 1993: 166). As such, using the foreign policy behavior as the unit of analysis is
an additional strength for the present study, whose major objective is precisely to scrutinize the
effects of domestic-level factors on these ‘decision process outcomes.’

1

In this study, foreign policy behavior is also referred to as ‘international behavior.’
These behaviors may or may not stem from the designated foreign policy as described by Holsti
(1992). Nevertheless, it has been argued that one of the major objectives of using events as a unit
of analysis in the study of foreign policy analysis is to account for the overlaps (or lack thereof)
between foreign policy and foreign policy behaviors (Callahan 1982b). This discussion,
however, is outside the scope of the present study.
2
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What is it that we explain when we study foreign policy behavior? A number of
alternatives exist in the literature. Kaarbo and Beasley (2008) and Kaarbo (2012), for instance,
study the moderate and extreme as well as the peaceful and aggressive forms of foreign policy
behavior while testing the effects of single-party governments and coalitions. While the
moderation-extremity dimension concerns the content of behavior, the peace-aggression
dimension looks at its direction. Clearly, these notions pertain to foreign policy behaviors that go
far beyond international conflict initiation or escalation, which have been studied extensively in
the literature (Clare 2010, Ireland and Gartner 2001, Palmer et al. 2004, Prins and Sprecher
1999).
Still, these dimensions are by and large relative, and therefore prone to misinterpretation.
For instance, while ‘political support for war’ could be understood as peaceful behavior within
an alliance towards a third party, the third party itself could interpret it as a form of aggression
towards itself. Similarly, the use of ‘extremity’ is susceptible to criticism as it is bounded by
context. The 2000 Belgian official visit to the Congo—the first in 10 years—was certainly
extreme within the context of the relations between these states, but one could still argue at the
end of the day that this was at best a moderate form of behavior since it involved nothing more
than an official visit paid by one government to another.
In an effort to circumvent the conceptual confusion that these terms could run into, this
dissertation employs a more comprehensive and less controversial concept to frame foreign
policy behaviors: their commitment, and more specifically, their commitment intensity.
As an attribute of foreign policy output—one of the four dimensions described earlier—
commitment “concerns the creation in others the expectations about the actor’s future behavior”
(Callahan 1982a: 176, see also Gaubatz 1996: 111). As commitments increase expectations, they
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result in increasing the future decisional and behavioral constraints on the actor (Callahan 1982a:
182-183).
Commitments can generate expectations in two ways. The first concerns the explicit use
of resources, or “resource commitment” (Callahan 1982a). States communicate to the
international and domestic audiences that they actively invest in an international effort by
contributing with their material capabilities. During the Gulf War of 1990, for instance, several
European countries showed commitment through resource use: Italy contributed ten Tornado
fighter-bombers and five warships, while Poland sent a field hospital, to name a few (National
Post 2003). The Belgian visit to the Congo presented in the opening of this chapter was also a
form of resource commitment that signaled Belgium’s intention to intensify its relationships with
this country.
Studying the international commitments of European parliamentary democracies is
therefore critical since they command considerable amounts of material resources. For instance,
the amount of development aid given by Austria in 2004 was 1.3 billion US Dollars.3 Active
armed forces in Germany by the year 2000 were 321,000, making them the third strongest
military in Europe after the United Kingdom and France.4 These countries, among several others,
are governed exclusively by coalitions and command incredible material resources. It is therefore
important that we understand whether the composition of their governments influence their
international commitments precisely because they have the authority to commit these resources,
or at the very least, to signal that they might commit these resources in the future.

3

OECD (2010), “Development aid: Total official and private flows”, Development: Key Tables
from OECD, No. 5, doi: 10.1787/20743866-2010-table5.
This amount is comparable to Somalia’s gross domestic product in 2012 (United Nations 2014:
15).
4
“NATO and Non-Nato Europe” (2000), The Military Balance, 100 (1), pp. 61-65.
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Indeed, states can also show commitment by verbally “pledging oneself [sic] to some
outcome, course of action, or nation,” also defined as “binding commitment” (Callahan 1982a:
179), which may not require resource use.5 President Obama wrote in a letter to President Peres
of Israel in 2012, for instance, that “the United States remains steadfast in its commitment to
Israel’s security and a comprehensive peace in the region” (Haaretz 2012). While this statement
signals no use of resources unlike the Gulf War example, it clearly communicates that the United
States binds itself to protecting the security of its foremost ally in the Middle East and to
supporting peace in the region now and in the future. The 1979 NATO case discussed in the
beginning of this chapter, on the other hand, was an incident of a failure to commit as the Dutch
defense minister Scholten could not bind his government during the Summit to allow the
deployment of the Dutch share of the missiles.
If commitments pertain to the resources used and pledges uttered that generate
expectations for the future, the intensity of commitments is then simply a “function” of these
factors (Callahan 1982a: 183). In other words, commitments will be more intense the more future
decisional and behavioral constraints they exert on the actor. They may incur more constraints
when they utilize “the reserves of scarce resources and thus limit[s] the range of future [policy]
options,” or when they verbally bind “the actor to certain options” (Callahan 1982a: 182).
Which types of commitments are more capable of exerting constraints on the actor?
While some argue that verbal behavior is ineffective in generating expectations in and of itself

5

In the instance that binding commitments do not require resource use, it becomes “very
problematic at the point of observation” (Callahan 1982a: 179). This is why, for instance, events
datasets are useful in compiling these types of commitments alongside those that require
resources. As it will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, with the help of events datasets, we
pay as much attention to pledges or promises, for instance, which are essentially types of verbal
behavior, as we do to nonverbal behavior that generally manifests itself in some form of resource
allocation.
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(Schelling 1960: 65), others contend that “actions are not automatically less ambiguous than
words” (Jervis 1970: 19). “A nonverbal action unaccompanied by a verbal explanation will
produce relatively diffuse expectations,” Callahan (1982a: 188) contends, suggesting that verbal
behavior complements and even provides clearer meanings to the nonverbal behavior, as well as
creating “strong, self-perpetuating pressures for the commitment’s fulfillment” (Weinstein 1969:
41). Callahan (1982a) accommodates both of these views by claiming that resource commitment
(i.e. nonverbal action) and binding commitment (i.e. verbal action) are interactive in nature. As
Chapter 3 discusses in greater detail, the various scales of commitment intensity in the literature
illustrate this interactive relationship (Callahan 1982a, East 1973, Goldstein 1992).
What is the significance of studying commitment as a specific characteristic of foreign
policy behavior? For one, commitments matter for international politics as well as for domestic
politics. As the audience costs literature has argued numerous times, unfulfilled commitments
not only create domestic unrest and build distrust toward the leader (Fearon 1997, Gaubatz
1996), they also increase uncertainty at the international level (Callahan 1982a: 183). Gaubatz
(1996) makes the convincing case that international commitments are especially critical for
democracies since they create expectations at the domestic and at the international levels, which,
if they are not met, may lead to electoral punishment as well as a decline in international
credibility.
Therefore, studying the executive conditions under which parliamentary governments
pursue varying intensities of international commitment matters precisely because it could help
manage expectations about the foreign policy behaviors of these regimes.
Indeed, discovering the factors that explain the international commitments of
democracies is important for policymakers around the world. For instance, Sobel and Shiraev
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(2003: 299, emphasis added) use the decisions to join international peacekeeping operations—a
form of highly intense international commitment—to stress that “few people want their country
to take steps irrespective of what other nations do. The existence of an understanding about other
countries’ commitment is therefore an important condition of domestic support.” It is therefore
important to focus on commitments not least because the term provides a far less slippery
conceptual framework to study the variation in foreign policy behavior. The political
implications of commitments also push policymakers to identify the structural factors that
explain them to more safely navigate in the high seas of domestic and international politics.
This dissertation contends that ‘government composition’ provides the key structural
explanation to do so. The fact that “most of the cables going to Washington from the embassy
during the 2006 Dutch debate regarding troops for Afghanistan were about explaining and
predicting the effects of coalition politics” (Kaarbo 2012: 81) precisely attests to the importance
of this explanation in understanding how parliamentary regimes like the Netherlands that are
often governed by coalitions make their commitment decisions. In sum, to the extent that the
‘coalition politics framework’ introduced in this dissertation reveals how some parliamentary
governments are much more constrained or enabled to make higher-intensity commitments than
others due to the nature of their arithmetic and ideological compositions, it will contribute not
only to the literature on the domestic political explanations of foreign policy behavior, but
expand our knowledge towards developing more efficient foreign policies when interacting with
these regimes.

14

Bounded and Innovative: The Scope of the Study
In order to undertake this research task, the dissertation builds on the principles that have been
championed by the foundational works in its home field of Comparative Foreign Policy, namely,
attention to actor-level detail while maintaining the systematization of analysis to discover
parsimonious relationships. In turn, these principles help define the scope of the project.
Therefore, before moving on to a summary of its organization, it is necessary to provide a brief
discussion of where this dissertation is situated within the broader framework of the Comparative
Foreign Policy scholarship, as well as an explanation of its scope.
Attention to actor-level variation in explaining international political outcomes
distinguishes the study of Comparative Foreign Policy from the mainstream field of International
Relations. Of course, this is not to say that International Relations scholars entirely dismiss the
nuances across actors to maintain the parsimony and generalizability of their theories. For
instance, the literatures on the “democratic peace” and the neoclassical realist approach in
International Relations theory are two important areas where nuance and parsimony go together
in explaining international outcomes. Indeed, some of the studies produced in these areas are
influential precisely because they consider actor-level variation to evaluate the explanatory
power of these theories.
The “democratic peace” literature, for instance, provides a great setting to observe how
this widely tested theory of International Relations can be further refined at the actor-level to
enhance its predictive power. Elman’s (2000) comparative case study on democracy and conflict
behavior is among the first to explain how democratic actors in international politics do not
homogenously conform to the expectations of the democratic peace theory that “democracies are
more pacific than other regimes in general” (Quackenbush and Rudy 2009, also see Rummel
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1995, Leeds and Davis 1999). Instead, Elman (2000) contends that these regimes vary
significantly in their hawkish capacities based on the extent to which their executive-legislative
dynamics favor one branch’s preferences over the other. In other words, Elman focuses on the
institutional variation among democratic actors to demonstrate that democratic subtypes do exist
and yield substantially different outcomes for international politics, contrary to the more
generalized expectation of the democratic peace theory.6
Similarly, the neoclassical realist approach in International Relations has been a major
source of challenge to the realist school in this field while supporting the epistemological
foundations of Comparative Foreign Policy. Whereas realism takes states as unitary actors,
Schweller’s (2004) neoclassical realist approach focuses on the intervening “unit-level variables”
such as elite consensus or social cohesion at the domestic level to show that states often act
contrary to realist predictions and fail to balance each other at the systemic level, or
“underbalance.” This approach thus contends that the mediating effects of domestic political
“pathologies” may prevent a state from behaving by realist reflexes. In this sense, the
conclusions reached by Schweller (2004) resemble those of Elman (2000), as both studies
underscore the need to qualify the respective general theories with state-level variables and shed
light on the “complexity of reality” (Hudson and Vore 1995).
This is precisely what Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP) seeks to accomplish as it
emphasizes the merits of shifting from actor-general theories to actor-specific theories in
International Relations (George 1993, Hudson and Vore 1995, Hudson 2005). This approach
6

Certainly, one can argue that this dissertation, too, contributes to the institutional analysis of
democratic foreign policy by developing an even more nuanced explanation of international
commitments based on the executive structures of European parliamentary systems. More
specifically, this dissertation contributes to the democratic peace debate by demonstrating that
even a subset of democracies—parliamentary systems—are far more diverse at the executivelevel than the existing IR scholarship presumes.
16

helps demonstrate that most instances of international interactions among states are at least
influenced and at most determined by what takes place at the domestic level, that is, by what is
specific to the actor.
In his foundational work on CFP, Pretheories and Theories of Foreign Policy, Rosenau
(1966) suggested the development of middle-range theories to push the actor-specific approach
further. Through mid-range theorizing, it is argued that we can “tease out cross-nationally
applicable generalizations about the foreign policy behavior of states in a systematic and
scientific fashion” while developing explanations that span multiple levels of analysis 7 and
engage multiple causal pathways (Hudson and Vore 1995: 212-213).
This endeavor, however, requires great attention to detail, which paradoxically challenges
another principle of Comparative Foreign Policy, which concerns commitment to parsimony.
Scholars of CFP aspire to provide an explanation of international politics that is parsimonious
enough to be generalized across a broad set of cases, yet detailed enough to underscore the
critical mediating factors at the domestic as well as the individual or international levels, which
might be essential to understanding the linkages and the mechanisms between the causes and
their expected or unexpected effects on international politics. Hudson and Vore (1995: 220)
summarize this dilemma as “CFP methods demanded parsimony in the theories that guided
research” while “CFP theories demanded nuance and detail in the methods used.”
As a corrective, Kegley (1980: 19) has proposed that foreign policy theories can be
“contextually-qualified, circumstantially-bounded, and temporally/spatially-specified” to better
accommodate Rosenau’s (1966) initial framework. Foreign policy theories, in other words, can

7

In his seminal review essay, Realism and Domestic Politics, Zakaria (1992: 197) also argues
that “a good explanation of foreign policy … must separate the effects of the various levels of
international politics.”
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still be the multicausal, multilevel, systematic and scientific explanations that Rosenau
championed if they are limited—and within the limits, these theories can still be the strongest
explanations of foreign policy out there.
This dissertation follows Kegley’s (1980) advice, which brings us to the scope of the
study. Namely, the dissertation is bounded temporally and spatially, as well as institutionally
while adopting a multicausal and multilevel approach that systematically tests the effects of
government composition on international behavior. These limitations, however, do not weaken
the explanatory power of the ‘coalition politics framework’ introduced in this study. Instead,
they justify how and why the framework is a strong explanation against other alternative
explanations given these boundaries.
First and foremost, the framework that is introduced in this dissertation applies to postCold War foreign policy behaviors. A major reason behind the decision to limit the temporal
applicability of the framework is the decreased role of systemic factors that used to define and
constrain international behavior during the Cold War, and the simultaneous rise of the
“determinants” measured at the individual- and state-levels to explain international relations
(Stein 2006, see also Hermann and Hagan 1998). Indeed, Stein (2006: 195) argues that in the
post-Cold War era determinants assume center stage in “filling in the explanatory gap left by the
indeterminacy of structural factors,” stating “when context does not impel, human choice takes
center stage.” The ‘coalition politics framework’ introduced here implies that parties (by way of
their representatives in the government) have the decisive ability to influence the way in which
the government will act at the international level, and that they use their ability within the
context of the mathematical and ideological composition of this government. This marks a
substantial departure from the systemic explanations that dominated the study of international
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relations and foreign policy during the Cold War, where the internal dynamics of states and
decision-makers were considered, and possibly were, second-order factors.
Second, the ‘coalition politics framework’ offered in this dissertation only focuses on
parliamentary democracies. The reason for this institutional limitation is due to the way in which
executive-legislative relations are designed in these regimes. Specifically, the executive in
parliamentary systems is a natural extension of the winners of the elections for the legislative
branch, which implies that the mathematical and ideological composition of the parliament
following the elections will be reflected in the government and thus will be an important defining
factor in explaining government behavior at the international level.
In addition, “the government serves at the pleasure of parliament,” in these regimes and
that “[the government] is stable as long as it is supported by a legislative majority” (Clare 2010,
see also Lijphart 1999), suggesting that from a decision-making perspective the government is
impossible to detach from the parliament from which it stems (Frognier 1993, Hagan 1993,
Auerswald 1999, Prins and Sprecher 1999, Ireland and Gartner 2001, Palmer, London, and
Regan 2004, Kaarbo and Beasley 2008). This is contrary to presidential regimes where the
executive is mutually exclusive from the parliament as the former assumes power through
separate elections and thus does not necessarily reflect the mathematical or ideological setup of
the legislative branch. In sum, parliamentary regimes provide a suitable universe of cases for a
study that focuses on the dynamics of those executives that stem from the legislative branch with
distinct arithmetic privileges and ideological diversity.
Third and finally, the framework introduced in this dissertation incurs a spatial limitation
as it focuses on the post-Cold War parliamentary democracies in Europe. It is well-known that in
proportional representational (PR) electoral systems, parties win seats proportional to their vote
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shares at the district-level, which translate into multiparty competition (known as Duverger’s
Law). This leads to multiparty parliaments, most frequently resulting in coalition governments,
which is the dominant game in town for European political systems, as described earlier. In other
words, as the dominant type of executive in this region, studying the foreign policy behavior of
coalitions in Europe facilitates comparison across a substantial number of cases while keeping
constant many other structural factors (geography, economic development, etc.) that may posit
alternative explanations. By limiting the scope of the study to post-Cold War European
parliamentary systems, therefore, the dissertation provides the largest possible room to assess the
role of government composition as well as other alternative domestic-, individual-, or
international-level factors on the international commitments of these democracies.
To set the stage for what follows in the remainder of this dissertation, the next section
presents an outline of chapters below.

Outline of Chapters:
Chapter 2. Building Bridges to Explain Coalition Foreign Policy
This chapter begins by discussing the current state of the literature on government composition
and international behavior. By pointing out the weaknesses and the inconclusive findings of this
body of research, the chapter then brings in the ‘veto players’ and ‘the clarity of responsibility’
explanations in Comparative Politics to more systematically frame the discussion regarding
whether coalitions are more or less constrained than single-party governments in foreign policy.
Next, in an effort to refine these theories to study international commitments, it introduces the
‘missing link’ in this debate, which concerns the two major dimensions of government
composition: the type of government (specifically, multiparty governments) that is based on the
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distribution of party seats in parliament, and the degree of ideological diversity among these
parties that make up the government. To push this discussion further, the chapter also
distinguishes minority coalitions and discusses the role of ideology in these governments by
bringing in the theory of ‘policy viability’ and the notion of ‘fragmented opposition’. The
chapter concludes by laying out the hypotheses, which will be tested quantitatively in Chapter 4.

Chapter 3.

A Multi-Method Approach to Studying the International Commitments of

Coalitions
This chapter introduces the multi-method research approach utilized for the project and argues
that to fully capture the analytical power of the government composition explanation, it is
important to employ both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Next, the chapter
introduces the core components of the research design, namely the operationalization and the
measurement of the key independent and the dependent variables, which will be utilized
throughout the empirical analyses. This is followed by the detailed explanations of the
quantitative and qualitative components of the research design. In the quantitative component,
the chapter discusses the foreign policy events dataset as well as the specific independent,
dependent and control variables that will be incorporated in the regression analyses. The
quantitative component of the chapter concludes with a discussion of the weaknesses of the
existing estimation approaches in the literature, and introduces the multilevel modeling approach
that will be used in the quantitative analyses. Next, the chapter moves on to the qualitative
component of the multi-method research design. Here, a discussion of the case selection
strategies, the method of structured-focused comparison, and variable specifications will be
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introduced. The chapter concludes with a summary of the multi-method design and final
thoughts.

Chapter 4. Coalition Governments and International Commitments: A Quantitative Analysis
This chapter presents a quantitative analysis using the foreign policy events of 30 European
parliamentary regimes across the 1994-2004 period. The chapter is divided into three parts,
where each part utilizes one alternative measure of the policy incongruence variable discussed in
Chapter 3, namely the standard deviation of party positions from the mean left-right policy
position of the coalition, ideological range of the coalition, and whether the coalition crosses the
center of the political spectrum by including parties from both the left and the right. The findings
of this chapter conclude that the mathematical and ideological organization of parties in coalition
governments exert diverse effects on commitment intensity. Finally, the chapter presents a
country-level analysis through the use of the multi-level estimates that are provided by the
regression analysis. With the help of the country-level discussion, the chapter concludes by
reiterating the necessity to develop the framework with qualitative analyses.

Chapter 5. ‘Reaching Across the Aisle’: Policy Viability and Danish International
Commitments
This chapter presents a structured-focused comparative case study of two instances in Danish
foreign policy commitments in the post-Cold War period, namely the 1990 decision to
participate in the Gulf operation and the 2003 decision to join the US-led war in Iraq. Through
these cases, the chapter intends to push the findings in Chapter 4 further by uncovering the
mechanism behind the commitments of minority coalitions at varying levels of policy
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incongruence, and testing the explanatory power of the ‘policy viability’ and ‘fragmented
opposition’ approaches against a series of alternative explanations. The chapter begins with an
overview of the Danish political system and foreign policy orientations during the post-Cold War
period, followed by the case analyses of the 1990 and the 2003 decisions, respectively. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the findings and their implications.

Chapter 6. When Disagreements Lead to Commitments: Dutch Foreign Policy Behavior in the
2003 Iraq War
This chapter intends to investigate one of the anomalous findings in Chapter 4, regarding
minimum winning coalitions. To uncover the mechanism behind the relationship between
ideological composition and international commitments in minimum winning coalitions, the
chapter focuses on the Dutch decision to provide support for the 2003 Iraq war. It begins with a
discussion of the domestic and international political context in the Netherlands to set the stage
for the analysis. Next, it introduces the case analysis by utilizing the method of structuredfocused comparison. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the results.

Chapter 7. Nuance and Parsimony in Coalition Foreign Policy: What Do We Know, Where
Do We Go?
This chapter concludes the dissertation by arguing that nuance and parsimony can be achieved
simultaneously in the study of coalition foreign policy. It sets the stage for this discussion by first
providing an overview of the research puzzle and its significance, followed by the summary of
qualitative and quantitative findings. This chapter then provides a visual summary of the
‘coalition politics framework’ to demonstrate that the ‘government composition’ explanation is
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situated at its core, where international-, domestic- and individual-level factors further provide
the contexts to explain commitment behavior in parliamentary governments. The chapter then
moves on to discussing the contributions of the project to the literature. It concludes with some
reflections on the limitations of the study and suggests avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER 2

BUILDING BRIDGES TO EXPLAIN COALITION FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction
As argued in Chapter 1, the current state of the literature on government composition and foreign
policy behavior has been inconclusive, particularly with respect to the coalition governments in
parliamentary regimes. This chapter proposes a theoretical bridge between Comparative Politics
and International Relations to discuss and resolve this debate by introducing a more refined
understanding of government composition by unpacking coalitions along mathematical and
ideological dimensions. As the rest of this chapter will show, by building bridges 8 between the
Comparative Politics research on legislative politics, theories of coalitions and economic voting
on one hand and the field of Comparative Foreign Policy in International Relations on the other,
we can uncover the patterns and the linkages through which government composition can lead to
differential outcomes in the ways that the executive branches in parliamentary systems engage in
international commitments.
This chapter therefore provides a theoretical discussion toward developing a ‘coalition
politics framework’ to study international commitments, though with an explanatory capacity
defined by its temporal, institutional, and spatial boundaries, which has been discussed at length
previously in Chapter 1. Within the limits of these boundaries, however, the framework is the

8

Hudson (2005: 5), too, contends that foreign policy analysis “is often a natural bridge from IR
to other fields, such as comparative politics and public policy. FPA [sic]’s ability to speak to
domestic political constraints and contexts provides a common language between FPA and
comparative politics.”
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first attempt in the literature that utilizes a multilevel and multicausal approach to systematically
study how government composition affects foreign policy behavior.
The chapter begins with a survey of the existing studies in the field that tackle the
relationship between domestic political institutions, specifically those pertaining to governments,
and the international behavior of parliamentary democracies. Most importantly, it will
demonstrate that the Comparative Politics theories, namely the veto players and the clarity of
responsibility approaches, introduce an exceptionally useful framework to structure the debate
that has so far remained inconclusive in its findings. The chapter will then use these theories to
address the existing theoretical gaps in the study of coalition foreign policy, namely the lack of
an understanding of how political parties are organized mathematically and ideologically in
coalitions. The chapter then introduces the key independent variables, government (coalition)
type and policy incongruence to further refine these theories, followed by the hypotheses. Next,
the chapter will zoom out and discuss alternative explanations: since ‘government composition’
is one of several plausible explanations of foreign policy behavior in the literature, it is necessary
to acknowledge these alternative explanations, which could influence international commitments
alongside the key argument offered here. The chapter will conclude with a summary of the
theoretical framework and some concluding thoughts.

Domestic Political Institutions and International Behavior
The effects of domestic political institutions on the international behavior of democratic regimes
have received significant attention, especially with the rise of the democratic peace literature. As
democracies vary substantively among each other, new research avenues have begun to focus on
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the (often domestic) sources of this variation and their possible effects on the regime’s
international behavior.
To that end, studies have looked at several factors that pertain to democratic political
institutions. For instance, research on public opinion and audience costs (Fearon 1997, Leeds
1999, Reiter and Tillman 2002, Tomz 2007) claim that through their “statements and actions,”
democracies generate “domestic expectations that will lead to audience costs or electoral
punishment if a leader fails to carry out an international commitment” (Gaubatz 1996: 123). This
literature suggests that it is the public opinion and accountability aspects of democracies that lead
these regimes to a particular behavioral path at the international level, implying that audience
costs may vary among democracies to the extent that citizens show a clear interest and concern
about the international standing of their state (Tomz 2007: 837).
The impact of elections and electoral institutions (Gaubatz 1991, Leblang and Chan
2003), and executive-legislative relations (Elman 2000, Reiter and Tillman 2002) are some of the
other venues that branch out from this field of study. It has been argued, for instance, that
democracies are more likely to engage in war in the immediate period after an election but less
so prior to it, showing that the war involvement of these regimes is associated with election
cycles (Gaubatz 1991). Similarly, the balance of power between the executive and the legislative
bodies in democracies is studied as a source of variation among democracies that leads to
differences in their belligerent international behavior (Elman 2000), as Chapter 1 has also
discussed.
Within this body of research, government composition has been studied numerous times
to explain the foreign policy behavior of parliamentary democracies, specifically concerning
their conflict behavior. It has been hypothesized that the basic structural differences of these
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governments, such as having one or many parties in the executive or whether the government
holds majority or minority status in the parliament, should influence how they act in the foreign
policy arena. The next section provides an overview of this literature and suggests that
Comparative Politics theories on government composition can frame the extant discussion a lot
more effectively.

Constraining or Enabling? Contending Theories on the Effects of Government
Composition
As Chapter 1 has discussed at length, the existing research has focused on the dichotomy of
having one or many parties in government to explain how governmental constraints influence
international behavior, but it has remained inconclusive over their effects. This chapter proposes
that, first, this research agenda can be framed by two Comparative Politics theories: the veto
players approach (Tsebelis 1995), and the clarity of government responsibility approach, also
known as “economic voting” (Powell and Whitten 1993).9 While these approaches generate
diverging expectations on the effect of having a single party (majority) government on its foreign
policy behavior, as I demonstrate further below, incorporating the variation among types of
governments as well as the ideological differences among the parties that make up a government
alter these expectations significantly.10

9

Vowles (2010) also compares the expectations of these two causal mechanisms to explain
electoral accountability.
10
To their credit, Hagan, Everts, Fukui and Stempel (2001: 175) do borrow from coalition
theories in Comparative Politics and browse a number of conditions that “lead separate, often
contending, actors to achieve agreement on foreign policy.” Among these factors they mention
policy distance (Axelrod 1970, De Swaan 1973) or presence of a pivotal actor in the coalition
(De Swaan 1973). However, as I will show below, only a handful of recent studies have tackled
these factors, and they, too, have their shortcomings.
28

First, take the veto players approach. Veto players are “individual or collective actors
whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo” (Tsebelis 1999: 591). From this
theoretical perspective, a coalition government implies the presence of at least one and possibly
several veto players, whose agreement is necessary to make policy decisions and implement
them. Studies in Comparative Politics demonstrate that having many actors in government
inhibits the government’s ability to move away from the status quo. Roubini and Sachs (1989)
show that having multiple parties in government acts as a barrier against decreasing budget
deficits.11 Similarly, Tsebelis (1999) shows that increasing the number of veto players leads to a
decrease in the likelihood of producing significant labor law in Western Europe. In sum, this
approach contends that coalitions are cumbersome, constrained, inefficient, and often
contentious.
Many International Relations scholars also argue that multi-party coalitions are more
constrained in their international conflict behavior than single-party governments.12 Hagan
(1993), Elman (2000), Ireland and Gartner (2001), Reiter and Tillman (2002), and Palmer and
his coauthors (2004) argue that coalitions should suffer from more constraints than single-party
governments due to having too many parties that get involved in decision-making. As far as
political outcomes are concerned, Elman (2000) argues that having too many parties will lead to
“middle-of-the-road” foreign policies, which implies more moderate behavior than one would
expect under a single-party government. The empirical results, however, are mixed. Whereas
some studies conclude that coalitions are less likely to be involved in international disputes than
single-party governments (Palmer, London, and Regan 2004), others find no relationship
11

The authors argue that logrolling and collective action problems stop these actors from
reaching a consensus to stop government spending (Roubini and Sachs 1989).
12
For simplicity, the term “single-party government” will refer to single-party majority
governments in this study unless otherwise is stated.
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between conflict initiation and the number of parties in government (Leblang and Chan 2003,
Reiter and Tillman 2002), suggesting that single-party governments are not significantly
different than multiparty governments in their belligerent behavior. Most recently, based on a
series of case studies from parliamentary regimes such as the Netherlands, Japan and Turkey,
Kaarbo (2012: 244) has argued that coalitions “are prone to deadlock and delay. But they also
show signs of good decision,” suggesting that there is no conclusive evidence as to the
constrained nature of coalitions in foreign policy.
The clarity of government responsibility (Powell and Whitten 1993) predicts an opposing
effect for coalition governments on policy.13 It has been argued that in proportional
representation systems with coalition governments, if voters cast votes based on the parties’ past
performance (e.g. retrospective voting) than on their expected future performance, the voters’
evaluation will be “compromised because the lines of responsibility will be blurred [for the
coalition parties]” (Hobolt and Karp 2010: 304, Figure 2). Originally an explanation on the
electoral consequences of national economic policy, the clarity approach has been tested
quantitatively to show that “when clarity of responsibility is obscured and when the level of
responsibility is low, governing parties are less affected by how citizens evaluate the nation’s
economy” (Anderson 2000: 168).
Studies testing the clarity of responsibility theory argue that the number of parties in
government affects the government’s likelihood of being held responsible by the voters for its
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To their credit, Powell and Whitten (1993) use a more comprehensive index of institutional
traits, including number of parties in government, cabinet stability, opposition influence on
policymaking and party cohesion that collectively make a system more or less accountable. In
this study I use only the number of government parties to resonate my study with the rest of the
literature on parliamentary foreign policy. It should be noted that other studies on clarity of
responsibility also isolate the number of parties as a main indicator of level of accountability in
public policy (Anderson 2000, Tavits 2007).
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actions (Fisher and Hobolt 2010). Strom (1990) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), for instance,
discuss how single-party governments are more constrained and cautious than coalitions
“because they are reluctant to invite domestic political challenge, perhaps to the point of forcing
an election” (Leblang and Chan 2003: 390). More recent studies in Comparative Politics have
looked at corruption levels (Tavits 2007) and public sector growth (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006)
to argue that increasing the number of parties in government leads to higher levels of corruption
and larger public sectors, respectively. These studies all point to a decisional environment where
accountability is compromised.
In sum, this approach suggests that governments which are less likely to be held to
account will have more room to pursue policies that, if failed, will not have detrimental
consequences on the political future of the governing parties. Therefore, the expectation is the
opposite of what was proposed by the veto players approach: coalitions suffer from less scrutiny
than single-party governments, and thus they are able to pursue riskier policies (Downs and
Rocke 1995) that do not have to be moderate, and, if they fail, the electoral punishment will not
be too high.
IR scholars discuss the less constrained nature of coalitions by looking at conflict
involvement—a risky pursuit with serious potential electoral costs. Prins and Sprecher (1999:
275) expect that “with coalition governments, the voting public may be less able to attach
responsibility to any one party for policy failures,” which might encourage these governments to
“be more willing to reciprocate militarized disputes.” Along the same lines, Palmer et al. (2004)
claim that having larger coalitions and more pivotal parties will increase the likelihood of
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conflict involvement,14 though they fail to conclude that such structural factors have any effect
on dispute escalation. More recently, Kaarbo and Beasley (2008, see also the quantitative
analyses in Kaarbo 2012) find that coalitions act more extreme (i.e. more cooperative or
conflictual) than single-party governments in their international behavior.
It is important to acknowledge here that with the exception of Kaarbo and Beasley’s
(2008) work on extreme foreign policy behavior, an overwhelming majority of the
aforementioned studies that focus on the effect of government composition take conflict behavior
as their main dependent variable. This is understandable given how these studies are cousins to
the democratic peace literature, and that conflict is really the only type of international
phenomenon that is so sensational that it gets attention from scholars and policymakers alike.
However, limiting the dependent variable only to conflict behavior (initiation, escalation, or
simply involvement) precludes the flipside of the coin, that is, cooperative behavior, which may
or may not include risky and overly committed policies. Indeed, Kaarbo and Beasley (2008) and
Kaarbo (2012) have already pointed to this weakness in the literature.
Furthermore, relations among states rarely involve major conflicts relative to the massive
amount of interactions that take place among them every day. In other words, there is a much
wider range of international behavior out there that easily outnumbers the widely studied conflict
events that international relations scholars frequently focus on. This study not only takes into

14

Palmer, London and Regan conceptualize democratic governments with multiple veto players
as low removal threshold (LRT) regimes. They contend that once these LRT regimes get
involved in conflict, “the necessary outcome to keep the office is less likely to exist in the range
of possible outcomes associated with peace than is true for the HRT [high removal threshold]
leader. Thus it is that the lower the removal threshold that a leader faces, the more likely it is
that, given involvement in conflict, the leader will have to gamble on escalation in order to find
redemption” (2004: 8). In other words, the authors claim that once LRT regimes are involved in
conflict, they are forced to escalate rather than back down or seek a quick, peaceful resolution,
which resonates with the audience costs literature discussed earlier in this chapter.
32

account this wider range of foreign policy behaviors but further makes the case that the effects of
domestic-level variables in international relations should be more noticeable if the analytical
focus is on ‘commitments,’ which “is a major act domestically” (Hagan 1993: 95). Specification
of the dependent variable, however, is only one of the analytical weaknesses in the existing
literature. What we really lack is a more nuanced specification of governments in parliamentary
systems, namely their mathematical and ideological composition.

The Missing Link? Ideological Cohesion and Government Type
The above discussion illustrates that there are two competing explanations in the literature on
government structures and foreign policy behavior, yet neither of them provides conclusive
results. I argue that the common weakness of these studies is that they neglect two important
characteristics that further differentiate single-party governments and coalitions: the degree of
ideological differences among the parties that make up the coalition as well as their mathematical
organization, yielding different types of multiparty governments. As I show below, the
explanatory powers of both the veto players or the clarity of responsibility approaches are
conditional on the ideological affinity of the parties inside the coalition and its type—
specifically, whether the coalition enjoys a strong or weak parliamentary majority, or no majority
at all.
The role that the ideological cohesion of a government plays in policymaking is a central
component of the veto players framework (Tsebelis 1995). In his study on labor law legislation,
for instance, Tsebelis (1999) demonstrates that the ideological range of a coalition is a mediating
factor on policy stability: coalitions with a wider ideological range are unable to produce laws,
whereas coalitions with a narrower range are less so. Similarly, some have argued that economic
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growth rates are affected by the political constraints exerted by the size and distribution of
political preferences inside a government (Henisz 2000), and others have tested whether the
ability to manage health care costs is affected by the partisan composition of the government
(Huber 1998).
From the perspective of foreign policy analysis, Hagan, Everts, Fukui and Stempel (2001:
171) also argue that a “defining feature of a coalition decision unit centers around the effects that
each actor’s constituencies can have on members of the decision unit.” To the extent that
constituencies expect the coalition actors to act according to their positions already determined
along the national political spectrum, these actors will be constrained as well as guided by these
positions that are simplified here as “ideological positions” during the processes of foreign
policy decision-making. It is for this reason that Hagan underscores the ideological differences
among coalition partners to argue that “there is little long-term interest shared in sustaining the
unsatisfactory compromise arrangement of a multiparty coalition” (1993: 72). The discussion
suggests that when coalition parties come from diverse ideological backgrounds, their
differences impede their willingness to act together.15
However, the structural conditions under which a coalition’s ideological differences
impede its ability to make international commitments are still unclear. As Clare (2010: 970,
emphasis added) argues, “if governments that are less vulnerable to breakdown are also less
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Contrary to this claim, recall Leblang and Chan’s initial expectation, which states that since
coalition governments represent a broader array of the electorate, they should be less constrained
in “making controversial policies” (2003: 390). The underlying assumption of the authors,
however, is that while coalitions may represent a larger share of the electorate, they are simply
not constrained by the diversity of opinions or policy preferences they represent as individual
political parties that garner votes based on their platforms. While coalition governments may
enjoy a larger winning selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992), it does not necessarily
imply decreased constraints on the executive unless the coalition partners (and hence the voters)
share exactly the same set of policy preferences. This is obviously very unlikely.
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constrained in their foreign policies, then variation in the cohesion or fractionalization of
coalition cabinets should have significant implications for understanding their conflict
behavior.” Therefore, explaining foreign policy behavior from a veto players perspective remains
incomplete unless we consider the ideological diversity inside governments in relation to their
mathematical composition. The interaction is critical for multiparty governments, which may or
may not enjoy stable majorities in the parliament, as I illustrate below in Table 2.1.
It is important to note that existing studies in foreign policy analysis do not disregard the
role of ideology altogether. As Chapter 1 has also discussed, more recent works in this field have
stressed the importance of looking at “partisan sources of preference” (Kelly 2007: 75) to explain
the variation in foreign policy choices. Others continue to point to the need to “bring parties in”
(Schuster and Maier 2006: 237) to this research area by highlighting the fact that “disagreements
between parties over foreign policy issues are quite common and often as fiercely debated as
those about domestic issues” (Schuster and Maier 2006: 230). The debate suggests that parties in
government, by way of their ideological differences, may diverge on foreign policy, which
should be studied far more closely. Most of the existing contributions, however, focus only on
the relative positions of coalition parties vis-à-vis each other rather than the overall ideological
cohesion inside the government to demonstrate how partisan discord leads to foreign policy
outcomes.
A recent study, for instance, has demonstrated that when there are no ideologically outlier
parties in coalition governments, they “act similar to single-party governments in their [conflict]
initiatory propensity” (Clare 2010: 985), thus concluding that cohesive coalitions are able to
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circumvent the veto player effect of pivotal junior partners.16 Clare (2010) reaches this
conclusion, however, by looking at the relative position of the junior partner vis-à-vis the rest of
the coalition as opposed to taking the coalition government as a whole to measure its overall
ideological congruence, which might be critical to consider when there are multiple pivotal
junior partners.17
Similarly, Kaarbo (2012) tests the ideological position of the junior partner relative to
that of the senior partner in coalitions to explain extremity in international behavior. She has also
argued, however, that focusing on the relative party placements could be misleading (2012: 58).
In this sense, using the absolute ideological positions of all partners as opposed to their relative
positions vis-à-vis the senior partner should be more explanatory in studying coalition foreign
policy. In sum, the literature has not systematically tested how the ideological distribution of
parties in a government affects its foreign policy behavior, even though it has resonated strongly
with the theoretical underpinnings of the veto players approach, where ideological cohesion is an
indispensable analytical component.
This nuanced understanding is similarly important to test the clarity of responsibility
thesis, which also disregards the ideological cohesion of coalitions. If the theory holds true as it
stands, all coalitions must benefit from responsibility diffusion and survive the future electoral
16

A pivotal, or critical junior party is defined as “a small party in a minority or a minimum
winning coalition that has the power to dissolve the government by defecting from the coalition
and taking away the number of parliamentary seats it controls that are necessary for the
maintenance of the cabinet” (Kaarbo 1996b: 507, also see Laver and Schofield 1990).
17
Moreover, Clare (2010) goes on to argue that these ideological positions will translate into
more militarist foreign policies for right-wing governments, and left-parties will be more
accommodative. This is an important and possibly misleading assumption as left-wing
governments may very well be belligerent depending on what foreign policy issue they have to
deal with. What I argue, on the other hand, relaxes this assumption and looks at whether these
ideological differences lead to deadlocks or an increased propensity to commit. Hence, my
approach provides a more generalizable conclusion about the conditions under which
governments behave more committed.
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consequences of their international commitments despite the ideological differences inside them.
If not, accounting for the ideological disparities among coalition parties will reveal whether
responsibility gets more diffused under certain conditions, such as where the government enjoys
a high level of ideological similarity, or congruence. In sum, even though previous studies point
out the importance of ideology in policy outputs at the domestic as well as the international level,
the precise effect of the overall ideological divergence among the players on foreign policy
behavior is still unknown, and this is the first caveat of the existing studies. Addressing this gap
constitutes one of the major contributions of this project.
A second caveat in the existing studies concerns explicating the mathematical
composition of governments in parliamentary regimes. How can we differentiate governments,
particularly coalitions, to capture their peculiarities? Two alternatives exist in the literature that
uses (a) the number of parties to suggest that the higher the number of parties in a government,
the bigger the coalition, and (b) the parliamentary seat percentage of the government parties to
suggest that the strength of the coalition increases with its seat share in the parliament.
Neither of these alternatives correctly captures the ways in which political parties
contribute to the strength and stability of their governments vis-à-vis the parliament. First, using
the parliamentary seat share of a coalition to measure its strength (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008, see
also Kaarbo 2012) is particularly misleading in proportional representation contexts, where
parties are more disciplined and ideologically coherent (Leblang and Chan 2003). For instance,
we know from Denmark, a country that uses proportional representation, that “all coalitions are
based on the understanding that…party cohesion is generally very high” (Damgaard 2000: 246,
emphasis added). The Danish example suggests that an individual-based measure such as the seat
percentage of government parties in parliament will be inadequate in capturing coalition strength
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since individual MPs belonging to the same party are expected to vote in the same direction.
Counting the MPs to measure the coalition’s parliamentary strength (say, towards voting for a
legislative bill) is irrelevant, in other words, if we know that party unity will compel all MPs
from the same party to reject the proposal. In these contexts, therefore, counting the parties
provides a better measure for coalition strength than counting the MPs.
Having said that, using the number of parties independently is not a clear indicator of
coalition strength either—the number of parties in a government does not always tell us whether
it is a majority government or not, or whether it is able to survive defections. One can easily
observe in the post-Cold War period that minority coalitions can be composed of two parties in
countries such as Ireland and Denmark or as many as seven parties in Italy. While the partybased approach to measuring coalition size assumes that ‘more is better,’ many contradictory
cases also exist, suggesting that one should go beyond a simple indicator of government number
of parties to measure coalition strength. What is most critical for coalitions, in fact, is how
parties and their seat shares in parliament together contribute to the overall strength and stability
of the government.
Indeed, even foreign policy scholars admit that “that the main difference is between
coalitions with the minimal number of parties required for a parliamentary majority (“minimal
winning”) and those with either too few (“undersized cabinets”) or more (“oversized coalitions”)
members than are necessary” (Clare 2010: 968), as they refer to Comparativist work by Riker
(1962) and Dodd (1976). What would benefit Comparative Foreign Policy scholars, then, is to
frame the discussion around the conventional typologies so that their findings resonate with the
similar work done in Comparative Politics both theoretically and empirically that facilitates
generalizations. It is for this reason that in contrast with the above alternatives to explicate
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coalitions such as looking at the parliamentary seat share of a coalition or the number of parties it
has, here it is proposed that we adopt the categories that are used in Comparative Politics
research—namely minority, minimum winning, and oversized (also known as “surplus
majority”) coalitions (Lijphart 1999). Table 2.1 below illustrates this point more clearly with an
example.

Parties in Government
Tweede Kamer (150 seats)

PvdA

VVD

D66

Total Seat Share

Coalition I: Wim Kok (1994-1998)

24.6%

20.6%

16.0%

61.3%

Coalition II: Wim Kok (1999-2002)

30.0%

26.0%

9.3%

65.3%

Table 2.1 Why Coalition Types Matter, the Netherlands

Wim Kok, the Dutch premier, was fortunate enough to get reelected consecutively
between 1994 and 2002 with the same coalition partners, the Labour Party (PvdA), the Liberal
Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and the Democrats (D66). Moreover, these three
parties captured almost the same percentage of seats in the parliament in 1994 and in 1999, as
Table 2.1 shows.
Is anything fundamentally different between these two governments? If we measured
coalition size and strength by following the existing literature, we would find no difference:
these governments have the same number of parties as well as almost identical parliamentary
seat shares. What still makes them significantly different, however, is how each of these parties
contributes to the stability of the government. While Coalition I requires the presence of all three
parties to maintain parliamentary majority, therefore making it a ‘minimum winning’ coalition,
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Coalition II could have done just as well without the D66 in the government given the combined
seat shares of the PvdA and VVD, suggesting that it is now an ‘oversized coalition.’ By the same
token, while D66 could enjoy its veto player position in Coalition I and threaten the government
with defection, it loses this bargaining power in Coalition II, which is expected to influence the
policy outputs.
Therefore, unpacking coalitions provides a dynamic conceptualization of governments
based not only on the number of parties or whether the coalition holds parliamentary majority or
not, but on how coalition parties contribute to the coalition’s overall parliamentary strength and
help cushion it against defections. This approach first and foremost refines the veto players
perspective as it relaxes the assumption that the influence of veto players will be constant across
all coalitional settings, regardless of the fact that some coalition types (e.g. oversized coalitions)
are formed specifically to inhibit the influence of these players, since no extra party can veto the
government altogether in an oversized coalition. As the second Wim Kok government in the
Netherlands illustrates, oversized governments constitute a special type of coalition where the
participation of several parties strengthen the government in the parliament while circumventing
the veto potential of the smaller partners.
Investigating the specific types of coalitions also helps refine the clarity of responsibility
approach: do all multiparty governments blur the lines of responsibility, or do some coalitions
enjoy a greater ability to diffuse responsibility among its partners? A closer, more nuanced look
at governments can reveal whether responsibility gets more diffused under certain coalitional
configurations like those which include more parties than necessary. This approach encourages
us to test whether the diffusion theory simply works as long as there is a multiparty government
or when this government maintains a strong and stable majority in the parliament.
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The expectations of the veto players and clarity of responsibility theories are still
primarily concerned with majority coalitions, however. If the government holds only 50 per cent
or fewer of the seats in the parliament, one could argue that whether or not it includes one or
several parties does not necessarily mean more or less freedom in decision-making and
consequently, more or less intense commitments. In fact, many scholars argue that the
parliamentary weakness of minority governments leaves them at the “mercy of the legislature”
(Lijphart 1999), constrains policymaking, and translates into “moderate policy” (Clare 2010;
Hagan 1993; Ireland and Gartner 2001; Maoz and Russett 1993; Vowles 2010). Therefore, the
two theories remain less relevant for coalitions which hold minority status in parliament.
Adopting a “size” perspective would be far more suitable to account for these governments.18
Ultimately, the fine-grained approach proposed in this dissertation calls for revisiting the
existing studies in foreign policy analysis. For instance, Auerswald (1999: 477) argues that
“coalition premiers will only reluctantly use force, as they must pay particular attention to
achieving immediate success or risk a parliamentary revolt, especially if the governing coalition
18

However, not all scholars find minority coalitions to be doomed to parliamentary weakness.
Strom (1997: 56) describes minority governments as “majority governments in disguise” since
they receive outside support from the parliament without actually holding any portfolios.
Lijphart (1999: 104) goes even further to argue that “it makes the most sense, both theoretically
and practically, to treat minority cabinets like oversized coalitions.” To the extent that minority
governments are treated as majority governments, these scholars suggest that one can continue to
treat explanations of coalition behavior at the domestic as well as the international level as
equally applicable to all government types.
Empirically, this is hardly plausible. If minority coalitions truly resembled majority
coalitions, let alone oversized coalitions, in their ability to make policy, one would expect their
durations to resemble too. We know, however, that minority coalitions are a lot less durable than
majority coalitions. Conrad and Golder (2010: 131) show that in post-Cold War Central and
Eastern Europe, the average duration of minority coalitions were 364 days whereas for surplus
(oversized) coalitions it was 608 days. In other words, surplus coalitions have been almost twice
as durable as minority coalitions, attesting to the structural weaknesses of minority coalitions in
policy-making as well as execution. This is why we should study them as they are, as a separate
category of cases.
41

is fragile” (emphasis added). What fragility entails, however, remains vague. Coalition fragility
can emanate from its mathematical or ideological setup, or both. Coalitions might be fragile and
constrained if they do not enjoy safe majorities such as those enjoyed by oversized coalitions, in
which there is at least one party that “can be removed with the remaining members still
controlling a majority of seats” (Carrubba and Volden 2004: 526), implying a weaker or even
non-existent veto power for some of the junior parties.
Having said that, oversized coalitions may also suffer from “policymaker’s blocks” when
the ideological differences among the governing parties are hard to reconcile, which make these
coalitions even harder to maintain and can even gradually make them fragile. For instance,
Israel’s oversized coalition under Ariel Sharon weakened and ultimately dissolved as the nonpivotal coalition partners initially began to leave the coalition as a reaction to Sharon’s 2005
proposal to dismantle the settlements in Gaza (Spruyt 2009). Kaarbo’s (1996a) case study also
shows that the oversized coalition led by Yitzhak Shamir had been stuck in a deadlock for three
weeks over the issue of the 1989 peace initiatives.
Multi-party governments might also be formed as minimum winning coalitions, where
the defection of at least one party leads to the government’s loss of parliamentary majority. The
ideological positions of parties should also matter in a minimum winning coalition, where each
party is a pivotal actor with the ability to credibly threaten to leave the government (Clare 2010).
Ideologically incongruent coalitions may be either deadlocked as pivotal players oppose policy
change and possibly cause the government to dissolve, or they may choose to act in a way that
requires less commitment in order not to antagonize any coalition partner. The Dutch NATO
cruise missile case introduced earlier in Chapter 1 is an example: since the governing parties at
the time could not agree, they chose to postpone the deployment of the missiles.
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Ideological composition is also critical for minority coalitions, even though the existing
discussions and the empirical support against the capacity of minority coalitions to execute
policy, one of which is to engage in international commitments, continue to disregard this
component of government composition.
The lack of emphasis on the ideological composition of minority coalitions is surprising
given the exciting research implications of existing theoretical works on governments and
oppositions in parliaments. For instance, Hagan (1993: 83, emphasis added) argues that “like the
regime’s itself, strength of party opposition depends upon its internal cohesiveness. If a sizeable
number of opposition seats are controlled by different parties, then it is less likely that they will
be able (or even willing) to work together to mount an effective assault on the regime [sic] and
its policies.”
One scenario where this is possible is a minority coalition, where the opposition controls
the majority of the parliamentary seats. The question is, how can one make sure that the
opposition seats belong to parties as far away and different from each other as possible?
The answer lies in the composition of the minority coalition: to the extent that the
ideological composition of the minority coalition leaves the opposition fragmented, the
government will enjoy the room to embark upon foreign policy commitments, while the
opposition parties remain without the ideological incentive to stand against the government’s
actions. In Comparative Politics research, Laver and Budge (1992) discuss this phenomenon by
using the term “policy viability.” The authors argue that so long as “there is no majority
legislative coalition that prefers an alternative,” a minority coalition that includes the core party
will not be defeated by the parliament (1992: 5). The government will be policy viable, in other
words, “if its policy position is such that there is no alternative executive coalition that can put
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forward a credible policy position that is preferred to the incumbent by a majority of legislators”
(Laver and Budge 1992: 6). Therefore, explicating government types and their ideological
cohesion refines the veto players and clarity of responsibility theories, as well as the size
perspective and unpacks the structural conditions that affect the intensity of international
commitments.

Hypotheses
The above discussion brings me to the hypotheses. First, I replicate a previous research that uses
minority governments19 and coalitions as the main independent variables (Kaarbo and Beasley
2008). As argued earlier in this chapter, there is a general consensus on minority governments
that their parliamentary weakness makes them vulnerable vis-à-vis the opposition (Lijphart
1999), impedes policymaking, and results in “moderate policy” (Frognier 1993, Hagan 1993,
Maoz and Russett 1993, Ireland and Gartner 2001, Clare 2010, Vowles 2010). The arithmetic
disadvantage of minority governments leads to the expectation that they will engage in less
committed international behavior than majority governments.
Hypothesis 1: Due to their size vulnerability, minority governments will be negatively
associated with commitment intensity.
Second, the contending theories lead to two opposing hypotheses. If the veto players
theory explains coalition foreign policy behavior, then it is expected that all coalitions will be
negatively associated with commitment intensity. If the mechanism is the clarity of
responsibility, however, then the relationship must be positive.

19

Minority governments can be composed of one or many parties.
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Hypothesis 2a: All coalition governments will be negatively associated with commitment
intensity (veto player approach).
Hypothesis 2b: All coalition governments will be positively associated with commitment
intensity in their international behavior (clarity of responsibility approach).
The above expectations, however, neither account for the extent of ideological
disagreements among the coalition parties nor the government type to explicitly evaluate the two
approaches. The next two hypotheses refine the clarity of responsibility approach by bringing in
these variables. First, if responsibility always gets diffused in multiparty majority governments
and leads to a greater ability to commit, then all types of majority coalitions should have a
positive effect on commitment intensity, even when ideological differences are controlled for.
Hypothesis 3a: After controlling for ideological differences, both oversized coalitions
and minimum winning coalitions will have a positive relationship with commitment
intensity.
However, by definition, oversized coalitions include more parties than necessary
compared to minimum winning coalitions.20 If responsibility gets more diffused in coalitions
with more parties, then oversized coalitions should have a stronger positive association with
commitment intensity than minimum winning coalitions while controlling for ideological
differences. It will be safe to conclude that diffusion is not the best mechanism to explain
commitment intensity across majority coalitions if Hypotheses 3a and 3b are not supported.
Hypothesis 3b: After controlling for ideological differences, oversized coalitions will
engage in more committed behavior than minimum winning coalitions.

20

For the present dataset, the correlation coefficient for minimum winning coalitions and number
of parties is 0.18; for oversized coalitions it is 0.41. On average, minimum winning coalitions
have 2.7, oversized coalitions have 3.9 parties.
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The next two hypotheses refine the veto players approach by testing the interaction
between coalition types and ideological cohesion. The veto players theory expects that majority
coalitions will be negatively associated with commitment intensity—especially when governing
parties share lower levels of ideological affinity. Thus, at increasing levels of ideological
disunity, oversized coalitions should be negatively associated with commitment intensity
compared to single-party majority governments. Similarly, minimum winning coalitions should
also be negatively associated with commitment intensity compared to single-party majority
governments, as ideological disagreements increase among the coalition partners
Hypothesis 4a: At increasing levels of ideological disunity inside the government,
oversized coalitions will be negatively associated with commitment intensity compared to
single-party majority governments.
Hypothesis 4b: At increasing levels of ideological disunity inside the government,
minimum winning coalitions will be negatively associated with commitment intensity
compared to single-party majority governments.
Finally, I use the size perspective to explain the commitment behavior of minority
coalitions. If minority coalitions are at a constant parliamentary disadvantage due to their size,
they must have a negative effect on commitment intensity regardless of the extent of ideological
differences inside them.
Hypothesis 5a: Minority coalitions will be negatively associated with commitment
intensity regardless of the ideological differences among the coalition parties.
However, if minority coalitions are formed so that they leave the parliamentary
opposition ideologically fragmented, then they will be able to pursue more committed
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international behavior than single-party majority governments, as expected by Hagan (1993) and
the policy viability (Laver and Budge 1992) explanation.
Hypothesis 5b: If minority coalitions can ideologically fragment the parliamentary
opposition, they will be positively associated with commitment intensity compared to
single-party majority governments.

Alternative Explanations of Foreign Policy Behavior
It is argued in the literature that the ‘size’ and the ‘ideology’ dimensions of coalitions “form the
core of the coalition theory” (Hagan et al. 2001: 175). This provides strong analytical leverage
for the theoretical framework introduced in this chapter, which builds precisely on these
dimensions to unpack coalitions in order to assess the effects of government composition on the
intensity of international commitments.
Even though the present work provides the much-needed attention to detail in the
parliamentary executives as suggested by Hagan et al. (2001) to study their foreign policy
behavior, it is important to proceed with caution: this approach hardly sweeps the many other
alternative explanations that exist in the literature on foreign policy behavior. It is certainly
plausible to expect that factors other than the size of the coalition and policy incongruence
among its partners contribute to explaining why certain governments make more intense
commitments in their international relations than others. These factors may provide the linkage
mechanisms, or perform as the inhibiting/reinforcing/facilitating conditions, that explicate the
relationships between government composition and commitment intensity. This section provides
a discussion of some of these alternative explanations that exist in the literature, whose
expectations will be evaluated with qualitative analyses in Chapters 5 and 6.
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One alternative explanation that Hagan et al. (2001: 175) discuss is the “willingness of
one group to accept side payments” (also see Browne and Frendreis 1980, Hinckley 1981) in
return for support for other policy proposals. Logrolling among political parties has been
frequently introduced to explain how governments overcome policy deadlocks by offering sidepayments to defecting actors, such as promises of support for future policies (Hagan 1993: 221,
also see Kaarbo 1996b). Logrolling might also lead to more committed international behavior
than otherwise anticipated (such as overexpansion), when parties yield to each other’s more
ambitious preferences (Snyder 1991) for future payoffs.
Kaarbo’s (1996b) work on coalition foreign policy provides useful insights on how
parties benefit from logrolling. She focuses on the influence of junior partners in “logrolling
coalitions,” where these smaller parties can get what they want by using their ability to “hijack”
foreign policy decision-making process (Kaarbo 1996b: 502) as they have the ability to dissolve
the government by withdrawal (Clare 2010). Logrolling could therefore be a mechanism
frequently used in minimum winning coalitions where parties, each of which is a veto player,
consent to each other’s preferences for future payoffs in their own preferred direction. Similarly,
these parties could also yield to each other’s preferences merely for the sake of remaining in
power, i.e. for government survival. Besides minimum winning coalitions, logrolling could also
work for minority coalitions as the latter could overcome their size vulnerability in the
parliament by cooperating with extra-governmental political parties and offering them sidepayments in exchange for their support for a proposed foreign policy commitment.
Another alternative explanation that finds emphasis in the literature concerns the
“existence of consensus-making norms” (Hagan et al. 2001: 175), such as those which used to
dominate the Dutch political system (Baylis 1989). Decision-making environments that are
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characterized by norms that appreciate consensus among policymakers may alleviate the
governmental constraints which may otherwise have impeded the government’s ability to
commit in international relations. Minority coalitions may still work with the opposition parties
towards building a broader parliamentary support base for their proposed foreign policy
commitment if the consensus-making norms are already embedded in the political system.
Similarly, minimum winning coalitions may be able to steer clear of crises if the political system
has traditionally favored consensus politics.
The literature also debates whether public opinion can influence foreign policy behavior.
Some scholars argue that public opinion hardly affects foreign policy and if anything, the
relationship takes place in the opposite direction such that foreign policy influences public
opinion instead (Leeds and Davis 1997: 817). In his study on how governments fulfill their
commitments once they verbally bind themselves, Lantis finds that public support is not an
explanation for sustaining commitments (1997: 197). Others qualify this claim by explaining
how public support has to be specific and focused on the foreign policy issue to have influence
on government behavior (Kaarbo 1996a: 268). Pointing out the difficulties of measuring the
effects of public opinion empirically, Everts and Van Staden argue that “public opinion is only
one of the factors shaping the outcome of the political process, and one cannot easily isolate the
impact of one factor from that of others” (1986: 125). It is thus plausible to expect that public
opinion should have some kind of direct, or, more realistically, indirect effect on governments.
Governments are expected not to pursue those international behaviors if the public shows
considerable opposition to the idea.
Threat to the survival of the regime is another alternative explanation that could outweigh
the effects of government composition on international commitments. Auerswald (1999: 470)
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argues that while coalitions should be less likely to use force than single-party majority
governments, this “should hold true as long as the national survival of the democracy is not
threatened.” Metselaar and Verbeek (1997: 109) also argue that disagreements will be pushed
aside and partners will work together to reach consensus when survival is at stake. For instance,
during one of the most volatile time periods in Turkish politics, an extremely fragile two-party
government comprising the centre-right True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi) and the social
democratic Republican People’s Party (CHP) put their continuous infighting aside to respond to
the Kardak crisis. When a Turkish ship accidentally hit an islet called Kardak (Imia) on the
Aegean Sea in December 1995, the tense relations between Greece and Turkey were further
jeopardized, initiating claims of sovereignty on the islet from both sides. The Turkish
government showed notable cohesiveness and soon declared that Kardak was within its
sovereign jurisdiction (Migdalovitz 1996: 1) and even deployed naval troops (Cumhuriyet,
2014)—a form of highly intense international commitment—despite the tough relationship
between its two governing parties. In other words, threats to the regime21 and to national survival
should be taken into account as environmental conditions that can influence the foreign policy
commitments of any government, regardless of its size or ideological composition.
Finally, the influence of strong political leaders finds emphasis in the literature as an
alternative explanation. The leader’s special interest in the issue (Hermann, Preston, Korany and
Shaw 2001, Kaarbo and Hermann 1998), her previous experience in that foreign policy area, or

21

Domestic economic deterioration, another source of threat to government survival, might also
overcome the constraints on decision-making caused by government composition. This time, in
an effort to divert attention away from home, a declining trend in the economy might encourage
governments to engage in committed behavior at the international level (DeRouen 1995,
Fordham 1998). Indeed, Brule and Williams (2009: 777) argue that minority governments “are
more likely to initiate disputes when faced with poor economic conditions, because these
executives are likely to face resistance to remedial economic policy.”
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her psychological traits (Hermann 2005) are some of the individual-level factors that might go
alongside the effects of government composition in explaining foreign policy behavior. Lantis
(1997) explains, for example, that Helmut Schmidt’s leadership was a key factor in explaining
Germany’s decision to join the European Monetary System in 1978, when he was leading a
coalition government comprising the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. Beyond
Europe, Kuperman (2001: 24) looks at the foreign policies of Israeli coalitions in the 1950s to
argue that the prime minister’s position prevailed in foreign policy over those of other ministers
or the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).
Further, “the strong tendency for a contraction of authority to the highest levels of
government” during international crises (Hermann et al. 2001) could also push leaders to
overcome the institutional constraints imposed by the government’s size and ideological
composition, resulting in leader-driven behaviors at the international level. In sum, it is important
to consider whether key leaders in foreign policy (such as prime ministers or foreign ministers)
show significant efforts to challenge the government-level constraints to achieve certain foreign
policy decisions, such as the commitments to participate in international operations.
The discussion presented in this section suggests that with the exception of public
opinion22 and political leadership,23 most of these factors are difficult to quantify and integrate in
the statistical analyses of foreign policy behavior. Furthermore, the literature suggests that these
22

Even though public opinion ratings are far easier to incorporate in quantitative datasets than
the other alternative variables discussed here, it still requires a considerable amount of time and
resources to track the public opinion ratings for all the governments in the 30 European countries
included in the analysis and match these ratings to the time-stamped international events
analyzed in the quantitative component of this dissertation. Therefore, I consider public opinion
as an alternative explanation in the qualitative analyses rather than in the quantitative.
23
Hermann’s (2005) Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is an exception. By adopting contentanalytic approaches to measure leader traits such as openness to information, distrust of others or
attitudes toward constraints, leadership styles can be quantified and incorporated in statistical
analyses.
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factors often act as conditioning or intervening variables as opposed to having independent
effects on foreign policy behaviors, which further complicates the task of estimating their effects
quantitatively. Therefore, given the nature of these variables, their effects can be best traced by
utilizing qualitative methodologies, which is discussed at greater length in Chapter 3.

Conclusion
It has been suggested in Chapter 1 that as it shifts the focus from actor-general to actor-specific
explanations, the field of Comparative Foreign Policy provides a window of opportunity to build
bridges between International Relations and other fields in Political Science, particularly
Comparative Politics, to investigate the behavior of democracies in international politics. As
such, theories of Comparative Foreign Policy aspire to bring domestic-level variables toward
building a multilevel explanation, while its methods emphasize systematic and rigorous scientific
analysis. With the understanding that achieving theoretical depth while maintaining
methodological rigor inevitably leads to less-than-universal explanations, this chapter has offered
a theoretical framework for studying coalition foreign policy that is temporally limited to Cold
War, spatially limited to Europe, and institutionally limited to parliamentary democracies.
Within these boundaries, however, the framework stands as theoretically the most detailed
explanation in the literature while still suitable for methodologically rigorous empirical testing.
It has been discussed in this chapter that the literature on the effects of government
composition on the foreign policy differences in parliamentary systems has largely remained
inconclusive over whether single-party governments are less constrained than multi-party
coalitions in their international endeavors. The precise effect of the government’s size in the
parliament—whether it commands parliamentary majority or not—has also not yet been clarified
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in the literature. Most importantly, the ways in which the ideological diversity of parties in a
government affects its foreign policy behavior has not been systematically investigated in the
literature.
This chapter has argued that this research program can be invigorated by incorporating
two major Comparative Politics theories: the veto players and the clarity of responsibility
approaches, and has emphasized that they perform exceptionally well to theoretically frame the
debate over government composition in the foreign policy literature. The chapter has also
argued, however, that they must be further refined to truly explicate the relationship between
coalition governments and the intensity of their international commitments.
To undertake this task, the chapter has proposed two distinct but mutually important
components of government composition: (i) the mathematical organization of parties in the
government that yields the government type (specifically, the types of coalitions), and (ii) the
ideological organization of parties in the government that yields its policy incongruence—whose
operationalizations will be discussed in Chapter 3 at greater length.
Based on these two key components of government composition in parliamentary
regimes, the hypotheses presented here are designed to capture the independent as well as the
interactive effects of these variables on the dependent variable, that is, commitment intensity,
with the objective that the findings will help refine the explanatory power of Comparative
Politics theories on foreign policy behavior. This way, one should be able to not only uncover the
precise governmental conditions under which governments act more committed at the
international level, but also shed light on how the coalition theories explained in this chapter
have differential explanatory powers for the study of foreign policy behavior.
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This chapter has also cautioned the reader against tunnel vision. While the two major
dimensions—size and ideology—of coalition theory in Comparative Politics provide the building
blocks of the ‘government composition’ explanation introduced in this chapter to unpack none
other than the coalition governments themselves, it is also critical to acknowledge that several
alternative explanations exist in the literature on foreign policy behavior. Therefore, in order to
strengthen the analytical vigor of the ‘government composition’ explanation, this chapter has
also offered a discussion of some of these alternative explanations. This discussion has also
illustrated that these explanations are not necessarily confined to the domestic-level, that foreign
policy behavior can be studied by utilizing multiple levels of analysis: individual-level factors
such as political leadership can be just as important to influence foreign policy behavior as
logrolling, or threats to national survival.
Together with its central and alternative components, the theoretical discussion presented
here offers a multicausal, multilevel framework of coalition politics as prescribed by the
Comparative Foreign Policy scholarship to explain the international commitments of post-Cold
War parliamentary democracies in Europe. The next chapter explains the multi-method research
strategy adopted in the dissertation to test the explanatory capacity of this theoretical framework.
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CHAPTER 3

A MULTI-METHOD APPROACH TO STUDYING
COALITION FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

This dissertation offers a theoretical framework to explain the international commitment
intensity of parliamentary democracies by focusing on the mathematical and ideological
composition of governments in these regimes. As Chapter 2 has discussed in detail, this
explanation intends to resolve the existing dilemma in the literature on whether single-party
governments are more or less constrained than coalition governments in their capacity to act at
the international level.
The most efficient way to solve this puzzle is to utilize quantitative methodologies. By
employing rigorous statistical methods, the effects of the key government composition variables
on commitment intensity can be tested across a large number of cases of foreign policy behavior.
In effect, quantitative analysis can provide the big picture in a parsimonious fashion: it can
highlight the size and the direction of the correlation between government composition variables
and commitment intensity, and therefore help clarify whether the dichotomous understanding of
governments in parliamentary systems is adequate to study their foreign policy behavior. If not,
quantitative analysis can show us how government types and policy incongruence drive
commitment intensity in different directions.
Solving this dilemma is not enough, however, to comprehensively demonstrate the
explanatory power of the ‘government composition’ approach. In other words, statistical
relationships alone are inadequate to argue that any variation in the commitment intensity of a
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government is the direct outcome of a change in its composition. To make that case, the
mechanisms through which government composition affect the intensity of commitments in
these regimes should be revealed.
To explicate these mechanisms, it is necessary to take a closer look at foreign policy
behavior by adopting qualitative approaches. By utilizing in-depth studies of a small number of
cases, qualitative analysis helps uncover the mechanisms that justify the relationship between
government composition and international commitments.
The need to engage with both of these avenues of analysis to establish the explanatory
power of the ‘government composition’ approach brings me to ‘multi-method’ research. Multimethod approaches, namely “the idea of nested designs, the iterated use of qualitative and
quantitative methods, and the role of qualitative anomalies in reorienting quantitative research”
(Collier and Elman 2008: 782) advocate the interactive use of multiple methodologies to solve
research puzzles and test the explanatory capacity of theoretical contributions.
This dissertation adopts a multi-method research design to study the effects of
government composition on international commitments. The multi-method approach offers an
effective methodological toolbox that helps achieve both cross-national generalizations on the
effects of government composition on international commitments as well as explicate the
mechanisms that link these factors to each other.
The present chapter provides a detailed discussion of this effort by illuminating the
quantitative and qualitative research design trajectories of the project. First, it presents an
account of the quantitative trajectory that has been developed to test the key relationship of
interest—that between government composition and international commitments. This
quantitative component incorporates a large-N foreign policy events dataset of 30 European

56

parliamentary systems from the post-Cold War period, between 1994 and 2004. It is designed to
provide the size and the direction of the independent and interactive effects of the key
government composition variables on the intensity of international commitments. The
quantitative component of the research design, in other words, helps model the relationship
between government composition and international commitments in bigger, more generalizable
terms, which will be demonstrated with a series of multilevel regression analyses in Chapter 4.
Next, the present chapter introduces the qualitative trajectory. This trajectory employs a
small-N approach to comparatively analyze the Danish decisions to participate in the 1990 war in
the Gulf and the 2003 war in Iraq, as well as the Dutch decision to support the 2003 war in Iraq,
which will be presented in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. The main purpose of the qualitative
research design component is to complement the systematized empirical tests and scrutinize the
resulting parsimonious relationships with in-depth inquiries that explicate the mechanisms that
link the composition of governments in these states to their political and material commitments
in international military operations.
Furthermore, the qualitative component evaluates the alternative explanations discussed
in Chapter 2 such as logrolling, political leadership, public opinion or threats to national survival,
many of which “turn on key conditions that evolve during policy-making” and can be evaluated
“only with a case study approach” (Kaarbo 2012: 11, emphasis added). In effect, the case
analyses also help demonstrate how the ‘government composition’ explanation performs against
the alternative explanations that are discussed frequently in the literature.
Ultimately, the qualitative component contextualizes the relationship between
government composition and international commitments to explicate the facilitating, inhibiting,
or reinforcing factors at the international, domestic, or individual levels. As a result, the multi-
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method research design of the dissertation also strongly resonates with one of the major
objectives of Comparative Foreign Policy scholarship as discussed in Chapter 1—that we should
test the actor-specific theories of foreign policy with a multicausal, multilevel analytical
approach.
In order to develop a multicausal, multilevel analysis of commitment intensity while
maintaining a balance between nuance and parsimony, it is undoubtedly necessary to scale the
explanatory scope of the project. As argued extensively in Chapter 1, this dissertation does it
with a research design whose boundaries are defined by post-Cold War European parliamentary
systems, specifically between 1994 and 2004. These limitations are by no means weaknesses,
however. Confining the analysis to Europe helps control for geographical, economic and
institutional variation in a region that is almost exclusively governed by parliamentary
governments. This leaves greater room to test the effects of other explanations of foreign policy
behavior. Furthermore, foreign policy has become an important agenda item for these regimes
especially after the demise of the Soviet Union and with the rise of the European integration
process, not to mention the ethnic crises in the Balkans that produced two regional wars during
this period and resulted in a number of territorial rearrangements. In this sense, post-Cold War
Europe provides a fruitful setting to design a multicausal, multilevel study that examines the
international commitments of parliamentary regimes.
Ultimately, the multi-method research design that will be explained in the remainder of
this chapter provides a testing ground to assess why and how each method contributes to our
knowledge of the effects of government composition on foreign policy behavior. In effect, it
offers a window of opportunity to take the research agenda to the next level by encouraging us to
learn from the nuances of the case studies and to think about new ways to apply them to
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improved quantitative tests in the future. Therefore, the multi-method approach offered here
becomes a useful design fit to carry out the Rosenau-Kegley prescription on formulating
bounded, mid-range theories of foreign policy, an example of which is the present study. It
provides an efficient methodological strategy to respond to the dilemma between “grand unified
theories” and “microlevel detail” that Comparative Foreign Policy scholarship aspires to resolve
(Hudson and Vore 1995).
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first two sections provide the general framework
for both quantitative and qualitative components. Specifically, the first section explains how the
key independent variables, government types and policy incongruence, were developed. The
second section discusses the operationalization and measurement of the dependent variable,
namely ‘commitment intensity,’ which stems from the notion of the ‘foreign policy event.’ The
chapter then moves on to explaining the quantitative component of the research design in the
third section by presenting the foreign policy events dataset, as well as the specific dependent,
independent and the control variables that will be used in the regression analyses. The fourth
section includes a discussion of the existing regression modeling approaches and their
weaknesses, and explains the multilevel estimation approach that will be utilized for the
quantitative component. Next, the chapter will move on to the qualitative component of the
research design. The three sections in this component will respectively discuss the case selection
strategies, the method of structured-focused comparison (George 1979) utilized for the case
analyses, and variable specifications. The chapter will conclude with an overview of the multimethod strategy and concluding thoughts.
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Measuring Government Composition
This dissertation argues that the government type and the extent of ideological differences
among government parties constitute the two major dimensions to specify the executive structure
in parliamentary regimes, and therefore they are the key domestic politics factors in explaining
their commitment intensity at the international level. As argued in the previous chapters, this is a
significant departure from the existing studies in the literature that focus on the dichotomy
between single-party and multi-party governments (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008). This section
provides a methodological account of how these key variables were conceptualized and
operationalized.

i.

Government Types

The first key component of the coalition politics framework introduced in this dissertation
concern the government types that are observed in European parliamentary systems. In order to
identify the government types and their frequencies during the post-Cold War period specified in
this dissertation, it is first necessary to decide when to count, or code for, a new government.
Following Lijphart (1984), a new government is coded whenever any of the following four
conditions was met:
(i)

When there is a new parliamentary election,

(ii)

When there is a new Prime Minister, even though the party composition of the
coalition stays the same,

(iii)

When the party composition of the coalition changes (a party leaves the coalition
and/or a new one joins),
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(iv)

When the Prime Minister or the cabinet resigns, but is reinstated by the Head of State
(see also Warwick, 1992; Browne, Gleiber and Mashoba, 1984).

Although the above rules capture the majority of conditions under which government
change occurs during the 1994-2004 period in Europe that this study primarily focuses on, some
conditions are still left outside of their scope.24 For instance, it is meaningful to expect that
governments which act as caretaker bodies no longer engage in policymaking in the same way as
a government that continues its electoral mandate. While the rules listed above account for the
physical changes in government, they do not consider the psychological changes that arise from
being an elected government towards becoming a temporarily appointed government (i.e.
caretaker). To fill this gap, the following rule was included in the coding procedure.
(v)

When the party composition of the government stays the same, but the government is
designated as caretaker according to the Economist Intelligence Unit reports, a new
government is coded.

24

It is important to account for those instances which alter the parliamentary strength of the
government, such as massive resignations from a coalition party due to intra-party
disagreements, for instance. Accounting for this intra-party shock is critical since, as it will be
discussed in detail below, this project assumes that parties are unitary actors. Massive
resignations signal that the party suffers from severe internal disagreements, which challenges
this assumption. Coding the government as a new government following the departure of a
sizeable number of MPs from a coalition party adjusts for high levels of intra-party factionalism.
Thus, when the government loses its parliamentary strength significantly due to massive
resignations from MPs who belong to a government party, it is coded as a new government.
There is, however, only one instance in the quantitative dataset that falls into this category: 63
MPs from the Turkish Democratic Left Party (DSP) resigned in July 2002, during a DSP-led
tripartite coalition in Turkey. The total seat share of the government decreased from 64 percent
to 52 percent, and the DSP seats decreased from 136 to 73, making the party the smallest
coalition partner.
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Several quantitative and qualitative sources were used to build the government
composition data according to the rules above. For the data on the seat shares of governments
and parties, Parliament and Government Composition Database (Doering and Manow 2012), the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems’ ElectionGuide (www.electionguide.org), InterParliamentary Union’s Database of National Parliaments (www.ipu.org), Norwegian Social
Science Data Services (www.nsd.uib.no), and the Italian Ministry of the Interior were used.
These data were supplemented with an in-depth reading of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s
monthly reports on each of the 30 countries included in the analyses in order to locate the
moments and reasons of government change. Table 3.1 tabulates by country the governments
that are included in the analyses. It shows that some 136 governments served during this
decade.25

25

However, given their time periods in office, some governments have no recorded events in the
original King and Lowe (2003) data, such as Wolfgang Schuessel’s caretaker government that
served briefly between September 2002 and April 2003 or Mesut Yilmaz’s caretaker government
that served from November 1998 to November 1999. This not only stops one from treating the
dataset as a balanced cross-sectional time-series, but decreases the actual number of governments
that are used in the analyses to 136.
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Western Europe
Country
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

Number of
Governments
8
5
5
5
4
5
4
4
8
4
5
5
5
4
4
5
3

Central and Eastern Europe
Country
Albania
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Turkey

Number of
Governments
3
2
3
4
3
3
6
4
4
6
5
4
6

Table 3.1 Number of Governments in the Dataset, by Country

Now that the governments are coded, three alternatives exist in the literature to dissect
the variation among multi-party governments: using the number of parties or the parliamentary
seat share of the government as a continuous measure, or borrowing the coalition typology from
the Comparative Politics literature on coalition theory (Lijphart 1999) and using minority,
minimum winning, and oversized (i.e. surplus majority) coalitions as the main categorical types.
Using the coalition’s parliamentary seat share to measure its strength is misleading in
proportional representation contexts, where parties are more disciplined and ideologically
coherent (Leblang and Chan 2003). As Chapter 2 has also discussed extensively with the
example of the Wim Kok coalitions in the Netherlands between 1994 and 2002 (Table 2.1),
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using this measure can obscure the mathematical contribution of each party in the government.
Table 2.1 has also illustrated that neither does the number of parties in a government always
capture if it is a majority government, or more importantly, whether it is able to survive party
defections.
This dissertation therefore adopts the categorical grouping of coalitions instead of the
other two approaches to unpack coalitions. To record the types of governments included in the
analyses, the dissertation first and foremost defines single-party governments as including only
one party in government. Coalitions, on the other hand, are defined as governments that include
at least two political parties.
Parties that win joint seats in the elections are counted as single parties, such as the PRLFDF in 1999 and the CD&V-NVA in 2006 in Belgium, or the Italian party, Rose in the Fist
(RNP), which is in fact an alliance of RAD-SDI in 2006. Otherwise, parties that enjoy exclusive
seats in the parliament are counted separately.26 When coalitions include independent
parliamentarians that do not necessarily belong to a political party, I count their seats toward the
total number of seats the government has in the parliament, but these seats are not counted
towards any political party. Furthermore, political parties that are not formally included in the
government are not counted towards government composition, such as the Movimenta per la
Autonomie (MpA) in Silvio Berlusconi’s 2008 government, which supported the government
while remaining outside its formal framework.27
The next categories are defined to unpack government types further. Minority
government occupies 50 percent or less of the total seats in the parliament. Single-party minority
26

An example is the Christian Democratic Union – Christian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU) in
Germany, where CDU and CSU win seats separately in the elections.
27
In this sense, it can be argued that this project focuses on ‘executive coalitions,’ rather than
‘legislative coalitions’ (Laver and Budge 1992: 4).
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governments include one party and enjoy 50 percent or less of the parliamentary seats. Minority
coalition has 50 percent or less of the total number of seats in the parliament, but includes two or
more political parties. If a coalition loses its parliamentary majority even when the smallest
partner departs, it is defined as a Minimum winning coalition. In contrast, in Oversized coalitions
there is at least one party in government without which the government can still maintain its
parliamentary majority (Volden and Carrubba 2004).28
Table 3.2 reports the trends from the 136 governments that are used in the analyses. It
shows that oversized coalitions, for instance, are not necessarily populated with several parties.
There are oversized coalitions with two parties, such as the center-left MSZP-SZDSZ
government in Hungary between 1994 and 1998, led by Gyula Horn. Similarly, several parties
can join a coalition but fail to carry it towards parliamentary majority. A dramatic example is
Massimo D’Alema’s seven-party minority coalition in Italy, which had served for only four
months between December 1999 and April 2000.

28

Oversized represents coalitions that have extra parties than necessary to reach a parliamentary
majority. Thus, this study disagrees with previous research that defines most grand coalitions as
oversized coalitions (Kaarbo 1996b). Grand coalitions might be “oversized” as they command an
overwhelming majority (70-80% of the parliamentary seats). However, they are usually
technically minimum winning coalitions, where the departure of any partner leads to the
coalition’s loss of parliamentary majority. Austria’s ÖVP-SPÖ grand coalition is an example
(Lijphart 1999).
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No. of Parties in
Government

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Government
Types
Single-party
Minority

Single-party
Majority

x

x

Minority
Coalition
x
x
x

Minimum
Winning
Coalition
x
x
x
x

Oversized
Coalition
x
x
x
x
x

x
Table 3.2 Government Types and Number of Parties

The main advantage of using the categories of coalitions builds precisely on these two
points: not only do these categories capture whether a coalition holds parliamentary majority or
not, but also whether the coalition is stable enough to survive defections with the help of the
extra parties that cushion it. These categories are based not merely on the number of parties, but
on how these parties contribute to the coalition’s overall parliamentary strength and stability.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the utilization of the coalition typology does not
preclude the “number of parties in government” approach in the literature. For instance,
oversized coalitions, by definition, should include more parties than necessary compared to
minimum winning coalitions. Indeed, the government composition data used in this dissertation
show that the correlation coefficient for minimum winning coalitions and the number of parties
is 0.18; whereas for oversized coalitions it is 0.41. On average, minimum winning coalitions
have 2.7, and oversized coalitions have 3.9 parties.
Figure 3.1 shows how the 136 governments included in the analyses are distributed
across these five government types. The graph shows that minimum winning coalitions dominate
the European parliamentary scene in the 1994-2004 period.
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Figure 3.1 Types of Governments Included in the Analyses

ii.

Policy Incongruence

The second component of government composition concerns the extent of ideological
disagreements inside the government. Ideological disagreements can be defined as those
incompatibilities among the political parties of a government that arise from their policy
positions. These disagreements can be of high or low degree, depending on the relative locations
of the parties along the policy spectrum. To the extent that the parties are closer to each other, the
resulting coalition will be ideologically compact, or connected (Axelrod 1970). Otherwise, the
coalition will be ideologically loose. The diversity of ideological positions in a coalition is taken
as a measure of policy incongruence, or how much ideological disagreement exists in a
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government that might stop it from demonstrating committed foreign policy behavior. Alongside
the types of government discussed above, the extent of policy incongruence among the
governing parties constitutes the second major aspect of government composition in
parliamentary democracies.
Before discussing how the policy incongruence of a government is operationalized and
measured, however, two assumptions are in order. First, parties are assumed to be cohesive and
disciplined, so that they do not suffer from intraparty factionalism. In other words, single-party
governments are assumed to have no ideological disagreements. Second, this project assumes
that the ideological positions of government parties reflect a good measure of their respective
preferences in foreign policy. As such, Clare’s views are echoed here (2010: 971), who also
argues that “parties should take stances on foreign policy issues in general (…) that are
consistent with their ideological positions.” The expectation that follows this assumption is that
to the extent that government parties come from distant ideological backgrounds, they will have
more difficulty in finding a common ground to act committed at the international level.29
To measure policy incongruence in a government, first it is necessary to identify the
ideological positions of government parties. To do this, their general left-right policy positions
are utilized. Warwick (2011: 1677) contends that “although not all issue positions can be
adequately captured by it, left-right position represents by far the best single measure of overall
position.” In other words, in line with the starting assumption above on party position and

29

In other words, this project is not concerned with whether and how the overall ideological
position of a coalition leads to commitment. Previous studies certainly studied the level of
belligerence in foreign policy behavior by focusing on the left-right policy positions of the
coalitions (see Clare 2010, Palmer, London and Regan 2004), some of which have concluded
that the left-oriented governments were less belligerent. The intention of this study is instead to
demonstrate how the ideological differences inside a government translate into difficulties in
reaching those behavioral outcomes that communicate international commitments.
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foreign policy, this dissertation acknowledges that while the foreign policy positions of parties
cannot be directly inferred from their overall left-right ideological positions, these values are the
best available option that we have as researchers for discerning how far parties are located away
from each other in general that might in turn lead to differences in their foreign policy
preferences, which ultimately reach to the decision-making stage and influence how committed a
behavior the government can pursue internationally.
Laver and Hunt (1992) describe three ways in which we can determine the issue positions
of political parties: analyzing party documents, use of mass public opinion, or expert judgments
(see also Ray 1999: 284).
This study will use data from a variety of expert judgment datasets to identify the leftright ideological positions of political parties, mainly for two reasons. First, using expert
judgments in this study helps minimize the missing data problem. In contrast with the datasets
that use party manifestos to infer party positions—a prominent example of which is the
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Budge et al. 2001, Klingemann et al. 2006), some argue
that expert judgments are more advantageous resources since party manifestos may not be
available for smaller parties, which in turn exclude these parties from the dataset (Ray 1999:
284). Coalition governments, specifically oversized coalition governments, are supported with
smaller parties against dissolution. These parties, however, may not be caught by the CMP radar.
Examples include the Democratic Union for Integration party in Macedonia, which joined the
government coalition led by Prime Minister Branko Sekerinska, following the elections in
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September 2002.30 The breadth of coverage, therefore, is a foremost advantage of using expert
datasets for the purposes of this dissertation.
Second, expert judgments provide useful yardsticks that capture the general overview of
party positions, rather than dissecting the manifestos by content analysis and then manipulating
those analyses to create new variable constructs such as External Relations, which include rather
irrelevant measures such as Anti-Imperialism or Internationalism. The decision to code a party
with these terms, furthermore, is very much at the discretion of the coder who reads and analyzes
the manifestos, notwithstanding his or her prior training. Scholars who use expert judgments, on
the other hand, argue that “the great virtue of an expert survey is that it sets out to summarize the
judgments of the consensus of experts on the matters at issue, and moreover to do so in a
systematic way” (Benoit and Laver 2006: 9, emphasis in original).
Following the footsteps of the rich literature in Comparative Politics that use expert
surveys (Castles and Mair 1984, Huber and Inglehart 1995, Laver and Hunt 1992), this
dissertation uses three sets of expert survey data to measure the left-right ideological positions of
government parties: (a) Hix and Lord’s (1997) survey,31 which is also used by Ray (1999), as
well as the (b) 1999-2007 iterations of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) dataset (Hooghe et
al. 2010, Steenbergen and Marks 2007); (c) and for those countries which were not included in
either of these two data sources (such as Malta or Iceland), the data from Benoit and Laver
(2006) are used. Following Hooghe et al. (2010), parties that assume less than 5 on the left-right
scale are left-wing, and parties that assume 6 or more are right-wing parties. The CHES dataset
30

Furthermore, Marks et al. (2007) argue that “expert surveys are more consistent with the
evaluations of voters and parliamentarians than data currently available from party manifestos,”
thus making expert surveys a better measure of party positions in terms of reflecting the true
locations of parties along the political spectrum.
31
Since these data were included from Leonard Ray’s own dataset, I use Ray (1999) as its
citation. Ray’s dataset is available at: http://www.lsu.edu/faculty/lray2/data/data.html
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labels a party’s policy position of 5 along the left-right [0-10] spectrum as ‘the center’ (Hooghe
et al. 2010, Bakker et al. 2012).
These datasets are used together as they follow the same methodology, and tests for
reliability and validity show that they provide similar information when compared to alternative
data sources. In their article on the CHES dataset, the authors argue that “as was the case with his
[Ray (1999)] data, our expert survey measures seem to capture essentially the same information
about party positions as other measures such as the party manifestos” (Steenbergen and Marks
2007: 360). The analyses reported in Hooghe et al. (2010: 12) suggest that “the CHES survey
produces information that is in line with alternative sources. There is a reasonable level of
convergence between the CHES data and the manifesto coding data, a non-expert instrument,
though the associations are lower than with expert surveys.” In conclusion, the CHES data are
reasonably reliable and valid on the ideological positioning of political parties when compared to
other datasets such as the Comparative Manifesto Project, Benoit-Laver expert survey, and the
Rohrschneider-Whitefield expert survey (Hooghe et al. 2010: 13). Moreover, the simultaneous
use of these datasets reflects the change in party positions across time.
For Western European governments prior to the first iteration of the CHES expert survey
in 1999, the left-right party positions data collected in 1996 by Ray (1999) were utilized. For all
other Western and Central and Eastern European governments after 1999, the below procedure
is executed. First whether or not the government came to power via elections is checked. If an
election date is present for the government, and if the country is included in the CHES datasets,
then the CHES iteration that is closest to the year of the elections is used. If the government
came to power via either of the “new government” rules explained earlier in this chapter, then
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the CHES iteration that is closest to the start year of the government is used. A similar practice is
also adopted by Huber (1998).
The first iteration of CHES in 1999, however, has primarily focused on the most
prominent Western European countries. For this reason, if a country is not included in the CHES
coverage, such as Malta or Iceland, or other Central and Eastern European countries that were
not covered until its 2002 iteration, the data source which was chronologically the closest to the
election date or the government start date was utilized. For example, while both the Benoit and
Laver (2006) and the 2006 CHES iteration include party positions for Estonia, the values from
the former dataset are utilized here, since Benoit and Laver collected the data in 2003.32
When there are electoral alliances or mergers among parties: As explained earlier in this
chapter, some parties enter elections together and win seats jointly, or they may merge to become
a single party. For these instances, the policy positions of allied parties are averaged to yield a
single left-right score.33 If, however, the left-right position data exist only for one of the allied

32

Here I must acknowledge that unlike the Western European countries for which expert datasets
get updated periodically to reflect any temporal changes in their policy positions, this practice is
generally absent for many Central and Eastern European countries. For instance, the 2003 values
from the Benoit and Laver (2006) dataset were used for all Estonian governments in this study,
which began their terms in 1997, 1999, and 2003.
33
For example, in Poland, the SLD-UP (Alliance of Democratic Left – Union of Labour) is an
electoral alliance that ran together in elections, based on the Economist Intelligence Unit’s
December 2001 report on this country. Their policy position is coded as the average policy
position of SLD and UP. Weighted averages (i.e. policy position of the new merger weighted by
the seat share each party separately received in the previous election) were not used for this
measure since it would have been misleading to assume that the seat shares parties had won in
the previous election would directly affect the policy influence each party had in the merger, and
that this proportionality would continue throughout the merger’s lifetime. This is similar to the
junior party influence in coalitions argued in the literature (Clare 2010): junior parties often have
more influence in a coalition than their seat share in the parliament would predict.
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parties (generally these alliances are made of two parties), then the left-right position of this
party is used.34
Following the above coding procedures, three different measures are created in this
dissertation, using the party position data explained above, to provide robustness to the analyses
as well as to demonstrate the different conceptualizations of policy incongruence. The first
measure is borrowed from Tsebelis (1999: 599), who calls it the Ideological Range and measures
it by “taking the absolute value of the distance between the most extreme parties of a coalition.”
The larger the absolute value, the larger the ideological range in the coalition, and thus the higher
the level of policy incongruence.
Figure 3.2 provides a box-plot of this measure, summarizing how the ideological range
values are distributed across the five government types. The top whiskers of each box on the
figure indicate the upper quartile on the ideological range values, while the bottom whiskers
indicate the lower quartile. The boxes represent the middle 50 per cent of the ideological range
values, and the lines in the boxes represent the median, or the middle-point in the data. The
length of a box indicates the spread of the values around the median. Longer boxes denote higher
levels of spread.
The figure echoes the unitary party assumption by illustrating that ideological range is
zero for single-party minority and majority governments. It also shows that oversized coalitions,
and to a lesser extent, minority coalitions show significant diversity in their ideological
compositions. On the contrary, the distribution of the ideological range values among minimum
winning coalitions is much more compact and closer to zero given the location of the top and

34

An example is Lithuania, for which the left-right position of the TS (Homeland Union) is used
to code for the TS-LK (Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats) until the 2006 CHES
dataset included this alliance in its coverage.
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bottom whiskers, indicating a higher level of ideological connectedness, though there are still
several noticeable outliers in this category, indicated by the dots.

Figure 3.2 Ideological Range of Governments, Box-Plot

The downside of the ideological range measure, however, is its potential of
overestimating policy differences. In a coalition of three or more parties, the ideological
positions of some parties in government will inevitably fall between the two that define the
government’s ideological range. These intermediary parties may dampen the ideological
extremities in the coalition by building a bridge between the two extremes, which might turn the
coalition into an ideologically less divided one than is measured by its ideological range.
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A second measure, Standard Deviation of Party Positions, is created to take into account
the possibility of overestimation.35 This alternative measure uses the mean coalition left-right
position and standardizes the distances of all parties in the coalition to this mean (Warwick
1992).36 This measure is very highly correlated with Ideological Range (r=0.98), as Warwick
(1992) also explains, but has a much smaller variance (0.52) than the former (1.95). Figure 3.3
presents a similar box-plot for this measure.

Figure 3.3 Standard Deviation of Party Positions in Governments, Box-Plot
35

The standard deviation measure is constructed by using the following equation
, where i denotes the party and x denotes is left-right policy position.

36

An alternative measure would be the weighted standard deviation of coalition parties. This
measure, however, would assume that coalition position was defined proportional to each
coalition party’s parliamentary seat share. Since the dissertation is arguing that junior party
policy influence in a coalition may not always be proportional to its size given a specific type of
coalition (especially in minimum winning coalitions where each party is a veto player regardless
of its size), an unweighted standard deviation measure is utilized instead.
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Figure 3.3 shows again that minority coalitions have the greatest ideological diversity,
whereas the level of ideological dispersion is noticeably lower for both minimum winning and
oversized coalitions. Similar to Figure 3.2, this box-plot also shows that despite the tighter
distribution of standard deviation values for minimum winning coalitions, there are still several
outlier cases for this government type.
Finally, a third alternative measure looks beyond the continuous distance measured along
the left-right spectrum and asks whether the coalition includes parties from the left as well as the
right of the political spectrum. This measure is called Center is Crossed. The underlying
motivation here is to see whether having parties in a government that are not just located away
from each other on the same side of the political spectrum but actually come from the opposite
sides affects the intensity of their international commitments. Indeed, it could be argued that
ideological differences could seem big when the range or standard deviation measures are
employed, but that they could be reconciled much more easily when parties come from the same
side of the political spectrum than when they come from the opposite sides. In other words, this
measure takes a more substantive approach in conceptualizing ideological disagreements. This
last variable is measured on a categorical level. It assumes 1 if the coalition includes parties both
from the political left and from the right, or includes the center party, and 0 otherwise. Figure 3.4
summarizes the distribution of governments over this categorical variable. It shows that 55 out of
136 governments cross the center of the political spectrum while 70 governments are composed
of only left or right parties.
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Figure 3.4 Governments Including Parties from the Left or the Right (Center is Crossed)

This section has provided a discussion of the operationalization and measurement of the
key independent variables that will be used in both the quantitative and qualitative components
of the dissertation. The next section turns to explain ‘foreign policy events’ and how they are
used to construct the measure of the dependent variable, commitment intensity.

Foreign Policy Events and Measuring Commitment
Chapter 1 has discussed in detail that this study takes foreign policy behavior as the unit of
analysis and uses ‘foreign policy events’ as its operational equivalent. This section discusses
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events and how the literature has utilized them to construct the scale of commitment, which is
the dependent variable of this project.
Events in foreign policy specify “‘who does what to whom, and how’ in the relations
among states” (Hudson and Vore 1995: 215, see also Schrodt 1995). The notion of the event is
so minimalist that an average consumer of international news gets exposed to them numerous
times every day. Consider BBC News, for instance. Their headlines share a common format that
capture all the information necessary for us to learn who did what to whom (and how): “Google
offers clearer search labels,” “PKK announces Turkey withdrawal,” “Serbia’s President,
Tomislav Nikolic, has apologized for all “crimes” committed by Serbs during the break-up of
Yugoslavia, including Srebrenica.” These are the headlines or the very first sentences of the BBC
newswires that I accessed from my phone on April 25th, 2013, all of which are examples of
world events. Foreign policy events, too, are communicated in the same way: “UN approves
peace force for Mali,” or “Hague [British foreign minister] opens new embassy in Somalia,” or
“Israel says one of its fighter jets has shot down an unmanned aircraft sent from Lebanon into
Israeli airspace” (BBC News 2013) are some examples.37
Clearly, the various formats in which foreign policy events are reported around the world
necessitate a framework to categorize and group them for scientific inquiry. The foremost effort
on this front belongs to Charles McClelland. The World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS)
(McClelland 1978: 1-2) that was compiled between 1966 and 1978 using The New York Times is
not only the first and one of the most prominent events datasets that documents “the flow of

37

A single news sentence can include more than one event. In the events dataset that is used in
this study, the first and second sentences of the news reports are recorded. If there are multiple
events reported in these sentences, each of these events is coded as individual observations
(VRA Documentation Manual 2003.Available at: http://gking.harvard.edu/data).
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action and response between countries,” but it has also introduced the event types and categories
that foreign policy analysis scholars continue to use to this day.
The 22 event types that McClelland (1978) has introduced with the WEIS dataset is
introduced in Table 3.3. For instance, the following line from the WEIS data reads: “NIGERIA
SUPPORTED UNK [United Kingdom] POLICY IN RHO [Rhodesia] AFFAIR,” which was
recorded on January 11th, 1966 and coded with the event code 4, denoting approval. “ISR
[Israel] TROOPS FIRED ON JOR [Jordan] TROOPS” is another record in the dataset, recorded
on April 9th, 1969 with the code 22, indicating the use of force.

Code

Event Type

01
Yield
02
Comment
03
Consult
04
Approve
05
Promise
06
Grant
07
Reward
08
Agree
09
Request
10
Propose
11
Reject
12
Accuse
13
Protest
14
Deny
15
Demand
16
Warn
17
Threaten
18
Demonstrate
19
Reduce Relationship
20
Expel
21
Seize
22
Force
Table 3.3 WEIS Event Types
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The event types listed in Table 3.3 above further branch out to yield 63 event categories.
Appendix A provides these categories as reported in McClelland (1978: 5-13), with their event
codes denoted in parentheses. As the quantitative research design that will be introduced further
below will show, the event categories presented in Appendix A also form the basis of the
categories of the observations that are coded in the large-N foreign policy events dataset (King
and Lowe 2003) used in this dissertation. Furthermore, these event categories provide the
conceptual framework for the measure of the dependent variable that this dissertation uses, to
which we now turn.

Measuring Commitment Intensity
Chapter 1 has provided an extensive conceptual discussion of commitment and commitment
intensity to establish the research puzzle that is raised in this dissertation as well as to situate the
project within the existing debate in the literature. Certainly, empirical analysis ensues so long as
the conceptual clarification of a variable is followed by decisions regarding its measurement, a
key component of any research design, qualitative and quantitative alike. This section explains
the ‘commitment intensity’ scale utilized for this dissertation to measure the dependent variable.
A more extensive discussion of the previous scholarly attempts in the field to measure
commitment is provided in Appendix B.
The present study uses the commitment scale developed by Goldstein (1992) to measure
the dependent variable. A sophisticated and widely consulted (Fordham 2005, Goldstein and
Pevehouse 1997, Kaarbo and Beasley 2008, King and Lowe 2003, Schrodt and Gerner 2004)
study on the rank-ordering of foreign policy actions, Goldstein (1992) utilizes the WEIS event
types and categories to construct this measure. It extends from conflictual towards cooperative

80

behavior along a scale that ranges from -10 to +8.3. Table 3.4 provides the Goldstein (1992)
scale.38 Even though the scale applies equally to the quantitative and qualitative components of
this dissertation, its quantified nature certainly benefits the quantitative component the most.

Event Definition
Military attack; clash; assault
Seize position or possessions
Nonmilitary destruction/injury
Noninjury destructive action
Armed force mobilization, exercise, display; military buildup
Break diplomatic relations
Threat with force specified
Ultimatum; threat with negative sanction and time limit
Threat with specific negative nonmilitary sanction
Reduce or cut off aid or assistance; act to punish/deprive
Nonmilitary demonstration, walk out on
Order person or personnel out of country
Expel organization or group
Issue order or command, insist, demand compliance
Threat without specific negative sanction stated
Detain or arrest person(s)
Reduce routine international activity; recall officials
Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow
Turn down proposal; reject protest, demand, threat
Halt negotiation
Denounce; denigrate; abuse
Give warning
Issue formal complaint or protest
Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove
Cancel or postpone planned event
Make complaint (not formal)
Grant asylum
Deny an attributed policy, action, role or position
Deny an accusation
Comment on situation
Urge or suggest action or policy

Weight
-10.0
-9.2
-8.7
-8.3
-7.6
-7.0
-7.0
-6.9
-5.8
-5.6
-5.2
-5.0
-4.9
-4.9
-4.4
-4.4
-4.1
-4.0
-4.0
-3.8
-3.4
-3.0
-2.4
-2.2
-2.2
-1.9
-1.1
-1.1
-0.9
-0.2
-0.1

38

Modified from Goldstein, Joshua S. (1992). “A Conflict-Cooperation Scale for WEIS Events
Data,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36(2): 369-85.
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Event Definition (continued)
Explicit decline to comment
Request action; call for
Explain or state policy; state future position
Ask for information
Surrender, yield to order, submit to arrest
Yield position; retreat; evacuate
Meet with; send note
Entreat; plead; appeal to; beg
Offer proposal
Express regret; apologize
Visit; go to
Release and/or return persons or property
Admit wrongdoing; apologize, retract statement
Give state invitation
Assure; reassure
Receive visit; host
Suspend sanctions; end punishment; call truce
Agree to future action or procedure, to meet, or to negotiate
Ask for policy assistance
Ask for material assistance
Praise, hail, applaud, extend condolences
Endorse other's policy or position; give verbal support
Promise other future support
Promise own policy support
Promise material support
Grant privilege; diplomatic recognition; de facto relations
Give other assistance
Make substantive agreement
Extend economic aid; give, buy, sell, loan, borrow
Extend military assistance
Table 3.4 Goldstein Commitment Scale

Weight
-0.1
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.6
0.6
1.0
1.2
1.5
1.8
1.9
1.9
2.0
2.5
2.8
2.8
2.9
3.0
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.6
4.5
4.5
5.2
5.4
6.5
6.5
7.4
8.3

As Table 3.4 shows above, on this scale the most intense conflictual action is military
attack (-10) or assault, and the most intense cooperative action is the extension of military
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assistance (8.3). The absolute neutral39 action is to “explain or state policy; state future position”
to which zero is assigned on the scale. As one moves closer to zero on the scale from either end,
the events become less action-oriented and more verbal, indicating low-intensity commitments.
For example, optimistic comment gets a Goldstein score of 0.1, proposal gets 0.8, or blame gets a
score of -2.2. These event categories clearly require less political/material commitment than
military mobilization (-7.6) or extending humanitarian aid (7.6). Similarly, as one goes from less
to more intense cooperative commitments the events include “offer proposal” (1.5), “suspend
sanctions; end punishment; call truce” (2.9), “ask for material assistance” (3.4), “promise
material support” (5.2) or “make substantive agreement” (6.5) (Goldstein, 1992: 376).
For example, an observation in the WEIS dataset states that the US and Southern
Vietnam signed an agreement in 1966 permitting television broadcasting in English and
Vietnamese. On the Goldstein scale this is a substantive agreement, which gets a score of 6.5.
Similarly, again in 1966, Belgium and the Netherlands “gave indication that they were unready
to yield to French demands for curbing integration of European Common Market,” which was
coded as turn down proposal in the WEIS dataset, and receives a score of -4.0 on the Goldstein
scale, indicating the conflictual nature of this rather low-intensity commitment in Dutch and
Belgian foreign policy behavior.
39

Neutrality here indicates a lack of pledge or resource commitment as opposed to “neutrality”
as a type of foreign policy. Neutrality as a foreign policy in states such as Sweden, Austria, and
Finland can well be discussed in the framework of high-intensity commitments. For example, a
news story that reads “Sweden refuses to cooperate with NATO” would reflect how Swedish
foreign policy is committed not to align militarily. Indeed, some scholars choose to label these
countries as “militarily non-aligned” rather than “neutral” (Ferreira-Pereira 2006: 101), which
helps avoid this conceptual confusion. From a normative perspective, however, neutrality
principle in foreign policy has also been criticized as indicating “a lack of commitment,” or as
“escaping from responsibility” (Moller and Bjereld 2010: 366). In this study, foreign policy
behaviors will be defined as neutral if they are low on commitment intensity, while keeping in
mind that foreign policies such as “military neutrality” do not necessarily mean low-commitment
policies.
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The above discussion has presented the operationalization and the measurements of the
independent and dependent variables that will be utilized in both the quantitative and qualitative
analyses of this dissertation. Moving forward, the next section introduces the quantitative
research design component of the project.

A Quantitative Approach to Studying Commitment Intensity in European Governments:
(a) The Data:
The preceding discussions in this chapter on the unit of analysis and the measurement of the
dependent variable have alluded to the prevalent use of large-N events datasets in the study of
foreign policy analysis. The quantitative component of the dissertation, too, will utilize a foreign
policy events dataset to explain the independent and interactive effects of government
composition variables on commitment intensity in post-Cold War European parliamentary
democracies.
Why use events datasets in the study of foreign policy? Through the utilization of news
reports40 that communicate a great variety of events such as Tables 3.3 and 3.4 have shown
earlier, the biggest advantage of events datasets is their ability to capture more than just the highend conflict behavior such as the widely used Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset
(Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004). Indeed, events datasets include behaviors that actually take
place far more frequently such as official visits to foreign countries, condemnations of

40

These datasets are generated by disaggregating news reports such as those exemplified above
into their three major components—actor (source of action), action, and target (recipient of
action) to explicate behavior. Several projects in the past have used news repositories such as
The New York Times as exemplified by the WEIS dataset (McClelland 1978) as well as Reuters
(King and Lowe 2003; Schrodt and Gerner 2004), or alternatively, combined multiple news
sources (Azar 1980) to generate events datasets. For an in-depth account of events datasets in the
study of foreign policy see Schrodt (1995).
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wrongdoings by other state or non-state actors, apologies for past behavior to foreign
counterparts and so forth, alongside the more high-profile behaviors such as granting of aids,
troop deployments, military attacks, or signing and ratification of agreements. In sum, the
determinants of international relations can be assessed not only more realistically but more
effectively by utilizing events datasets, which contain not just the dramatic (but far less frequent)
episodes such as acts of violence but those low-profile engagements that take place among dyads
or between states and other international actors on a daily basis.
Well-known and widely used events datasets abound in the literature, such as the WEIS
(McClelland 1978), COPDAB (Azar 1980), or CREON (Hermann, East, Hermann, Salmore and
Salmore 1973), which focus on the foreign policy events and interactions among states. As
mentioned earlier, however, one of the main objectives of this dissertation is to move the
analysis outside the scope of the international systemic balance of power of the Cold War period
so that the results are not biased by its influence. That neither of these datasets extends beyond
1990 is therefore a temporal limitation, which obliges me to look elsewhere.41
The dataset that is used for the quantitative component of this dissertation, Gary King and
Will Lowe’s 10 Million International Dyadic Events42 dataset (2003) is thus the perfect fit as it
focuses on entirely post-Cold War international events by covering the period between 1990 and
2004. Furthermore, from a practical viewpoint, the dataset builds on the categorizations
presented in Table 3.3 and Appendix A, which not only allows for methodological affinity with
the existing studies that use the WEIS dataset (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008, Kaarbo 2012) but it
41

The WEIS data has recently been updated to cover events up until 1996, though the new
version has not yet been released for public use. Even if it were, however, running a statistical
analysis of government composition on pre- and post-Cold War events would have been
theoretically misleading despite the use of simple variables such as a Cold War dummy.
42
For a more detailed explanation of how the authors collected, machine-coded, and categorized
the data see King and Lowe (2003).
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also facilitates the mapping of the Goldstein commitment intensity scale onto the foreign policy
events that are reported in the data.
The 10 Million dataset even extends the 63-category scheme of the WEIS dataset to 157
in order to introduce more nuance to the existing categories, referred to as the ‘IDEA’ categories,
which “are intended to be congruent with preexisting WEIS categories” (King and Lowe 2003:
621). To illustrate this, Table 3.5 shows how the WEIS cues were parsed out to create the IDEA
categories by looking at the WEIS event code 06 as an example. Notice that the first two digits
of each IDEA code from the left correspond to the WEIS cue category 06, listed in Table 3.3 as
Grant.

IDEA
Definition
06
Grant
066
Release or return
065
Ease sanctions
0655
Relax curfew
0654
Demobilize armed forces
0653
Relax administrative sanction
0652
Relax censorship
0651
Observe truce
0632
Evacuate victims
064
Improve relations
063
Provide shelter
0631
Grant asylum
062
Extend invitation
Table 3.5 WEIS-to-IDEA Categories43

Though the data originally include millions of news events collected from Reuters that
cover the period from 1990 to 2004 for a wide range of topics including sports and natural
43

Modified from King, G. and W. Lowe. (2003) “An Automated Information Extraction Tool
For International Conflict Data with Performance as Good as Human Coders: A Rare Events
Evaluation Design,” International Organization 57: 617-642.
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disasters, for the purposes of the dissertation, they were narrowed down to include only those
events where the actors (initiators) are government agents or the national executives. This
decision makes the substantive coverage of the dataset consistent with the definition of foreign
policy and foreign policy behavior, presented in Chapter 1.44
The 10 Million dataset originally includes not only countries from around the world but
other international actors such as the Arab Cooperation Council, European Free Trade
Association, or the Islamic Development Bank, even the “world community.” Per the
institutional, spatial and temporal boundaries of the study that were discussed previously in the
dissertation, the present dataset now includes all foreign policy events that were recorded for 30
Western and Central/Eastern European countries with parliamentary systems.45
Finally, in order to ascertain the democratic character of the Central and Eastern
European countries, the time period was front-censored so that the dataset starts from 1994
instead of 1990. The assumption here is that democracies in transition show greater promise
towards consolidation as long as the first round of post-transition elections is completed with a
peaceful transfer of power from one incumbent to the next.46 For the post-Communist

44

In the original dataset, the actors of the source country are coded as <NEXE> for National
Executive and <GAGE> for Government Officials, respectively (King and Lowe 2003).
45
Switzerland is not included in the dataset since the executive branch in this country is
structured differently than the other parliamentary systems in Europe, where the federal
government is a seven-member executive (Swiss Confederation, 2014). Croatia switched from
presidential to parliamentary system in 2000, so the data for this country begin in 2000.
46
This assumption is based on the literature on democratic transition and consolidation,
specifically regarding turnover. An example is Huntington’s (1991: 266) “two-turnover test,”
which argues that democracies are consolidated where “the government loses an election to the
opposition and the successor government subsequently loses” (Schneider 1995: 220).
Furthermore, Linz and Stepan (1996: 56) emphasize “pacts,” which “may explicitly entail some
nondemocratic constraints for a short period of time before and after the first foundational
election.” Therefore, even though the 10 Million events dataset begins from 1990, the data for
this study begins from 1994 as it considers such potential democratic deficits during the
transition phase, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.
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parliamentary regimes in Europe, this assumption called for the exclusion of their very first postSoviet democratic governments from the dataset.
As a result, the events dataset that will be used in the quantitative component of this
project utilize a total of 17,149 foreign policy events that were initiated by the government
officials or national executives of the 30 European states with parliamentary systems over a
decade between 1994 and 2004. The distribution of events over countries is presented in Figure
3.5 below. The figure shows that events from Germany, the United Kingdom, and to some
extent, Italy, dominate the dataset. The numbers suggest that the media sources from which the
events data are generated focus on the major European countries far more than they do on the
smaller ones. The media bias, in other words, results in an unbalanced dataset and requires
special statistical procedures to prevent further bias at the analysis stage. These procedures will
be discussed further below.
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Figure 3.5 Distribution of Events over Countries47

Figures 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 further illustrate the frequencies of foreign policy event
categories in the dataset. First, Figure 3.6 below displays which event categories occur between
ten to 50 times in the data. The bar graph shows that some of the most dramatic incidents that
International Relations scholars are interested in, such as military assistance, agreement

47

ALB: Albania, AUS: Austria, BEL: Belgium, BUL: Bulgaria. CRO: Croatia, CZR: Czech
Republic, DEN: Denmark, EST: Estonia, FIN: Finland, FRG: (Federal Republic of) Germany,
GRC: Greece, HUN: Hungary, ICE: Iceland, IRE: Ireland, ITA: Italy, LAT: Latvia, LIT:
Lithuania, LUX: Luxembourg, MAC: Macedonia, MLT: Malta, NOR: Norway, NTH:
Netherlands, POL: Poland, POR: Portugal, SLO: Slovenia, SLV: Slovakia, SPN: Spain, SWD:
Sweden, TUR: Turkey, UK: United Kingdom.
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ratifications, sanctions and threats only make up a tiny fraction of events that take place at the
international level.

Promise
Decline comment
Arrest and detention
Expel
Non-specific threats
Extend military aid
Ratify a decision
Provide shelter
Disclose information
Mediate talks
Break relations
Yield
Pessimistic comment
Empathize
Reject
Promise material support
Yield to order
Physical assault
Demobilize armed forces
Consult
Complain
Border fortification
Request an investigation
Sanction
Promise policy support
Security alert
Threaten
Armed actions
Offer to Negotiate
Apologize
Return, release person(s)
Impose restrictions
Rally support
Protest demonstrations
Ask for humanitarian aid
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Figure 3.6 Event categories that are observed 10-50 times in the dataset
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Figures 3.7 and 3.8 respectively report the event categories that occur between 500 and
1000 times; and between 1000 and 2000 times in the dataset. The graphs indicate that less
dramatic international events such as criticisms or praises directed at other international actors or
visits to other states occur far more frequently than attacks, threats or military assistance, though
they are much less frequently studied in International Relations research.
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Engage in negotiation
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Figure 3.7 Event categories that are observed 500-1000 times in the dataset
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Figure 3.8 Event categories that are observed 1000-2000 times in the dataset
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In sum, the graphs provided above suggest that the international relations among states
and various other actors are not nearly as dramatic and sensational as it is reflected in the
scholarship. What we most often study in IR as the dependent variables are “rare events” (King
and Zheng 2001) and therefore, do not reflect the plethora of the more ordinary, daily
interactions that take place. Furthermore, the “rare events” are often oriented towards
confrontation and conflict, whereas Figures 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 above suggest that most international
events are not at all associated with conflict. The dataset utilized for the quantitative analysis
therefore covers the dramatic and extraordinary events as well as the more ordinary, mundane,
everyday events, most of which are indeed what we read in the news every day and what takes
place at the international level. As such, the explanatory power of the coalition foreign policy
framework introduced here reaches beyond international conflict and other dramatic relations
among actors at the international level. The complete list of the event categories that are
observed in the dataset are presented in Appendix C.

(b) Dependent Variable:
The dependent variable for the quantitative component of the dissertation is the Goldstein (1992)
commitment intensity scale, introduced earlier. Since the quantitative analyses will be interested
in the intensity of commitments regardless of their policy content, the scale is folded in the
middle and a new scale is therefore generated that goes from 0 to 10, where 10 indicates the
event that signals the most intense cooperative or conflictual commitment. This practice follows
an earlier work by Kaarbo and Beasley (2008) and therefore maintains methodological affinity
with their analyses. Figure 3.9 presents the frequency distribution of observations in the dataset
along the folded Goldstein scale. The new IDEA event categories that King and Lowe (2003)
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have introduced to the data have led to the creation of new values on the Goldstein scale. 48
Appendix C provides the list of all events included in the data with their corresponding Goldstein
scores.

Figure 3.9 Frequency of Events by Folded Goldstein Scores49

48

Although King and Lowe (2003) introduce many additional event categories as exemplified
earlier in Table 3.2, those still stem from the original WEIS scheme and build upon Goldstein’s
categorization. For the perfect matches, the values presented in Goldstein (1992: 376-377) are
assigned. For the additional event categories that King and Lowe (2003) introduce, however, the
authors’ Documentation Manual advises to “take the average score for the events within that
cue” (VRA Documentation Manual 2003, p. 10. Available at: http://gking.harvard.edu/data).
Example: For the event category 2239, the manual advises to average the values of all events in
the Goldstein scale that belong to the WEIS cue category 22. I followed this procedure for all
new event categories in the dataset that were not captured by the categories in the Goldstein
scale.
49
The event categories that correspond to each of these values cannot be reported here since
these are the results from the folded scale and some event categories assume the same Goldstein
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(c) Independent Variables:
a. Government Types:
As one of the key components of the ‘government composition’ explanation, the first set of
independent variables used in the quantitative analysis includes government types. These types
include single-party minority, single-party majority and multi-party governments, as well as the
types of these multiparty governments. These include minority, minimum winning, and
oversized coalitions. Dummy variables are generated for each of these categories.
Figure 3.10 below shows the distribution of governments and foreign policy events
across these government types, and Figure 3.11 displays the densities of these government types
across the countries included in the dataset.

values. In addition, some event categories are already averaged by using the procedure explained
in fn. 48.
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Figure 3.10 Number of Observations, by Government Type
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Figure 3.11 Frequency Density of Government Types by Country
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b. Policy Incongruence:
The second set of independent variables concerns the degree of ideological disagreements among
parties in government, or the policy incongruence of the government, as discussed extensively
earlier in this chapter. These variables include ideological range, standard deviation (of the
coalition parties from the mean left-right position of the coalition) and center is crossed. The
range and the standard deviation measures are continuous while the center is crossed measure is
categorical. Each of these variables will be incorporated in the regression models to test their
independent and interactive effects on commitment intensity.50

(d) Control Variables:
Several control variables are used in the quantitative component of the dissertation to account for
country- and context-specific factors that might help explain commitment intensity in foreign
policy behavior.
First, from a realist International Relations perspective, it is important to acknowledge
that the extent of a country’s material resources might have an impact on the international
behavior of its government (Trachtenberg 2003). It is also meaningful to expect that a
government’s room for maneuver in international politics is greater when the state enjoys more
capabilities. In return, governments that enjoy greater resources at their disposal might have a
tendency to act more committed at the international level. To account for this hypothesis,
50

The first two measures of policy incongruence are coded missing if there is no policy position
value for at least one party in the government. The third measure is coded missing if there is at
least one party in the government without a known policy position, without which it is
impossible to decide whether the coalition crosses the center or not. In other words, if there are at
least two parties from the opposite sides of the political spectrum in a coalition, then that
coalition assumes 1 for the center is crossed variable, even if other coalition partners’ positions
are unknown. The models that use the center is crossed variable in Chapter 4 thus result in fewer
missing cases.
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following the quantitative literature on international behavior of states (Fordham and Walker
2005; Morgan and Palmer 2000) the scores from the Composite Index of National Capabilities
(CINC) (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972, Singer 1987) dataset are used to account for a state’s
capabilities.51 Figure 3.12 displays the mean CINC score of the European countries between
1994 and 2004.

Figure 3.12 Mean CINC Scores of European Countries, 1994-2004
51

CINC is calculated by adding together the six major components of material capabilities,
namely total population, urban population, military personnel, military expenditures, primary
energy consumption, and iron and steel production for all states for a given year (Singer, Bremer,
and Stuckey 1972, Singer 1987), and is standardized by “converting each state's absolute
component to a share of the international system, and then averaging across the six components”
(Fordham and Walker 2005: 149). Since CINC is measured at every year for a given state, the
CINC score of the state may change across time during the 1994-2004 period. The present
dataset is coded so that each observation has a CINC score that belongs to the actor country at
the year in which the event took place.
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Second, it is reasonable to expect that the European democracies included in the dataset
will behave differently when interacting with democracies than they will with non-democracies,
as theorized by the democratic peace research (Owen 1994, Russett 1993). Democracy scores of
target countries are coded by using the Polity IV data set (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2011).
Following Kaarbo (2012), they are recoded into a dummy variable that assumes 1 for all target
country regimes that score 7 and above, and 0 otherwise. Foreign targets that are not states but
international organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE); geographic regions; or states which are not assigned a Polity score, such as Palestine or
Vatican City, are coded as missing for this binary variable, as well as they are for the CINC
variable. The data show that the foreign policy events whose targets were democracies in this
period are more than twice as frequent as nondemocratic targets in this period, as illustrated in
Figure 3.13.

Figure 3.13 Frequency of Democratic Targets
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In addition to these control variables which are frequently employed in similar studies in
the literature, particularly those on the domestic-level causes of international conflict, this
dissertation introduces a new set of control variables that account for memberships in
international organizations as well as major international crises that took place in this period. In
line with the major premise of the multi-method research design presented in this chapter, these
additional control variables help account for the international context within which these events
took place. The next few pages discuss these additional, context-oriented control variables.
First, the quantitative analyses control for the effect of European Union membership. A
flourishing discussion in European Union studies concerns the extent to which the Union can
influence national foreign policies through a mechanism called “Europeanization,” defined as “a
set of regional, economic, institutional, and ideational forces for change also affecting national
policies, practices, and politics” (Schmidt 2002: 41). The implication of Europeanization for
foreign policy analysis is that as the EU became a more proactive economic and political actor
throughout the post-Cold War period, its foreign policy actor capacity or ‘actorness’ (Groenleer
and Van Schaik 2007, Jupille and Caporaso 1998, for a conceptual discussion of the term see
Ginsberg 1999) has become more relevant for the member states, possibly leading to a greater
influence on national foreign policy formation and consequently, behavior.
More recently, studies began to question whether the relationship between EU foreign
policy and national foreign policies is interactive, so that nationally formulated preferences can
be transferred to the EU-level and, through socialization, can further influence national foreign
policy formation into the future (Groenleer and Van Schaik 2007, Wong and Hill 2010). For
instance, in their comparative case study, Groenleer and Van Schaik (2007: 989) demonstrate
that once the national preferences were initially converged (i.e. national foreign policies share
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similar outlooks), “member state representatives appear to have been “socialized” by the
interaction during the frequent meetings taking place in Brussels and the EU co-ordination
meetings at international conferences.” This has lead to the ratification of the Rome Statute that
established the International Criminal Court and a common EU position during the negotiations
in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) concerning the
Kyoto Protocol.
If socialization as a mechanism is a function of the time the member state engages with
the EU on foreign policy matters, then one should expect that the length of EU membership
should ultimately influence national foreign policy decisions. From a commitment intensity
perspective, the implication is that if the common EU position on a foreign policy issue calls for
more intense commitments (such as EU-level humanitarian task force deployments in conflict
areas), then member states might be compelled to go along with the EU position regardless of the
executive dynamics at the domestic level—and this relationship should be positively influenced
by the length of EU membership. Indeed, Italy was only initially reluctant to act alongside the
EU during the UNFCCC negotiations before it changed its position (Groenleer and Van Schaik,
2007: 985).
Having said that, it is also plausible to argue that the younger members of the EU will
need the EU more and thus, they are expected to not antagonize the EU by diverging from its
common position.52 If the EU wants to act more committed at the international level, in other

52

Previous research on the bargaining power of EU candidate countries, however, suggests that
the new members will not necessarily choose to formulate their foreign policy behavior in line
with the EU. Discussing the relative weakness of the candidate countries at the bargaining table
during the negotiation process, Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003: 44) argue that “applicant
countries have consistently found themselves in a weak negotiating position vis-à-vis their EU
partners, and accordingly have conceded much in exchange for membership.” However, the
authors continue to claim that “membership effectively reverses the power relationship between
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words, one can expect the younger member states to go along with it. Indeed, while the Czech
parliament was opposed to the ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC, the Czech government
continued to express its commitment to ratification, demonstrating that the government was less
influenced by its parliament than by what was expected of them by the European Union
(Groenleer and Van Schaik, 2007: 977-978). In sum, in order to see whether either of these
explanations holds, a Years of EU Membership variable is constructed. This variable measures
for how many years the country has been a member of the EU as of December 31, 2004. Figure
3.14 summarizes this variable.53
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Figure 3.14 Years of EU Membership as of December 31, 2004

core and peripheral members of the EU” (2003: 52), suggesting that once members, these states
may easily challenge and refuse to go along with an EU position that could ask for more
international commitment than states would otherwise prefer.
53
As Figure 3.14 implies, a binary “EU membership” variable would have captured the East /
West Europe differences instead of EU membership in this period, since (a) the dataset ends at
2004 and (b) the 2004 enlargement was by and large an Eastern European enlargement. For this
reason an interval-level measure to test the effect of EU membership is used to capture more
variation among the European countries.
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Finally, it is reasonable to expect that governments may have to commit more to respond
to the international crises that they face during their terms in office, especially when these crises
are proximate to the borders of their countries, or when the crisis alters the dynamics of the
international system. The decade that this dissertation focuses on has witnessed a number of
severe international crises that may have influenced more intense commitments such as military
aid provision by those governments who were in charge as these crises took place. Four dummy
variables were therefore created to account for the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as the
attacks to the U.S. World Trade Center in 2001 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These variables
assume 1 if the government was in power during the Bosnia War (April 1, 1992 – December 14,
1995), the Kosovo War (February 28, 1998 – June 10, 1999), on the day of September 11th,
2001 or during the 2003 invasion of Iraq (March 13, 2003 – May 1, 2003), and 0 otherwise.
Table 3.6 displays the number of governments which were in charge during the course of these
major international events.

No. of
governments in
term during

Bosnia
War

Kosovo
War

September
11, 2003

2003 Iraq
Invasion

Neither

34

45

28

31

29

Table 3.6 Government term during the Bosnia War, Kosovo War, 9/11, and 2003 Iraq invasion

(e) Estimation: Multilevel Modeling and Its Advantages
The preceding sections have discussed the independent and control variables in detail, providing
a clearer picture for the quantitative research design. To complete the discussion, this final
section lays out the specifics of the quantitative models that will be utilized to estimate the
103

relationships between commitment intensity in foreign policy behavior and government
composition.
Previous studies that focused on the effects of government-level variables on the
international behavior of states have used pooled linear or nonlinear models depending on the
nature of the dependent variable (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008). The preference for pooled models,
however, carries three assumptions that could be misleading. First, using pooled models implies
an a priori assumption about the nature of the data, such as the observations having objectively
the same properties regardless of which country they are drawn from. Second, pooled models
assume that the cross-sectional dataset includes roughly the same number of observations from
each country so that the possibility of one group of observations driving the results is slim. Third,
pooled models disregard the possibility that observations, or foreign policy events in this case,
collected from the same country might also be correlated due to historical reasons that are
peculiar to that context (that is, there might be high intraclass correlation), which would violate
the OLS assumptions for linear models. These assumptions are risky as they might lead to biased
results despite the inclusion of country-level control variables to account for upper-level factors
such as the national material capabilities, or years of EU membership that are included in this
study.
In order to account for the genuine effects of countries from which the observations are
drawn from, a possible solution is to run no-pooled analyses by adding country indicators to the
models. This way, one can estimate the latent effects of the countries that the pooled models fail
to account for. This approach, however, has the downside of forcing the analyst to exclude the
country-level control variables to avoid multicollinearity.
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Moreover, it has been argued that no-pooled analyses are erroneous when sample sizes
vary dramatically across groups (Gelman and Hill 2007: 8), which is the case with the present
dataset. Understandably, media reports from which the events data are generated are biased
against smaller countries, and this bias is also reflected in the data: there are 17 events recorded
for Iceland, and some 4000 events for Germany between 1994 and 2004, as Figure 3.5 has
shown earlier. Scholars argue that such variation in sub-sample sizes is particularly dangerous
when using no-pooled models: “No-pooling model overstate[s] the variation among [groups] and
tend to make the individual [groups] look more different than they actually are" (Gelman and
Hill 2007: 253).
A better way to account for the effect of country differences on commitment intensity
while accounting for the effects of country-level variables such as national capabilities is to use
multilevel models. As opposed to complete-pooling or no-pooling models, multi-level models
use partial pooling and work better for datasets which have variation in group sample sizes as
well as between and within groups (Gelman and Hill 2007: 254). The advantage of the multilevel
model is that one can check for country-level differences and use country-level variables (such as
CINC, or years of EU membership) at the same time, without running into problems of
multicollinearity.
Furthermore, the multilevel estimation technique relaxes the assumption that the
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables is constant across
different contexts, “whereas in fact they are to some extent dependent [on context] because of the
hierarchical nesting structure” (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 227). By acknowledging the effects
that contexts can exert on the estimated relationships, multilevel models “permit the analysis of
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substantive contextual effects while still allowing for heterogeneity between contextual units”
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 227).
Finally, multilevel models acknowledge the possibility of “causal heterogeneity”
(Western 1998). They facilitate cross-level interactions and help “determine whether the causal
effect of lower-level predictors is conditioned or moderated by higher-level predictors”
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219). For instance, one could test whether policy incongruence in
governments on the event-level also varies across countries as a result of the variation in these
countries’ party systems and the issues represented along their left-right political spectrum. Since
the present study focuses on European democracies where the left-right spectrum by and large
represents the same issue positions for political parties across these regimes, such a cross-level
approach will not be adopted in the analyses. However, future studies that go beyond Europe to
look at how ideological differences influence international behavior in other parliamentary
systems as diverse as India, Canada, Australia or Japan could very well benefit from the crosslevel interactions facilitated by multilevel estimation.
In this study, random-intercept models will be used where applicable,54 in order to model
the relationship between commitment intensity and government structure while taking contextual
variation into consideration. Specifying the models in multiple levels (at the event-level as well
as the country-level) effectively relaxes the assumption that context does not muddle the
relationships. Multilevel models with varying intercepts will yield the same slopes for the
independent variables (that is, fixed effects), but estimate different intercepts for each country
54

Stata 11 simultaneously runs a likelihood ratio test (LR-test) alongside running a multilevel
model to check whether the model is statistically different from a classical regression model with
the same variable specifications (linear or nonlinear). This dissertation will report and discuss the
results of multilevel models where the LR-test holds. In those instances where the LR-test fails to
provide statistical significance, results from classical regression models with robust standard
errors will be used.
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(that is, random effects). Ultimately, the fitted lines will have a unique intercept for each country,
but the slope of the relationship will be the same across all other countries. These intercepts will
be critical to discern the contextual effects imposed by the countries from which the observations
were taken.
Random-intercept models, in this sense, assume that countries (that is, contexts) must be
able to account for some of the variation that is left unexplained by the fixed part of the model,
where several explanatory variables are introduced to explain the variation in the dependent
variable. More specifically, the models specified here work on the assumption that the contexts
in which these governments preside introduce a baseline effect on commitment intensity that is
not accounted for by the explanatory variables. They also assume that the effect of the
components of government composition (government type and policy incongruence) or the
national capabilities of the state are constant across these contexts. Policy incongruence inside a
government, for instance, is expected to have the same effect on commitment intensity across all
countries.55
A random-intercept multilevel model specification that uses the variables explained
above looks like the following (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008: 94):

55

This is to say that random-coefficient models, an alternative way to specify multilevel models,
are not used in this dissertation due to the assumption that government-level variables such as
policy incongruence or government type will have the same effect (or, the same slope) across all
countries. For instance, the model specifications in this dissertation assume that a 2.5 point
ideological distance between the political parties in a governing coalition means the same across
all countries and that this value will have the same effect on commitment intensity across these
countries. Similarly, since CINC is a standardized variable, the model specifications here also
assume that its effect will be constant across all countries. Therefore, this variable is not included
as a random component of the models. Instead, it is part of the fixed portion of the models.
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where the first part of the equation that includes the coefficients

to

corresponds to the

fixed-effects. The random effects, or the effects that are not estimated but predicted, are denoted
by the second part of the equation that are captured by the sum of error terms,

, where

stands for the random effects, or in this case, random-intercepts, introduced by the countries,
and

are the errors at the event-level. As hypotheses require, this model will include interaction

terms as additional components.56
Ultimately, multilevel modeling highlights the main methodological vision of the
dissertation from a quantitative viewpoint. Even though a statistical procedure in itself whose
objective is to capture parsimonious relationships, the random- and the fixed-effects components
of this method respectively account for context and detail—the central objective of the multimethod research design explained in this chapter. Using multilevel estimation in a large-N study
of foreign policy behavior not only facilitates a systematic analysis of the relationship between
government composition and commitment intensity as the quantitative component of this study
intends to find out, but it undertakes this task in a two-pronged fashion where the multilevel
56

The xtmixed command in Stata 11 will be used with the mle option.
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characteristics of the procedure estimate intra-country factors alongside those at the countrylevel to better explain the influence of context on commitment intensity. In fact, the countrylevel findings of this analysis will be central to case selection as the qualitative research design
component also discusses below.

Zooming Out, Zooming In: A Qualitative Research Design to Study Commitments
To explain the intensity of foreign policy commitments in parliamentary regimes in post-Cold
War Europe, this dissertation has proposed ‘government composition,’ or more specifically the
simultaneous study of government type and policy incongruence, as a key domestic politics
explanation. The quantitative research design presented above has offered a nuanced, contextconscious approach to systematically analyze the power of this explanation on commitment
behavior. Namely, it has proposed to explicate the independent and interactive effects of the type
and the ideological diversity of multiparty governments on their commitment intensity alongside
a series of control variables to account for international and contextual factors. This discussion
has also highlighted the advantages of multilevel modeling to carry out a quantitative analysis
that can be attentive to parsimony and context at the same time.
It is now time to zoom out. This chapter has started with the argument that to
comprehensively capture the explanatory power of the ‘government composition’ thesis, it is
also important to uncover its mechanisms. How does government composition lead to a change
in the intensity of international commitments? Furthermore, Chapter 2 has emphasized at length
that given the breadth of the literature on foreign policy analysis and the second-image
perspectives of International Relations theories, government type and ideological diversity are
just two of the several factors that explain foreign policy behavior. It is important to take into
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account the other factors at the domestic and the international level, as well as those factors
pertaining to the leadership dynamics at the governmental level, some of which may not be
quantifiable to incorporate in the existing datasets for statistical analysis. These explanations
could be of great utility to uncover the mechanisms that link the composition of coalition
governments to their foreign policy commitments, as well as help explain some of the anomalies
in these behaviors that cannot be readily predicted by the government composition explanation.
To address these gaps, the qualitative design component suggests that we zoom back in,
this time by considering the alternative explanations alongside the key explanation raised in
Chapter 2. Using a comparative case study approach, the qualitative component of the multimethod design will therefore move beyond the quantitative analysis and contextualize two of the
key findings of the dissertation regarding the ‘policy viability’ and ‘veto players’ hypotheses: it
will assess the mediating effects of policy incongruence on the commitment intensities of
minority and minimum winning coalitions in Denmark and the Netherlands, respectively.
Specifically, the qualitative research design will evaluate the influence of government
composition on the commitment behavior of the coalitions in these states while taking into
account the alternative explanations that include logrolling dynamics among political parties,
threats to national survival, public opinion and political leadership. These alternative
explanations will be complemented with an analysis of historical foreign policy orientations and
domestic political norms in each state so as to situate the commitment behaviors of their
governments within the regime’s greater policy context. The section below provides a discussion
of this qualitative effort.
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(a) Case Selection:
First and foremost, why are Denmark and the Netherlands chosen for qualitative analysis?
Unlike Germany—another coalition powerhouse of parliamentary Europe—Denmark and the
Netherlands fall into the category of small states. As Kaarbo (2012: 72) quotes from Van
Staden’s (1989: 109) earlier work: “small powers … may be net consumers rather than producers
of security and likewise their options may be more constrained than of major allies, it is
nevertheless false to believe that their behavior is completely determined by the parameters of
international power constellations or that is fully conditioned by outside pressures.” Doeser
(2013: 583) calls this dynamic the “home-court advantage” of international-level theories.
Put differently, small states make the ‘least-likely’ cases (Doeser 2013: 583) for studies
such as this contribution, which focus on the role of domestic politics in determining
international behavior. To the extent that the domestic political dynamics of small states—most
importantly, their coalition dynamics—outweigh international systemic factors such as alliance
structures or the distribution of power in explaining the intensity of their commitment behaviors,
the argument raised in this dissertation will have far more leverage in explaining the
commitments of ‘bigger states,’ for which international factors constitute even weaker causes for
concern. Denmark and the Netherlands, two of the smaller states in Europe, were chosen
precisely to take on this challenge.
The second reason why these countries were chosen for this study has to do with their
institutional consistency. Damgaard (2000: 231) explains that in Denmark “majority coalition
governments have been the exception rather than the rule,” pointing out the frequency of
minority coalitions in this country. Similarly, studies on Dutch politics show that minimum
winning coalitions have been the predominant institutional outcome since the 1970s (Pennings
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and Keman 2008: 159). These two countries, in other words, respectively provide the best
institutional environments for studying the foreign policy behaviors of minority and minimum
winning coalitions. Choosing the cases from the Denmark and the Netherlands thus controls for
domestic-institutional variation and allows me to assume that the cases do not constitute unique
instances with regards to their political systems.
Finally, Denmark and the Netherlands are chosen to evaluate the “baseline commitment
intensity” levels as determined by the random-intercept models which will be presented in
Chapter 4. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the random-intercept models in multilevel
estimation are advantageous to discern the influence of country-level factors on commitment
intensity that cannot be captured by the independent and control variables in the analyses. As
Chapter 4 will show, Denmark stands as an outlier country in Europe while the Netherlands
shows a much more modest independent effect on commitment intensity, falling within the range
of other European countries in the quantitative analysis. Especially for Denmark, the case
analyses presented in Chapter 5 will therefore be informative to shed light on some of the latent
factors that were not accounted for by the ‘fixed’ portion of the empirical models. It will help us
better understand why Denmark seems to commit far more intensely than expected by the
regression analysis at the international level, when compared to its European counterparts. This
is precisely where the interactive relationship between diverse methodologies that multi-method
designs ever aspire to achieve can be observed most dramatically.
The second question on case selection concerns why these cases from Denmark and the
Netherlands were chosen in particular. First, as discussed above, all three cases are instances of
international cooperation towards military intervention that communicate international
commitment, either in the form of resource allocation such as naval and human capabilities as in
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the case of Denmark, or in the form of political support with incremental resource allocation, as
the Dutch case reveals. In other words, the topical (issue area) similarity of these events allows
for better comparisons.
Furthermore, all three cases are concerned with the Iraqi regime within the context of the
transatlantic leadership, which provides consistency with regards to the allies and the targets that
these commitments engage in. In other words, the events also control for contextual and actor
similarity.
The two Danish cases were chosen to study the most significant inflection points in
Denmark’s foreign policy, or in other words, to show that even the most dramatic foreign policy
issues can be influenced primarily by domestic political dynamics. First, as Chapter 5 will
discuss, sending the warship to the Gulf in 1990 signaled the end of the ‘footnote policy era’ in
Danish foreign policy and marked the beginning of Danish activism in foreign policy (Doeser
2013). Further, this case was also chosen to provide an ‘out-of-sample’ demonstration of the
‘policy viability’ and ‘fragmented opposition’ explanations.
Denmark’s 2003 decision to join the war coalition in Iraq, on the other hand, not only
provides a within-case comparison for Denmark’s involvement in the Gulf region, but it also
constitutes the second historical turning point for Danish foreign policy as it challenged the
consensus-seeking nature of Danish politics, causing a split between the hawkish/pro-US and
dovish/pro-UN supporters of an activist foreign policy in the parliament. In sum, to the extent
that government composition in a small state such as Denmark at two different points in time—
during the final stages of the Cold War and well into the post-Cold War years—explains how
this country decided to participate in international military operations, it will provide strong
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support for the power of domestic-level explanations vis-à-vis those focusing on the
international.
The final case of the qualitative analysis, the 2003 Dutch decision to provide to provide
‘political, but not military’ support for the war in Iraq, was chosen for two reasons. First, it
allows for cross-country comparisons with the 2003 Danish decision to join the war coalition.
More importantly, however, the case provides an exceptional setting where three different
coalitions (more specifically, two governing coalitions and a third coalition in-the-making) tackle
one foreign policy issue: support for the war in Iraq. Whereas the Danish cases take a discrete
approach toward studying government composition and international commitment by looking at
two different points in time, the Dutch case portrays the continuous character of international
politics, where governments might come and go while dealing with common foreign policy
challenges along the way. Looking at the changes in government and their effects on the
variation in the Dutch commitment towards the Iraq war will therefore be informative to
understand whether and how the fluidity of a state’s domestic politics influences its international
behavior.

(b) Dependent Variable:
The dependent variable in the qualitative analysis concerns three instances of international
commitment, namely Denmark’s 1990 decision to send the naval corvette Olfert Fischer to the
Gulf and the 2003 decision to participate in the Iraq war coalition with “a 24-member submarine
and a 91-member escort” (Kaarbo and Cantir 2013) respectively, as well as the 2003 Dutch
decision to commit political support for the 2003 Iraq war. All of these cases are instances of
international commitment to military operations in the Middle East, though they vary in the
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extent to which they involve verbal and nonverbal forms of behavior. The Danish cases are
examples of extending military assistance—the most intense cooperative international
commitment (8.3) as the Goldstein (1992) commitment scale introduced earlier denotes. On the
contrary, the Dutch case begins with political (verbal) support for the war (3.6 on the Goldstein
scale) but as Chapter 6 will explain in detail, incremental material support was also provided by
the Dutch along the way, therefore increasing their commitment intensity score above the 3.6
level.
These three instances of commitment behavior will be explained by utilizing the method
of structured-focused comparison. The next sections introduce the method of structured-focused
comparison as well as the independent variables, which are derived from the theoretical
framework offered in Chapter 2.
.
(c) The Method:
To assess the effects of government composition on the intensity of international commitments
in Denmark and the Netherlands alongside the alternative explanations discussed in Chapter 2, I
use George’s (1979) method of structured, focused comparison. This method “encourages
analysts to ask a set of ‘standardized, general questions’ across cases” (Mahoney 2004: 1099) in
order to evaluate the presence, absence, or the intensity of independent variables of interest on
the observed outcome.
The method of structured, focused comparison “deals selectively with only certain
aspects of the historical case” (George 1979: 61) while “assur[ing] the acquisition of comparable
data from the several cases” (George 1979: 62) through the use of standardized questions, each
of which are tailored to measure the independent variables. The method thus cannot exhaust all
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possible explanations of the phenomena. Nevertheless, this method allows the investigator to
focus on their most important possible causes and provides “systematic and contextualized
comparisons” (Mahoney 2004: 1100, emphasis added) across and within cases. In effect, the
method further illuminates the core methodological vision emphasized throughout this chapter.
As it maintains the balance between systematic inquiry and context-oriented evaluation, the
method of structured-focused comparison facilitates powerful qualitative analysis that continues
to remain attentive to revealing comparable, succinct findings while ensuring that these findings
are situated within their international, domestic, and even individual contexts.

(d) Independent Variables:
As described above, asking standardized questions across a small number of cases to identify the
presence and the effects of independent variables of interest is the foundation of the method of
structured-focused comparison. The following questions are designed to evaluate the effects of a
series of independent variables on the commitment decisions of Denmark and the Netherlands to
support the wars in the Gulf and in Iraq. These questions are designed to not only evaluate the
effects of the key explanation emphasized in this study, namely government composition, but
also the alternative explanations introduced in Chapter 2.

Ideological Composition: Which parties were included in the Danish minority and the Dutch
minimum winning coalitions at the time of these events? What were their left-right ideological
positions in their respective political systems and what were their policy positions regarding the
proposals to commit in the Gulf or in the Iraq war coalition?
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Logrolling: Were there any parties inside or outside the governments in Denmark and the
Netherlands that gave support to the decisions in 1990 or 2003 in return for future sidepayments? Was the support of these parties contingent on future policy or office payoffs?

Public Opinion: Were the 1990 Gulf and the 2003 Iraq wars and the possibility of joining these
wars publicly popular in these countries? Was public opinion influential on these regimes’
decisions to engage in foreign policy commitments in the Gulf War and in the war in Iraq?

Threat to National Survival: Did the Danish and the Dutch governments perceive the foreign
policy situations in the Gulf (1990) and in Iraq (2003) as threats to their national survival? Was
there any domestic political crisis at the time that compelled the government to divert the
public’s attention?

Political Leadership: Were there any influential political leaders in the Danish and Dutch
governments who hijacked the decision-making process and forced the government to make
commitments in their own preferred direction? Were personal motivations involved in these
commitment decisions?

Finally, the analysis will look at two more contextual factors that could influence policymaking. The first factor concerns the historical orientations of foreign policy in Denmark and
the Netherlands: What are the historical foreign policy orientations of these states? Did their
commitment decisions in Iraq and in the Gulf conform to or deviate from these orientations? The
second factor concerns the existence of consensus-seeking norms in the policy-making
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environments of these states: are the Danish and Dutch political systems mostly competitive or
do policy-makers mostly seek consensus in decision-making? These questions will be discussed
in detail throughout each analysis to provide the foreign policy and domestic political
competition contexts in each state.
To respond to these standardized questions, several primary and secondary sources have
been utilized. To investigate the ideological positions and foreign policy preferences of the
Danish and Dutch political parties, primary resources such as statements of party leaders and
advisers are used alongside expert survey datasets on party positions such as the Chapel Hill
Expert Survey (Hooghe et al. 2010) and the Ray-Marks-Steenbergen dataset57 (Ray 1999;
Steenbergen and Marks 2007), as well as other secondary resources that provide historical
accounts such as Damgaard (2000), Andeweg and Irwin (2005) and the Inter-Parliamentary
Union’s PARLINE online database of national parliaments.
Evidence for logrolling, threats to national survival and political leadership also come
from party statements and other secondary accounts, including news articles from the
international media, the Danish Foreign Policy Yearbooks (2012, 2013), reports from the Danish
Institute for International Studies (Olesen 2012) and the Danish Defense Commission (1998), as
well as scholarly books and articles. Finally, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s monthly reports
on Denmark and the Netherlands between 2001 and 2003 have been utilized among other
scholarly accounts to trace the changes in the public opinion ratings of parties in the parliament
as well as other, more instantaneous developments in the country’s foreign and domestic politics.
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This dataset is used primarily in the discussion of the 1990 Denmark case. As discussed
previously in this chapter, the CHES datasets methodologically echo the Ray-Steenbergen-Marks
surveys, which facilitate its simultaneous use with CHES.
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Conclusion
This chapter has raised the argument that it is crucial to combine and harmonize quantitative and
qualitative methodologies in order to comprehensively demonstrate the analytical power of the
‘government composition’ thesis, and more generally, the ‘coalition politics framework’
introduced in Chapter 2.
The chapter has begun with the assertion that we should seek to exploit the advantages of
both methodologies. By using qualitative and quantitative methodologies in tandem, we can
develop systematic accounts of foreign policy behavior while at the same time uncovering the
mechanisms that lay beneath these relationships and the contextual factors that might further
influence them. To that end, this chapter has provided an extensive account of the multi-method
research strategy adopted in this dissertation to explain the international commitment intensity of
post-Cold War European parliamentary systems by focusing on their government composition as
the key explanatory factor. Furthermore, the multi-method approach also offers a good
methodological fit towards building multilevel and multicausal explanations of foreign policy
while maintaining systematization and rigor on one hand and attentiveness to context and detail
on the other, as prescribed by James Rosenau and Charles Kegley.
In this effort, the chapter has first introduced the major cornerstones of the empirical
analyses, namely the operationalization and measurement of the key independent variables—
government type and policy incongruence—as well as the dependent variable, commitment
intensity. Next, the chapter has introduced the quantitative research design by discussing the
foreign policy events dataset and laying out the dependent, independent and control variables
that will be employed in the regression analyses. This section concluded with a discussion of the
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advantages of multilevel modeling, which is the estimation procedure that will be used in the
statistical analyses.
The most critical point suggested throughout the quantitative research design section of
the chapter has been that even though the large-N analysis is utilized to provide a parsimonious
account of the relationship between government composition and commitment intensity, the
level of detail and attentiveness to context introduced by the independent and control variables as
well as the estimation technique nicely corresponds to the greater methodological vision of the
dissertation—that nuance and parsimony can indeed go hand in hand, even in quantitative
research.
The chapter has then moved on to discussing the need to complement the quantitative
analysis with qualitative insights. In order to establish the explanatory power of government
composition and the underlying mechanisms that link its influence to commitment behavior, it is
important to empirically demonstrate how this key explanation performs on its own as well as
against the alternative international-, domestic- or individual-level explanations. As the final
section of Chapter 2 has highlighted, government composition is one of the several possible
explanations of commitment behavior at the international level. Most of these alternative
explanations work as facilitating, inhibiting or reinforcing factors that influence foreign policy
behavior. Therefore, their effects can be best evaluated through qualitative research designs.
With that in mind, this chapter has offered a qualitative research design component to
outline the methodology behind the case analyses of the Danish decisions to join the 1990 war in
the Gulf and the 2003 war in Iraq, as well as the Dutch decision to give political support to the
2003 war in Iraq. These cases are selected to explicate the ‘policy viability / fragmented
opposition’ explanation regarding minority coalitions (Denmark) and the ‘veto players’
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explanation regarding minimum winning coalitions (the Netherlands). The discussion has
outlined the method of structured-focused comparison for the qualitative analyses and provided
an extensive account of the case selection strategy, independent variables and the data sources.
The qualitative research design has echoed its quantitative counterpart in emphasizing the
methodological vision of the dissertation. Through the utilization of the method of structuredfocused comparison and standardized questions, the qualitative component of this dissertation,
too, aims to maintain a systematic inquiry of commitment behavior across the minority coalitions
in Denmark and the minimum winning coalitions in the Netherlands. While doing that, however,
the qualitative nature of the method continues to provide greater room to include detail and
contextual evidence in the analysis.
Ultimately, the multi-method approach offered in this chapter aspires to result in a
fruitful, engaging and comprehensive empirical analysis of foreign policy behavior in post-Cold
War European governments toward developing a coalition politics framework. The next three
chapters present the empirical outcomes of this effort.
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CHAPTER 4

COALITION GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS:
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS58

Introduction
As part of the multi-method research design employed in this study, this chapter takes a
quantitative approach to explain international commitments across European governments in the
post-Cold War era, specifically the period from 1994 to 2004. The chapter seeks to uncover
whether the composition of governments parliamentary democracies, described as the
parliamentary arithmetic of the government and the level of policy incongruence among the
government parties, affects the intensity of commitments in their foreign policy behavior.
As a refresher, Table 4.1 below summarizes the hypotheses that were introduced in
Chapter 2.
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Sections from this chapter are published in Oktay, S. (2014) Constraining or Enabling? The
Effects of Government Composition on International Commitments, Journal of European Public
Policy, 21(6): 860-884.
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Hypothesis 1

Due to their size vulnerability, minority
governments will be negatively associated with
commitment intensity.

Hypothesis 2a

All coalition governments will be negatively
associated with commitment intensity (veto
player approach).

All coalition governments will be positively
associated with commitment intensity in their
Hypothesis 2b
international behavior (clarity of responsibility
approach).
After controlling for ideological differences,
both oversized coalitions and minimum
Hypothesis 3a
winning coalitions will have a positive
relationship with commitment intensity.
After controlling for ideological differences,
oversized coalitions will engage in more
Hypothesis 3b
committed behavior than minimum winning
coalitions.
At increasing levels of ideological disunity
inside the government, oversized coalitions
will be negatively associated with commitment
Hypothesis 4a
intensity compared to single-party majority
governments.
At increasing levels of ideological disunity
inside the government, minimum winning
coalitions will be negatively associated with
Hypothesis 4b
commitment intensity compared to single-party
majority governments.
Minority coalitions will be negatively
associated
with
commitment
intensity
Hypothesis 5a
regardless of the ideological differences
among the coalition parties.
If minority coalitions can ideologically
fragment the parliamentary opposition, they
will be positively associated with commitment
Hypothesis 5b
intensity compared to single-party majority
governments.
Table 4.1 Summary of Hypotheses

This chapter begins by reporting the findings of three sets of multilevel regression
analyses, where each set employs a different measure of policy incongruence, namely the
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standard deviation of party positions from the coalition mean, ideological range, and a
categorical variable that measures whether the government includes parties from both the
political right and left (“center is crossed”). The chapter will conclude with an overview of the
findings and what they mean for the existing literature on foreign policy analysis.
A major contribution of this chapter is that through the use of multilevel modeling, the
results demonstrate how countries—regardless of their government composition or material
capabilities—vary in their commitment intensity. As such, the findings reported in this chapter
call for a more nuanced study of domestic-level variables on international outcomes: variablebased approaches to the quantitative analysis of second-image-level puzzles can be improved by
incorporating more sophisticated statistical tools that can help account for other underlying
effects that are not accounted for individually by variable specification.

Policy Incongruence as “Standard Deviation from the Mean Coalition Position”
Table 4.2a below presents the results of the analyses that use Standard deviation of government
party positions to measure policy incongruence. This table includes seven models that illustrate
how the relationship between government composition and international commitments changes
as more nuanced conceptualizations and aspects of “government structure” are adopted along the
way, as well as different estimation approaches.59 For simplicity, Table 4.2a excludes the models
that test the effects of the additional control variables. These additional models are provided in
Table 4.2b.

59

The xtmixed, mle command in Stata 11 is used to run the multilevel regression analyses.
Likelihood ratio tests for all models indicate that the multilevel models are statistically different
from ordinary least squares models that include the same set of variables. It is advised that
scholars use multilevel model specifications when they are statistically different from the OLS
specifications.
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Model 1 replicates previous approaches and uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
with robust standard errors to test the effects of two independent variables that are used
frequently in similar research studies—coalition and minority government.60 This model shows
that when the OLS estimation is used, neither the Coalition nor the Minority government dummy
variable has a statistically significant effect on the intensity of international commitments of
European parliamentary democracies during the 1994-2004 period.
Model 2 shows that the findings from Model 1 change once the characteristics of the
dataset are considered and a multilevel model (MLM) is used to test the same set of independent
variables. The results show that minority governments significantly decrease the intensity of
international commitments, supporting Hypothesis 1. Moreover, the negative and significant
coefficient for Coalition in Model 2 suggests that the veto players approach finds support in
general, while the clarity of responsibility approach does not: having many parties in government
decreases the intensity of international commitments. Hypothesis 2a is supported and Hypothesis
2b is rejected. Finally, minority coalitions have the largest negative effect on commitment (~0.3
points).
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Kaarbo and Beasley (2008) use a logistic model as they explain the effects of these variables
on a binary dependent variable. The main point here is that regardless of the nature of the
dependent variable, the analysis used to estimate the relationship focuses only on the fixedeffects of the independent variables rather than considering both fixed and random effects.
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Coalition
Minority Government
CINC
Democratic Target

(1)
(OLS)

(2)
(MLM)

-0.064
(0.034)
-0.059
(0.042)
-9.617***
(1.551)
-0.321***
(0.039)

-0.145*
(0.066)
-0.141*
(0.060)
-8.009*
(3.724)
-0.319***
(0.038)

Single-party Minority
Minority Coalition
Minimum Winning Co.
Oversized Co.

(3)
(MLM)

(4)
(MLM)

(5)
(MLM)

(7)
(MLM)

(9)
(MLM)

-7.436*
(3.702)
-0.320***
(0.038)
-0.082
(0.089)
-0.275**
(0.097)
-0.140
(0.084)
-0.046
(0.090)

-11.342**
(4.133)
-0.321***
(0.040)
-0.087
(0.091)
-0.067
(0.150)
0.151
(0.119)
0.323*
(0.132)
-0.192**
(0.060)

-11.333**
(4.125)
-0.321***
(0.040)
-0.087
(0.091)
-0.060
(0.215)
0.149
(0.131)
0.320*
(0.144)
-0.190**
(0.071)
-0.006
(0.140)

-11.161**
(4.045)
-0.320***
(0.040)
-0.084
(0.090)
0.080
(0.164)
-0.024
(0.144)
0.404**
(0.136)
-0.291***
(0.077)

-11.733*
(4.678)
-0.320***
(0.040)
-0.107
(0.096)
-0.216
(0.170)
0.039
(0.136)
0.551***
(0.167)
-0.110
(0.073)

Pol. Incongruence (St. Dev.)
Minority Co. * Pol. Inc.
Minimum Win. * Pol. Inc.
Oversized * Pol. Inc.
Constant

2.526***
(0.048)

Country-Level Std. Error
Event-Level Std. Error
Rho
N

11211

2.590***
(0.072)
0.133***
(0.034)
1.783***
(0.012)
0.006
11211

2.555***
(0.081)
0.131***
(0.035)
1.783***
(0.012)
0.005
11211

0.228*
(0.109)

-0.292*
(0.122)
2.586***
2.586***
2.589***
2.599***
(0.084)
(0.084)
(0.083)
(0.090)
0.137***
0.136***
0.132***
0.164***
(0.038)
(0.042)
(0.037)
(0.045)
1.791***
1.791***
1.790***
1.790***
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.013)
0.006
0.006
0.005
0.008
9963
9963
9963
9963
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 4.2a Commitment Intensity in Foreign Policy Behavior, Folded Goldstein Scores
(IV: Standard deviation of party positions from the mean Left-Right position of the coalition)
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CINC
Democratic Target
Single-party Minority
Minority Coalition
Minimum Winning Co.
Oversized Co.
Pol. Incongruence (St. Dev.)
Minority Co. * Pol. Inc.

(6)
(MLM)

(8)
(MLM)

(10)
(MLM)

-13.412**
(4.923)
-0.316***
(0.040)
-0.124
(0.098)
-0.110
(0.221)
0.100
(0.139)
0.273
(0.150)
-0.173*
(0.075)
-0.024
(0.145)

-13.679**
(4.670)
-0.317***
(0.040)
-0.102
(0.096)
0.010
(0.172)
-0.054
(0.152)
0.359**
(0.139)
-0.273***
(0.080)

-14.282**
(5.345)
-0.317***
(0.040)
-0.133
(0.101)
-0.255
(0.174)
0.012
(0.142)
0.482**
(0.175)
-0.112
(0.074)

Minimum Win. * Pol. Inc.

0.215
(0.117)

Oversized * Pol. Inc.
Years of EU Membership
September 11, 2001
2003 Iraq Invasion
Bosnia War
Kosovo War
Constant
Country-Level Std. Error
Event-Level Std. Error
Rho
N

0.001
(0.002)
-0.035
(0.063)
-0.125
(0.089)
-0.006
(0.063)
-0.034
(0.055)
2.638***
(0.100)
0.144***
(0.044)
1.790***
(0.013)
0.006
9963

0.002
(0.002)
-0.037
(0.062)
-0.095
(0.089)
-0.022
(0.063)
-0.038
(0.054)
2.625***
(0.097)
0.133***
(0.038)
1.790***
(0.013)
0.005
9963

-0.252
(0.133)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.020
(0.063)
-0.098
(0.091)
-0.013
(0.063)
-0.025
(0.055)
2.629***
(0.105)
0.161***
(0.044)
1.789***
(0.013)
0.008
9963

Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 4.2b Commitment Intensity in Foreign Policy Behavior, Folded Goldstein Scores, with
Additional Control Variables (IV: Standard deviation of party positions)
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Model 3 and the subsequent models in Table 4.2a explicate government types so that
single-party majority governments remain as the baseline for the analyses, captured by the
constant term in the regressions. The negative and significant coefficient for Minority coalition
in Model 3 suggests that minority coalitions are significantly different from all other government
types and they engage in less intense international commitments than single-party majority
governments. Thus, Hypothesis 5a is supported. Model 3 also suggests that it is misleading to
consider Coalition and Minority government as homogenous categories as Model 2 does, since
the negative and significant effects of these variables seem to come from minority coalitions
only.
When policy incongruence is accounted for in Model 4, however, the empirical support
for Hypothesis 5a disappears. Further, the negative and significant coefficient for the Policy
Incongruence variable suggests that as coalition parties are more dispersed ideologically, the
intensity of their international commitments decreases significantly.
Model 4 also presents a refined approach to test the clarity of responsibility thesis. It
shows that when all coalition types are set to a constant level of ideological dispersion, oversized
coalitions act significantly more committed than single-party majority governments. The results
therefore partially support Hypothesis 3a as only oversized coalitions engage in more intense
commitments than single-party majority coalitions. In other words, the clarity of responsibility
thesis is supported only for oversized coalitions, which command more parties than other
majority coalitions in the dataset. As such, the results echo Vowles (2010), who shows that
coalition governments of three or more parties in more developed democracies enjoy less
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accountability.61 The results also reject Hypothesis 3b, since the statistical insignificance of the
coefficient for Minimum winning coalition does not allow for the comparison of minimum
winning and oversized coalitions regarding the size of their effects on commitment intensity.
Model 4 assumes that the effect of policy incongruence is the same across all coalition
types as it generates a single slope, while the effects of different coalitions on commitment
intensity are captured by their respective intercepts. Considering the expectations of the veto
player approach, what if policy incongruence has different effects for different coalitions? The
next models therefore refine the veto players approach and test whether policy incongruence
moderates the effect of different majority coalitions on commitment intensity. In Table 4.2a,
Models 5, 7, and 9 include interaction terms constituted by coalition type and policy
incongruence to test these effects, first without the additional control variables. Table 4.2b then
includes these control variables in Models 6, 8, and 10 for robustness.
First, take oversized coalitions. Model 9 in Table 4.2a shows that the interaction term
(Oversized*Pol. Inc.) is negative and significant, indicating that as policy incongruence increases
in an oversized coalition, its commitment intensity decreases compared to single-party majority
governments. The results therefore support Hypothesis 4a. As more parties from divergent
ideological positions populate an oversized coalition, it becomes harder for this government to
engage in more intense international commitments.
The results above, however, also suggested that having an oversized coalition enabled
more intense commitments through diffusion. How do we reconcile these outcomes? These
findings suggest that an oversized coalition enjoys diffusion of responsibility when compared to
other coalitions with the same level of ideological dispersion as long as this dispersion is not
61

In the present dataset, the average number of parties is 2.72 for minimum winning coalitions,
and 3.9 for oversized coalitions.
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disturbed. As the interaction term shows, an increase in the policy incongruence of existing
oversized coalitions leads to a decrease in the intensity of their international commitments. In
other words, if a party joins an oversized coalition, its left-right ideological position should not
cause a stretch in the existing level of dispersion in the coalition in order not to decrease its
commitment intensity.
Figure 4.1 below explains this phenomenon graphically. Suppose a Party D joins an
existing oversized coalition, ‘ABC,’ whose ideological dispersion is defined by the parties A, B,
and C. If Party D’s ideological position fell anywhere between those of A and C (Scenario I), the
new oversized coalition ABCD would be an even bigger oversized coalition with the same level
of policy incongruence as the dispersion of the parties from the mean coalition position would
not expand.62 In fact, this new coalition would act even more committed than the previous tripartite coalition as with more parties, increased diffusion of responsibility would allow the new
coalition to increase the intensity of its commitments.63 However, if Party D’s ideological
position fell to the right of Party C or to the left of Party A (Scenario II), then the policy
incongruence of the new ABCD coalition would be greater than that of the ABC coalition. Thus,
given the results of Model 9, the increased ideological dispersion would cause a decrease in the
commitment intensity of the new coalition.
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In fact, the standard deviation value would decrease, mathematically speaking.
Simple correlations show that the strength of the positive relationship between oversized
coalitions and commitment intensity almost doubles from .44 to .73 as the number of parties in
the coalition goes from three to four (significant at p < 0.005).
63
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Figure 4.1 Oversized Coalitions and Policy Incongruence

Next, consider minimum winning coalitions. Model 7 shows that the interaction term
Minimum Win.*Pol. Inc. has a significant coefficient, though its sign is the opposite of what was
expected. Hypothesis 4b cannot be supported: when policy incongruence increases in minimum
winning coalitions they engage in more—not less—intense commitments than single-party
majority governments.
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Figure 4.2 Marginal Effect of Minimum Winning Coalitions on Commitment Intensity,
with 95% Confidence Intervals
(Table 4.2a, Model 7)
Figure 4.2 above suggests that a two unit increase in the dispersion of party ideologies in
a minimum winning coalition increases its commitment intensity by about 0.5 points when
compared to single-party governments. This corresponds to a move from issuing an informal
complaint (-1.9) to a formal complaint (-2.4), or more dramatically, from threatening with force
(-7.0) to actual armed force mobilization (-7.6).
A possible explanation for this finding is that at higher levels of policy incongruence,
minimum winning coalitions suffer from fragility and lack domestic legitimacy, to which they
might respond by diversionary foreign policy (Smith 1996). In this vein, Hagan (1993: 30)
argues that “even the most unstable coalition may try to act on major foreign policy issues in
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order to demonstrate its ability to cope with policy crises and thereby achieve some legitimacy at
home.” Second, junior parties in these coalitions have credible blackmail power that allows them
to hijack the government toward their own policy position by threatening to defect if their
preferences are not met (Kaarbo 1996a, 1996b, Clare 2010). Any party in a loosely connected
minimum winning coalition might then pull the coalition toward its own position and force it to
act more committed in its preferred direction. Clare (2010) has found, for instance, that pivotal,
right-wing outlier parties in coalitions pull the government towards international conflict
involvement.
Finally, the insignificance of the interaction term for minority coalitions in Model 5
shows that the ideological dispersion inside these governments does not moderate their
commitment intensity. This gives support to the claim that size vulnerability is the mechanism
that drives these governments toward lower levels of intensity when compared to their singleparty majority counterparts.
Models 6, 8, and 10 in Table 4.2b include the crisis and the EU control variables for
robustness, and they have no significant effect on the intensity of commitments in foreign policy
behavior. Furthermore, they also lead to a loss of statistical significance when they are included
in the models. For instance in Models 8 and 10, the interaction terms are no longer significant
even though they retain the expected sign.
It is especially interesting that the length of EU membership has no effect on the
commitment intensity of European governments, considering the Union’s increasingly proactive
foreign and security frameworks over the years as well as its economic interactions with other
international actors. The other control variables, CINC and Democratic Target, are both
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negatively associated with commitment intensity, echoing earlier findings (Kaarbo and Beasley
2008).
Finally, the intra-class correlation, or Rho, reports the ratio of variance explained by the
country-level effects to the sum of variation explained by both country- and event-levels.64 The
Rho values in Tables 4.2a and 4.2b range between 0.5 percent and 0.8 percent, which indicate
low intra-class correlation: the events that come from the same country are not correlated
strongly enough to bias the results. These values also suggest that less than one percent of the
variation in the data is explained by the country-level factors which constitute the ‘randomeffects’ portion of the models. The rho values, in other words, provide additional statistical
leverage for the results since they suggest that the country-level factors that are not explicitly
accounted for in the models explain only a tiny fraction of the variance in the data.

Policy Incongruence as “Ideological Range”
To provide robustness to the results reported in Tables 4.2a and 4.2b, a second set of tests uses
ideological range as a measure of policy incongruence. This measure uses the distance between
the most distant parties in a coalition along the left-right political spectrum (Tsebelis 1999). As
explained in the previous chapter, this measure of policy incongruence is very highly correlated
with the ideological dispersion measure used earlier (Warwick 1992). Following the previous
format, Table 4.3a below presents the results without the additional control variables
The first three models in Table 4.3a are the same as those reported in Table 4.2a. Model 1
uses ordinary least squares estimation to replicate earlier studies, Model 2 uses multilevel

64

Mathematically, Rho can be expressed as
and it is also known as intra-class

correlation.
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estimation to re-test Model 1, and Model 3 looks at the individual effects of different coalition
types on commitment intensity, respectively. The rest of the models use multilevel estimation.

Coalition
Minority Government
CINC
Democratic Target

(1)
(OLS)

(2)
(MLM)

-0.064
(0.034)
-0.059
(0.042)
-9.617***
(1.551)
-0.321***
(0.039)

-0.145*
(0.066)
-0.141*
(0.060)
-8.009*
(3.724)
-0.319***
(0.038)

Single-party Minority
Minority Coalition
Minimum Winning Co.
Oversized Co.

(3)
(MLM)

(4)
(MLM)

(5)
(MLM)

(7)
(MLM)

(9)
(MLM)

-7.436*
(3.702)
-0.320***
(0.038)
-0.082
(0.089)
-0.275**
(0.097)
-0.140
(0.084)
-0.046
(0.090)

-10.255*
(4.368)
-0.321***
(0.040)
-0.090
(0.093)
-0.093
(0.146)
0.125
(0.113)
0.330*
(0.131)
-0.097***
(0.028)

-10.251*
(4.382)
-0.321***
(0.040)
-0.091
(0.094)
-0.099
(0.223)
0.127
(0.119)
0.332*
(0.139)
-0.098**
(0.031)
0.003
(0.077)

-10.768*
(4.340)
-0.320***
(0.040)
-0.094
(0.093)
0.005
(0.154)
-0.024
(0.136)
0.399**
(0.136)
-0.138***
(0.035)

-10.940*
(4.843)
-0.320***
(0.040)
-0.110
(0.097)
-0.236
(0.167)
0.018
(0.131)
0.477**
(0.152)
-0.054
(0.037)

Pol. Incongruence (Range)
Minority Co. * Pol. Inc.
Minimum Win. * Pol. Inc.

0.101
(0.053)

Oversized * Pol. Inc.
Constant

2.526***
(0.048)

Country-Level Std. Error
Event-Level Std. Error
Rho
N

11211

2.590***
(0.072)
0.133***
(0.034)
1.783***
(0.012)
0.006
11211

2.555***
(0.081)
0.131***
(0.035)
1.783***
(0.012)
0.005
11211

2.579***
(0.087)
0.149***
(0.040)
1.790***
(0.013)
0.007
9963

-0.111*
(0.054)
2.579***
2.589***
2.594***
(0.087)
(0.087)
(0.092)
0.150***
0.148***
0.172***
(0.045)
(0.040)
(0.046)
1.790***
1.790***
1.789***
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.013)
0.007
0.007
0.009
9963
9963
9963
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 4.3a Commitment Intensity in Foreign Policy Behavior, Folded Goldstein Scores
(IV: Ideological range)
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(6)
(MLM)

(8)
(MLM)

(10)
(MLM)

-12.663* -13.570** -13.596*
(5.160)
(5.020)
(5.537)
***
***
Democratic Target
-0.316
-0.317
-0.317***
(0.040)
(0.040)
(0.040)
Single-party Minority
-0.125
-0.111
-0.132
(0.100)
(0.098)
(0.102)
Minority Coalition
-0.120
-0.062
-0.268
(0.229)
(0.161)
(0.173)
Minimum Winning Co.
0.074
-0.054
-0.004
(0.126)
(0.144)
(0.138)
Oversized Co.
0.279
0.352*
0.410**
(0.144)
(0.139)
(0.159)
Pol. Incongruence (Range) -0.087**
-0.128*** -0.056
(0.033)
(0.037)
(0.038)
Minority Co. * Pol. Inc.
-0.018
(0.080)
Minimum Win. * Pol. Inc.
0.095
(0.058)
Oversized * Pol. Inc.
-0.091
(0.060)
Years of EU Membership
0.001
0.002
0.002
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.003)
September 11, 2001
-0.036
-0.037
-0.025
(0.063)
(0.062)
(0.063)
2003 Iraq Invasion
-0.106
-0.081
-0.084
(0.089)
(0.090)
(0.091)
Bosnia War
0.008
-0.012
-0.003
(0.064)
(0.064)
(0.065)
Kosovo War
-0.024
-0.034
-0.021
(0.056)
(0.055)
(0.055)
Constant
2.623***
2.620***
2.620***
(0.103)
(0.101)
(0.107)
Country-Level Std. Error
0.154***
0.146***
0.169***
(0.047)
(0.041)
(0.045)
Event-Level Std. Error
1.790***
1.790***
1.789***
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.013)
Rho
0.007
0.007
0.009
N
9963
9963
9963
CINC

Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 4.3b Commitment Intensity in Foreign Policy Behavior, Folded Goldstein Scores, with
Additional Control Variables (IV: Ideological range)
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The results reported in Table 4.3a show noticeable similarities to those presented in Table
4.2a. First, when measured in terms of the ideological range of parties in government based on
their positions along the left-right political spectrum, Policy Incongruence continues to exert a
negative effect on commitment intensity as observed in the previous set of results. Furthermore,
Model 4 shows that oversized coalitions continue to have a positive effect on commitment when
ideological range is used as a measure of policy incongruence. Of all majority coalitions, only
oversized coalitions enjoy the diffusion of responsibility, through which they find the room to act
more committed in their foreign policy behavior. Therefore, the results continue to provide
partial support for Hypothesis 3a and reject Hypothesis 3b.
As for those models testing the refined veto players approach, Model 7 shows that using
ideological range as a measure of policy incongruence does not have a significant amplifying
effect on the commitment intensity of minimum winning coalitions. Unlike the results reported
in Table 4.2a, here the interaction term (Minimum Win.*Pol. Inc.) remains insignificant. Once
again, Hypothesis 4b cannot be supported. On the other hand, the results of Model 9 continue to
support Hypothesis 4a: as the ideological range expands in existing oversized coalitions, their
commitment intensity decreases. The mechanism presented by Figure 4.1 earlier also applies
here to explain this relationship.
Tables 4.3a and 4.3b show that CINC and Democratic Target are negative and
significant, echoing the previous sets of results. The additional control variables that test the
effects of international crises and European Union membership continue to remain insignificant
in Table 4.3b, and they continue to affect the pre-control results. As Model 10 in Table 4.3b
shows, the interaction term Oversized*Pol. Inc. in Model 9 is no longer significant once the
additional control variables are included. Ultimately, the analyses reported in Tables 4.3a and
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4.3b conclude that when compared to the tests using the ideological range measure of policy
incongruence, the standard deviation measure not only provides more statistical leverage for the
results but results in larger substantive effects as well.

Policy Incongruence as “Center is Crossed”
The final set of results use a third alternative measurement for the independent variable, policy
incongruence. This measure looks at whether the government includes parties from the opposite
sides of the political spectrum, shortly termed as “center is crossed.” The assumption here is that
parties that come from the same side of the political spectrum—no matter how distant they might
be—could still share similar positions on policy, whereas parties from the opposite sides might
have more fundamental differences that could affect their commitment intensity. In other words,
this measure of policy incongruence focuses on the quality of ideological differences rather than
their quantity. Table 4.4a and 4.4b below present the results, first without and then with the
additional control variables, respectively. Once again, the first three models in Table 4.4a report
the same results as did Tables 4.2a and 4.3a. The rest of the models use the center is crossed
measure for the policy incongruence variable and they are estimated with multilevel modeling.
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Coalition
Minority Government
CINC
Democratic Target

(1)
(OLS)

(2)
(MLM)

-0.064
(0.034)
-0.059
(0.042)
-9.617***
(1.551)
-0.321***
(0.039)

-0.145*
(0.066)
-0.141*
(0.060)
-8.009*
(3.724)
-0.319***
(0.038)

Single-party Minority
Minority Coalition
Minimum Winning Co.
Oversized Co.

(3)
(MLM)

(4)
(MLM)

(5)
(MLM)

(7)
(MLM)

(9)
(MLM)

-7.436*
(3.702)
-0.320***
(0.038)
-0.082
(0.089)
-0.275**
(0.097)
-0.140
(0.084)
-0.046
(0.090)

-7.963*
(3.860)
-0.324***
(0.039)
-0.089
(0.090)
-0.328**
(0.114)
-0.145
(0.095)
-0.019
(0.103)
0.027
(0.074)

-9.701*
(3.777)
-0.324***
(0.039)
-0.108
(0.089)
-0.541***
(0.147)
-0.083
(0.096)
0.035
(0.103)
-0.069
(0.085)
0.403*
(0.177)

-6.826
(4.241)
-0.318***
(0.039)
-0.096
(0.093)
-0.229
(0.123)
-0.293**
(0.108)
-0.002
(0.108)
-0.148
(0.089)

-9.152*
(4.075)
-0.319***
(0.039)
-0.109
(0.092)
-0.418***
(0.118)
-0.198*
(0.098)
0.161
(0.112)
0.150
(0.079)

Pol. Inc. (Center Crossed)
Minority Co. * Pol. Inc.
Minimum Win. * Pol. Inc.
Oversized * Pol. Inc.
Constant

2.526***
(0.048)

Country-Level Std. Error
Event-Level Std. Error
Rho
N

11211

2.590***
(0.072)
0.133***
(0.034)
1.783***
(0.012)
0.006
11211

2.555***
(0.081)
0.131***
(0.035)
1.783***
(0.012)
0.005
11211

2.562***
(0.082)
0.133***
(0.037)
1.785***
(0.012)
0.006
10423

0.414***
(0.115)

-0.616***
(0.126)
2.575***
2.567***
2.572***
(0.080)
(0.087)
(0.085)
0.125***
0.152***
0.144***
(0.036)
(0.040)
(0.040)
1.785***
1.784***
1.783***
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
0.005
0.007
0.006
10423
10423
10423
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 4.4a Commitment Intensity in Foreign Policy Behavior, Folded Goldstein Scores
(IV: Center is Crossed)
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(6)
(MLM)
-12.184**
(4.656)
Democratic Target
-0.320***
(0.039)
Single-party Minority
-0.121
(0.094)
Minority Coalition
-0.547***
(0.151)
Minimum Winning Co.
-0.103
(0.102)
Oversized Co.
0.017
(0.106)
Pol. Inc. (Center is Crossed) -0.061
(0.088)
Minority Co. * Pol. Inc.
0.346
(0.181)
Minimum Win. * Pol. Inc.
CINC

(8)
(MLM)

-9.286
-11.683*
(5.031)
(4.877)
***
-0.318
-0.319***
(0.039)
(0.039)
-0.092
-0.117
(0.098)
(0.096)
-0.261*
-0.450***
(0.127)
(0.121)
-0.278*
-0.213*
(0.111)
(0.103)
-0.004
0.150
(0.109)
(0.114)
-0.138
0.138
(0.094)
(0.081)
0.373**
(0.125)

Oversized * Pol. Inc.
Years of EU Membership
September 11, 2001
2003 Iraq Invasion
Bosnia War
Kosovo War
Constant
Country-Level Std. Error
Event-Level Std. Error
Rho
N

0.002
(0.002)
-0.065
(0.061)
-0.093
(0.086)
-0.027
(0.060)
-0.041
(0.052)
2.623***
(0.095)
0.129***
(0.037)
1.785***
(0.012)
0.005
10423

(10)
(MLM)

0.002
(0.002)
-0.061
(0.061)
-0.049
(0.089)
-0.048
(0.061)
-0.033
(0.053)
2.603***
(0.100)
0.147***
(0.040)
1.784***
(0.012)
0.007
10423

-0.605***
(0.136)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.029
(0.062)
-0.065
(0.087)
-0.040
(0.060)
-0.012
(0.053)
2.597***
(0.098)
0.141***
(0.040)
1.783***
(0.012)
0.006
10423

Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 4.4b Commitment Intensity in Foreign Policy Behavior, Folded Goldstein Scores, with
Additional Control Variables (IV: Center is Crossed)
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Unlike the previous results, it is first and foremost observed in Model 4 of Table 4.4a that
Policy Incongruence has no independent effect on commitment intensity when it measures the
presence of both left and right-wing political parties in a coalition. In fact, Model 4 also defeats
the earlier finding on the positive and significant effect of oversized coalitions. Therefore,
Hypotheses 3a and 3b cannot be supported: when policy incongruence is accounted for in the
form of a categorical variable such as center is crossed, majority coalitions have no positive,
significant relationship with commitment intensity. Incidentally, the lack of statistical
significance for the policy incongruence variable provides support for Hypothesis 5a: the
negative and significant effect of minority coalitions on commitment intensity is consistent
across all models in Table 4.4a and 4.4b except in Model 7.
The interaction terms in Table 4.4a, however, clearly show that having ideologically
opposing parties in government alters the effects of each coalition type on their commitment
intensity, supporting the previous results. Model 9 demonstrates that oversized coalitions show
less commitment once they include parties from opposing ideological camps. The finding echoes
what was presented in Tables 4.2a and 4.3a: when a left-wing (right-wing) party enters an
existing oversized coalition that exclusively includes right wing (left-wing) parties, it decreases
the intensity of the government’s international commitments. Notice that the shift from a
homogenously right-wing or left-wing oversized coalition to an ideologically heterogeneous
oversized coalition also leads to an expansion of its ideological range, as well as to an increase in
the standard deviation of the mean ideological position of the coalition. Hypothesis 4a is
supported for oversized coalitions, as earlier.
In Model 7, the negative and significant coefficient for the interaction term Minimum
Win.*Pol. Inc. shows that minimum winning coalitions with ideologically opposing parties
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continue to act more committed than single-party majority governments, once again rejecting
Hypothesis 4b. In addition to the alternative explanations presented above, one can also argue
that minimalist coalitions that include left and right parties are often grand coalitions (Lijphart
1999), such as the Christian Democrat-Social Democrat governments in Germany or the LaborLikud governments in Israel, which bring together the largest opposing parties to address the
pressing policy issues that may force these governments to act more decisively and thus, more
committed. Ultimately, then, further research is needed to explicate the exact causal mechanism
that reflects the foreign policymaking dynamics inside minimum winning coalitions, given their
ideological composition. In Chapter 6, the Dutch decision to provide support for the 2003 Iraq
war will be discussed at length to answer this puzzle.
Finally, the positive and significant coefficient for the interaction term Minority Co.*Pol.
Inc. in Model 5 suggests that minority coalitions engage in more intense international
commitments when they include both left and right-wing parties than when they include only
right-wing or only left-wing parties. Here is why: suppose there is a parliament with 100 seats,
distributed roughly equally among five political parties. Party A gets 18 seats, B gets 21, C gets
20, D gets 23, and E gets 18 seats. Suppose also that Party A is located at the far-left of the
political spectrum, C is at the center, and E is located at the far-right. A government that includes
parties B and D would result in a center-left/center-right minority coalition that held 44 percent
of total parliamentary seats.
As explained earlier in Chapter 2, minority coalitions are assumed to be vulnerable to the
parliamentary opposition due to their size. The BD coalition, however, is difficult to defeat as
Party C has to convince both Party A and Party E—which are already at opposing ideological
extremes—in order to enact a vote of no confidence against the incumbent coalition. Going back
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to Hagan’s (1993) expectations, the ACE opposition is composed of ‘different parties’. As a
result of their ideological diversity, the ACE opposition is unlikely to challenge the BD
government, and therefore gives the BD coalition “policy viability” (Laver and Budge 1992: 58), suggesting that the government enjoys the room to make policy simply because the
parliamentary opposition is now ideologically fragmented. Thus, the fragmented nature of the
parliamentary opposition enables the BD coalition to make more intense international
commitments. Hypothesis 5b is supported: when the ideological setup of a minority coalition
divides the parliamentary opposition, its commitment intensity increases. Incorporating the
alternative conceptualizations of policy incongruence and utilizing their relevant measures to
build interaction terms in each set of tests were crucial in revealing this insight. 65
Figure 4.3 below further illustrates this example.66 Notice that the distance from Party C
to any of the two incumbent parties is much smaller than to either of the opposition parties A and
E, which facilitates the alternative scenario where C would even give outside support to the BD
65

An alternative measure for capturing the ideological diversity of the opposition parties would
be measuring how fragmented the opposition is, or ‘opposition fragmentation,’ since “the
number of parties and the ideological distances between parties are correlated” (Maeda 2009:
422, see also Sartori 1976, Ware 1996). Maeda (2009: 423) introduces a measure of opposition
fragmentation by calculating the effective number of opposition parties (ENOP) similar to
Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) measure of the effective number of parties (ENP). The
expectation is that as ENOP increases the ideological diversity among opposition parties also
increases and therefore the minority coalition finds greater room to intensify its foreign policy
commitments. I do not choose to use this alternative measure for practical reasons. First, as
Maeda (2009: 423) also admits, most sources “usually lump small parties into an ‘other’
category” which stops us from identifying the individual seat shares of each opposition party—a
necessary component to calculate ENOP. As a result, severe data limitations prevent me from
measuring opposition fragmentation for the countries in my dataset. Maeda’s (2009) dataset only
includes 17 parliamentary democracies across the world (including Japan, New Zealand,
Australia and Canada) for the 1965-1997 period, which is why I cannot use his data for my
study. Furthermore, my definition of ‘government’ goes beyond elected governments and also
includes those cases where parties join or leave coalitions during an elected term, which
complicates the calculation of ENOP for every change in government composition.
66
The figure is for illustration purposes only and does not imply that parties are located at
regular intervals along the political spectrum.
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incumbency (say, on an ad hoc basis) as opposed to taking the more difficult road which requires
collaborating with the rest of the parliamentary opposition parties to defeat it. As a matter of fact,
crossing the political center implies that the preferences of those parties which end up within the
ideological range that is created by the left-right crossover would, by definition, fall within the
preference range of the government to begin with. In other words, the center party or parties that
fall within the left-right crossover would not only have ideological difficulties to collaborate with
the opposition, but may find the government a much closer partner ideologically to work with,
especially when the government holds the minority and thus needs the help of other
parliamentary parties to make policy.

Figure 4.3 Minority Coalition and Fragmented Parliamentary Opposition
In sum, in any alternative setup where the minority coalition would include a left-wing
and a right-wing political party, this coalition would hinder the chances of the parliamentary
opposition parties to collaborate against the government due to ideological disparities.
Furthermore, Party C or any other parties that end up within the ideological range of the minority
coalition would likely be cooperating with the government parties vis-à-vis the rest of the
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parliamentary opposition and therefore increase the commitment intensity of the incumbent
minority coalition.
Notice that the operationalization of policy viability introduced in this study is
fundamentally different than the initial formulation presented by Laver and Budge (1992). In the
book, the authors focus on the core party in the legislature, i.e. the party that captures the median
voter that is not necessarily located at the center of the left-right ideological spectrum, and argue
that the core party must be in the government to achieve policy viability. Specifically, they argue
that “in our [sic] terms, a minority government comprising only the core party would be ‘viable’”
(Laver and Budge 1992: 5).
This argument is discussed at greater length in Laver and Schofield (1998: 79-80), who
reiterate the critical importance of the core party67 in achieving viability in a three-party
legislature, arguing that the core party can singlehandedly maintain incumbency even though it
enjoys a minority of parliamentary seats. They argue that to the extent that governments “divide
the opposition by putting forward policy packages at the ‘centre’ of the policy space,” they are
“making it impossible for the opposition to agree on an alternative and thereby allowing the
government to manage with much less than a majority” (Laver and Schofield 1998: 81). In other
words, policy viability explanation originally intends to focus on the policy position of the core
party in the system vis-à-vis the other parties.
The argument introduced in this dissertation and the results presented in this chapter,
however, look at those cases where the center party—which might very well be the core party in
the legislature as far as Laver and Schofield’s (1998) formulation is concerned—is left outside a
minority coalition government that includes parties located both at the left and the right of the
67

To be sure, in their illustration in the book (Laver and Schofield 1998: 80), the core party does
seem like the center party.
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political spectrum, regardless of where the core party is located. In other words, my finding and
Figure 4.3 above suggest that even a minority coalition that does not include the center party can
achieve policy viability and therefore commit more intensely than single-party majority
governments at the international level.68
Moving on to the additional control variables reported in Table 4.4b, they remain
insignificant as the case was in the previous sets of tests, though this time they hardly challenge
the significance of the pre-control results. Similarly, the main control variables CINC and
Democratic Target remain with the same substantive and statistical effects on commitment
intensity. The Rho values, once again, continue to indicate very low intra-country variation,
which increases confidence in the results by showing that the observations, that is, foreign policy
events, are not correlated with each other in each country.
As explained in Chapter 3, the nature of the data makes it necessary to account for the
latent effects of the countries from which the events are drawn, which is facilitated by the use of
multilevel modeling. The Rho values in each set of results presented in this chapter show that
between 0.5 and 0.9 per cent of the variation in commitment intensity across these models is due
to country-level factors. Even though this is a very small effect substantively, using multilevel
modeling and generating random effects allow us to calculate the baseline commitment intensity
value for each country, regardless of the effects of the independent variables accounted for in the
models.

68

It is important to remind that the coding of my variable is such that center is crossed also
assumes a value of 1 if the government does not include parties from both the left and the right
of the political spectrum but instead includes the center party (i.e. the party that scores 5 on the
left-right spectrum). However, of the 12 minority coalitions that are coded 1 for crossing the
center in the dataset, only three governments satisfy this condition. 77 events belong to these
governments in my dataset of 17149 events, which correspond to 0.45 per cent of the entire
sample. As such, those three minority coalitions are not expected to bias the results.
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Statistical packages allow me to predict the random-effects generated by each country in
the dataset.69 Since ‘random-intercept’ models are utilized for the multilevel analyses in this
chapter, these predicted random-effects are practically the random intercepts for each country.
Adding these to the Constant term in the models, that is, the intercept that is estimated for the
overall regression model, one can calculate the estimated intercepts for each country. Figure 4.4
illustrates these intercepts, based on Model 4 in Table 4.2a, where the models include the
Standard deviation measure of Policy Incongruence.

Figure 4.4 Estimated Country Intercepts based on Model 4 from Table 4.2a

69

To do this, Stata 11’s predict u*, reffects procedure is used.
147

Figure 4.4 suggests that leaving all the independent variables concerning government
composition, material capabilities, democratic targets, international crises and years of European
Union membership aside, most European countries have a baseline commitment range between
2.45 and 2.65 on the folded Goldstein scale. This range corresponds to somewhere around formal
complaint or protest (-2.4) in terms of conflict behavior, or give state invitation (2.5), from a
cooperative standpoint. In other words, Figure 4.4 shows that the country-level factors that are
not accounted for explicitly in the models but still estimated through random-effects in my
analyses exert an average baseline effect of 2.53 on commitment intensity.
Figure 4.4 also shows, however, that some countries still deviate considerably from the
mean value denoted by the red line. While most countries remain within the 2.45 – 2.65 range;
countries like Norway, Hungary, and Lithuania show notably lower levels of commitment
intensity. On the contrary, Denmark has the second highest level of commitment intensity,
leaving the effects of all other independent variables aside. The figure shows that as one of the
few countries ruled exclusively by single-party governments, Spain has the highest level of
commitment intensity in the period between 1994 and 2004.
Figure 4.4 provides an important visual leverage to argue for the need to support the
quantitative findings with more detailed case insights in order to understand how countries could
have a differentiating effect on commitment intensity. As it will be explained in Chapter 5 in
detail, for instance, qualitative accounts of Danish foreign policy argue that “all Danish
governments since the end of the Cold War have declared that they have conducted an ‘active’
foreign policy” (Larsen 2009: 219). This trend was called “active internationalism” (Petersen
2004) during the first decade of the post-Cold War period. Further, the country became even
more proactive in the period that followed September 11, 2001, which was referred to as
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“offensive Danish foreign policy” (Larsen 2009: 220). Clearly, these assessments of Danish
foreign policy attest to the increase in the commitment intensity of Denmark in this post-Cold
War period as a foreign policy vision, regardless of the composition of its executive branch. As
such, in-depth qualitative analyses not only contextualize the results of statistical tests but lend
confidence in the quantitative findings, as illustrated in Figure 4.4.

Conclusion
This chapter has provided a quantitative analysis to investigate the differential effects of
government composition on the intensity of international commitments across parliamentary
regimes in Europe during the post-Cold War era, specifically between 1994 and 2004.
The major conclusion of this chapter is that there is no single path that explains the
relationship between the governments and their international commitments: it is impossible to
generalize on the intensity of commitments simply by looking at whether the government
includes one or many parties, or whether or not it enjoys a parliamentary majority. Instead,
coalition types, and the extent of policy incongruence inside these coalitions do much of the
explanation, even when state-level characteristics such as the national capabilities that these
governments command or the regime characteristics of the target states are taken into account.
This chapter therefore concludes that a more nuanced specification of government composition is
necessary to explicate the particular mechanisms through which these governments decide how
much to commit.
A number of findings help illuminate this conclusion further. For instance, even though
the initial set of findings show that the ‘veto players’ mechanism explains the commitment
intensity of coalitions in general, this explanation cannot be sustained once the ideological
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differences among the coalition partners are accounted for. In fact, once the policy incongruence
inside the coalition is accounted for, the empirical analyses reveal that an alternative
mechanism—clarity of responsibility—is at work, specifically for oversized coalitions.
Indeed, the results presented in this chapter demonstrate that only oversized coalitions,
that is, those coalitions that include more parties than necessary to maintain a parliamentary
majority, are associated with more intense commitments in their foreign policy behavior
compared to single-party governments. This relationship is revealed, however, only when the
policy incongruence between coalition parties are controlled for. This result is robust against the
different specifications of this key independent variable, such as the standard deviation of party
positions from the mean position of the coalition (Warwick 1992) and the ideological range
(Tsebelis 1995, 1999) measures.
This finding on oversized coalitions challenges the earlier analysis by Kaarbo and
Beasley (2008). In their study, the authors find that coalitions act more “extreme” as the number
of parties in government increases. However, contrary to their expectations, their findings also
indicate that stronger coalitions engage in more nonverbal (i.e. high-intensity) behavior than
verbal (i.e. low-intensity) behavior. Together, their conclusions clearly indicate that more
committed behavior is a result of having more parties in government, which also commands
higher seat shares. This is an obvious characteristic of oversized coalitions, indeed a conclusion
of this project. In other words, this study illustrates the merits of implementing a more succinct
conceptualization of coalitions to study foreign policy behavior, so that we can capture the
specific mechanisms through which they behave differently than single-party majority coalitions.
Another key finding of this chapter is that even though oversized coalitions engage in
more intense international commitments than other majority coalitions ceteris paribus, their
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commitment intensity decreases once the level of policy incongruence increases in existing
oversized coalitions with the inclusion of additional, ideologically diverse parties. Consistent
across the different specifications of the policy incongruence variable, this finding suggests that
as governments with an already existing surplus of parties grow larger and ideologically more
diverse, disagreements begin to jeopardize their policy-making capabilities, working against the
expectations of the ‘clarity of responsibility’ mechanism and ultimately resulting in lower levels
of international commitment.
Next, the findings show that the commitment intensity of minimum winning coalitions
cannot be readily explained either by the veto players or the clarity of responsibility theory. It
seems that minimum winning coalitions act more committed than single-party majority
governments when the ideological disagreements among the coalition parties grow. This is
counterintuitive, as one would expect the coalition partners to use their veto power and either
block or water down those policy proposals that require more commitment if they cannot agree
at a very basic, ideological level. On the other hand, it is well-known that alternative
explanations that might contextualize and illuminate this outcome are discussed frequently in the
literature. Some of these explanations include logrolling, blackmail potential of the junior
partners, or strategizing around intra-party fragmentation to build ad hoc alliances in the
government to make policy (Clare 2010, Kaarbo 1996a, 1996b, Snyder 1991). To contribute to
this debate and expand on this surprising finding on minimum winning coalitions, Chapter 6 will
provide a qualitative analysis of the 2003 Dutch decision to support the war in Iraq.
A third conclusion of this chapter concerns minority coalitions. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom that minority coalitions always remain at a size disadvantage and engage in
moderate foreign policy behavior, the results of the analyses presented here conclude that
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minority coalitions can overcome their parliamentary vulnerabilities if their ideological setup
leaves the parliamentary opposition fragmented. To reveal this relationship, the empirical
analyses were designed by building on the earlier theoretical work by Hagan (1993) and Laver
and Budge (1992). As discussed in Chapter 3 in greater detail, the analyses utilized a third
measure of policy incongruence, center is crossed, to test whether a minority coalition’s
ideological heterogeneity results in the ideological fragmentation of the opposition, therefore
enabling the government to engage in more intense foreign policy commitments compared to
single-party majority governments. The results reported in the present chapter have supported
this expectation quantitatively, demonstrating that the policy incongruence of a minority
coalition measured as the participation of left- and right-wing parties helps fragment the
parliamentary opposition ideologically, thereby allowing the government to increase the intensity
of their international commitments.
This is a novel finding that brings minority coalitions back in to the debate in the
literature that has so far focused almost exclusively on the differences among majority
governments. To further illuminate how minority coalitions make foreign policy commitments at
varying levels of ideological composition and demonstrate the ‘policy viability’ mechanism
qualitatively, Chapter 5 will utilize two foreign policy episodes from post-Cold War Denmark,
specifically the decisions to participate in the 1990 war in the Gulf and the 2003 war in Iraq.
The results of this chapter also suggest that the EU’s effect on national foreign policies in
the region, or the major international crises that took place in this decade are insignificant factors
in explaining the intensity of commitments in foreign policy behavior during this period. This is
an important finding that challenges the fast-growing literature on the Europeanization of foreign
policy and should certainly alert those scholars whose work focus on the ways in which
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harmonization takes place between national and European foreign policies (Wong and Hill
2011).
Finally, from a methodological point of view, the results of this chapter demonstrate that
multilevel modeling (i.e. hierarchical linear modeling) addresses several problems associated
with multi-country events datasets and yields results which would have remained unclear if
classical regression models were used. Moreover, using multilevel estimation techniques
provides information regarding the baseline effects of countries on commitment intensity, further
allowing us to contextualize the results of the regression analyses. As illustrated on Figure 4.4,
some countries exert a greater baseline effect on commitment intensity than others, regardless of
the independent variables that are accounted for in the models. That is to say, all else being
considered, some countries engage in more intense commitments than others due to factors that
are unaccounted for in the models.
The baseline values presented in Figure 4.4 also constitute a useful next step in multimethod research designs. Knowing these values informs the researcher on the systematic,
categorical differences across the countries and therefore allows for a more informed case
selection process prior to designing qualitative research. For instance, the researcher can focus
on those countries that are closer to the mean in order to eliminate the possibility that highly
committed foreign policy behaviors are merely the results of historical or other unaccounted
factors that are associated with that country. Similarly, the researcher can also focus on an outlier
country to observe how the intense commitment behaviors are in fact the result of a multitude of
individual-, domestic- or international-level factors that pertain to that country.
The next two chapters take a qualitative approach to respond to this discussion by
introducing a series of structured-focused case study comparisons of Denmark’s 1990 decision to
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participate in the Gulf war and its 2003 decision to join the war coalition in Iraq, as well as the
Dutch decision to support the 2003 Iraq war, respectively.
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CHAPTER 5

‘REACHING ACROSS THE AISLE’:
POLICY VIABILITY AND DANISH INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

“Any line of thought going towards Denmark promoting itself through military means far away
from our own neighborhood goes against deep-rooted Social Democratic instincts. For that
reason, we have also said clearly “no” to all suggestions from the centre-right politicians about
letting NATO act outside the North Atlantic area, as stipulated in the Atlantic Treaty.”
Social Democratic Party Leader Hans Haekkerup, August 13, 199070

“Only the Americans have the military strength to disarm Saddam and liberate Iraq. But we
have an obligation to help. We cannot just sail under a flag of convenience and let others fight
for freedom and peace. There has in fact been too much of that kind in the past in Denmark. If
we mean anything seriously about our democratic values, then we should also be ready to make
a small contribution to the international coalition.”
Liberal Party Leader and Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, March 26, 200371

Foreign policy behaviors such as the commitments to send a naval corvette to the Gulf or a
submarine and escort troops to the Iraq war as Denmark did in 1990 and 2003, respectively, are
the outcomes of a complicated series of debates in democratic regimes. These are the behavioral
outcomes of deliberations among actors in parliamentary democracies, foremost of which are the
political parties in government: they must synchronize their policy preferences to formulate their
international behavior, which would communicate the commitment intensity of their regimes.
To explain the intensity of international commitments in parliamentary regimes, this
dissertation has proposed the simultaneous study of the mathematical and the ideological
composition of the parties in government as two key domestic politics variables. Chapter 4 has
70
71

Quoted in Olesen (2012: 28).
Quoted in Laybourn (2003).
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presented a nuanced, quantitative approach to measure the independent and interactive effects of
the size and the ideological diversity of multiparty governments on their commitment intensity.
The quantitative analyses have concluded that coalition governments are significantly different
from single-party governments in their commitment behavior in general. More importantly,
however, the analyses have demonstrated that coalitions show significant differences among
each other regarding their effects on commitment intensity, once the variation in their size and
ideological diversity are accounted for. As such, the results of the previous chapter attest to the
importance of unpacking coalitions and scrutinizing their major defining characteristics to
explain the foreign policy commitments of parliamentary democracies.
One central finding of the quantitative analyses in Chapter 4 concerns the ‘policy
viability’ of minority coalitions, particularly when they fragment the parliamentary majority by
‘reaching across the aisle’ and including parties from both the left and the right of the political
spectrum. The large-N analysis has demonstrated that the commitment intensity of foreign policy
behavior increases when a minority coalition shifts from a ‘pure-right’ or a ‘pure-left’
government to a ‘heterogeneous’ left-right government by crossing the center of the political
spectrum. This finding supports the ‘policy viability’ and ‘fragmented opposition’ explanations,
discussed in Chapter 2.
Moving forward, it is necessary to explicate the mechanism that justifies this relationship
to argue that it can be observed beyond statistical association. The chapter therefore asks: how
does the ideological composition of minority coalitions influence their foreign policy
commitments? What is the link between the fragmented parliamentary opposition and the
increase in commitment intensity in minority coalition settings? Furthermore, it is necessary to
test whether the ‘policy viability’ explanation performs strongly against alternative explanations.
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Can a minority coalition that does not cross the center of the political spectrum still engage in
high-intensity commitments at the international level? What are the factors that could influence
such an outcome?
These questions are important for two reasons. First, they shift the focus away from
majority governments and open up a new pathway to studying coalition foreign policy, this time
with a focus on minority coalitions. Second, they reject the conventional wisdom that minority
coalitions are categorically vulnerable vis-à-vis the parliamentary opposition due to their size
disadvantage. Following the ‘policy viability’ explanation and the regression results presented in
Chapter 4, this chapter seeks to show that minority coalitions may well circumvent their size
disadvantage and make international commitments such as participating in war coalitions as long
as the composition of their coalition leaves the parliamentary opposition ideologically
fragmented.
This chapter addresses these questions by introducing a qualitative analysis of
international commitments. Using the method of structured-focused comparison, the chapter
demonstrates the relationship between minority coalitions and the intensity of their international
commitments in Denmark, while accounting for the variation in the government’s policy
incongruence. The chapter also evaluates a number of alternative explanations, discussed in
Chapter 2, against the ‘government composition’ explanation. These include logrolling, public
opinion, threat to national security, and political leadership. The policy-making context in
Denmark alongside its historical foreign policy framework will also be discussed throughout the
chapter as two contextual variables that could further influence these relationships.
The least-likely case status of Denmark due to its position in the international system as a
small state (Doeser 2013), as well as its institutional stability as a country that has been
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historically ruled by minority coalitions, makes this country a great case for analyzing the ‘policy
viability’ explanation. Moreover, the outlier position of Denmark among other European
parliamentary democracies regarding its baseline commitment intensity makes it a puzzling case.
As Figure 4.4 has shown in Chapter 4, Denmark exerts the greatest baseline effect on
commitment intensity, whose reasons are yet to be discovered.
The chapter focuses on two cases of international commitment. First, the ‘policy
viability’ and the ‘fragmented opposition’ explanations will be evaluated with the crucial case
analysis of the Danish decision to send the naval corvette72 Olfert Fischer to the Gulf in
September 1990, which was possible only because the ideological formation of the government
ended what is known in Danish foreign policy as the “footnote policy era” and marked the
beginning of the country’s international activism. In other words, the 1990 case will help
demonstrate how the ‘fragmented parliamentary opposition’ gave ‘policy viability’ to the Danish
minority coalition and led to a change in its foreign policy behavior.
The chapter will then use Denmark’s 2003 decision to participate in the Iraq War
coalition as a deviant, over-determined case. The 2003 decision demonstrates that minority
coalitions can continue to engage in high-intensity commitments such as joining war coalitions,
even when their ideological composition does not lead to a ‘fragmented opposition’ in the
parliament. Instead, the 2003 case will demonstrate that a number of other factors, such as
logrolling among the parties inside and outside the government that belong to the same side of
the political spectrum, national threat perceptions, and, to some extent, political leadership

A naval corvette “is a small and fast naval vessel ranking in size below a frigate,” and is
“usually armed with torpedoes, missiles and machine guns and have displacement from 500 to
1000 tons. They are performing antisubmarine, antiaircraft, and coastal-patrol duties in the
world’s small navies.” (Source: maritime-connector.com, accessed June 6, 2014).
72
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together play an important role in accounting for the international commitments of minority
coalitions.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I give an overview of the Danish
political system alongside a discussion of Danish foreign policy orientations throughout the postCold War years, particularly what is known as Danish foreign policy activism. Next, I move on
to the case analyses. The first section analyzes the 1990 Gulf War, followed by the second
section on the 2003 Iraq War. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the findings and their
implications.

Politics of Denmark: A Primer
Denmark is a small Nordic country ruled by parliamentary democracy, with membership in the
European Union since 1973 and in NATO since 1949. The country adopts proportional
representation (PR) with a national electoral threshold of two percent, resulting in parliaments
with several parties from the left, center and right of the political spectrum (Damgaard 2000).
Writing in the late 1990s, Elklit (1999: 63) has argued that “for more than two decades,
all Danish governments were minority governments.” Specifically, between 1971 and 1993, six
of the thirteen minority governments were coalitions (Elklit 1999: 63). Echoing this trend, the
present dataset also shows that all five governments in Denmark between 1994 and 2004 were
minority coalitions, clearly indicating that minority coalition politics is the rule rather than the
exception in this country.
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The high level of parliamentary fractionalization in Denmark yields “extreme pluralism
with six to seven significant parties” that marked the party system since 1973.73 As with most
party systems in Europe, these parties fall along the classic left-right political spectrum. They
include the left-wing Social Democratic Party (SD), “the largest party in parliament since 1924,”
the Social Liberal Party (RL, previously known as the Radical Liberal Party), the Center
Democrats (CD), and right-wing parties such as the Christian People’s Party (CPP), the Liberal
Party (L), the Conservative People’s Party (Con), and more recently the Danish People’s Party
(DPP) (Damgaard: 2000: 233-35). These are joined by parties at the extreme right such as the
Progress Party and, at the extreme left, such as the Left Socialists, Danish Communist Party, and
the Socialist People’s Party.
Of these parties, the Social Democrats, Social Liberals, Centre Democrats, Conservatives
and the Christian Democrats have historically been the most relevant parties for government
formation. Elklit (1999: 65) shows that between 1968 and 1996, Social Liberals participated in
five out of 17 governments, all of which were coalitions. Similarly, Conservatives participated in
six coalition governments in this time period, often alongside the Liberals, the Centre Democrats,
and the Christian People’s Party. Most dramatically, the Social Democrats participated in 10 out
of 17 governments in this period, including when they enjoyed the single-party government
status six times until 1982, when the long hiatus of Social Democratic victories began and had
lasted until 1993 (Elklit 1999: 65). For the post-Cold War period, the quantitative dataset used
for this study also shows that the Social Democrats were in four consecutive governing coalitions
Elklit (1999: 64) argues that the 1973 election is coined in the literature as the ‘earthquake
election,’ when all of the parties in the previous parliament received devastating results
(Fitzmaurice 1981: 23), indicating voters’ loss of heart with the existing parties. Elklit (1999: 64)
explains that altered the Danish political landscape “by adding entirely new elements to the party
system, by changing its overall configuration, and by gradually letting the parties—new and
old—find their places in either the central or the peripheral parts of the party system.”
73
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between 1993 and 2001, until the Liberals took over under the leadership of Anders Fogh
Rasmussen following the parliamentary election in November 2001.
Perhaps due to the institutional conditions that facilitate party fractionalization, parties
that enter into coalitions enjoy high level of party cohesion in Denmark (Damgaard 2000: 23235). For example, Chapel Hill Expert Survey data from 1999 to 2006 (Hooghe et al. 2010,
Steenbergen and Marks 2007) show that dissent in the leadership of Danish political parties on
the issue of European integration was noticeably low in 1999, and was virtually nonexistent by
2006, indicating strong levels of party cohesion.74 In other words, intra-party fractionalization
does not threaten either the government’s ability to make policy or the opposition parties’
capacity to block legislation. This insight certainly adds confidence to the analyses that follow,
which measure ‘policy incongruence’ as a matter of party position regardless of factional
divergences within these parties.
The locus of foreign policy in Denmark is the governing cabinet, which makes the
governing parties central for this country’s formulation and execution of foreign policy.
However, as Jakobsen (2012: 3) explains, “the government is constitutionally obliged to seek
consent from the Parliament when it considers participating in operations involving the use of
force beyond self-defense,” and since 1990, “all major troop contributions regardless of mission
type are submitted to a vote in parliament.” In this sense, the government’s ability to ensure that
its foreign policy agenda is not obstructed by the parliamentary opposition as well as its
opportunities to enter into alliances with the opposition parties for additional support when

On a scale of 1 (complete party unity) to 5 (party leadership facing major opposition from the
party activists), Danish political parties scored less than 3 in the 1999 iteration of the CHES
dataset. In the 2006 iteration of the dataset, the dissent scale ranged from 0 (complete unity) to
10 (extreme divisions), where the party with the highest level of dissent on EU integration,
Socialist People’s Party, scored 4.1 (Hooghe et al. 2010, Steenbergen and Marks 2007).
74
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necessary becomes extremely crucial to commit resources to participate in international military
operations. As I demonstrate below, the government was able to send the corvette to the Gulf in
1990 because it was able to obstruct the opposition by entering into a coalition agreement with
the Social Liberals. Similarly, in 2003, the Rasmussen government aligned with the opposition
Danish People’s Party that allowed the former to garner a majority of votes in the parliament and
pass the Iraq war bill.

Danish Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Period
“What’s the use of it?” asked Viggo Horrup, a member of the traditionally anti-militarist Social
Liberal Party, in 1883, echoing Denmark’s historical skepticism toward the utility of military
force (Rasmussen 2005: 67) and “Denmark’s alleged military impotence vis-à-vis the newly
united Germany” at the time (Branner 2013: 160).
Conceptualized by Danish foreign policy scholars as Danish ‘defeatism’ or
‘cosmopolitanism’ (Rasmussen 2005), the pacifist and non-militarist vision of Danish foreign
policy continued until the final years of the Cold War. “The traditional image of Denmark as a
state whose main priority was to promote a politics of non-involvement, uncommitted alliance
and restraints in international affairs” (Pedersen 2012: 342) gave way to a new foreign policy
orientation that championed international activism by the 1990s.
Not surprisingly, this shift in Danish foreign policy coincided with international systemic
change. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity “the external pressure on
Denmark disappeared” (Pedersen 2012: 334), where the country found the room to move “from
reactive to active adaptation” (Due-Nielsen and Petersen 1995, quoted in Pedersen 2012: 334).
This was also a necessary step in redefining Denmark’s role in the new international system,
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especially vis-à-vis its relations with the United States (Mouritzen 2007). To that end, “Denmark
had to undertake new and independent initiatives as a means to make herself heard and thus
compensate for her reduced status” (Branner 2013: 145).
The change in the international balance of power also meant new security challenges for
Denmark. Following the end of the Cold War, the Danish Defense Commission released a white
paper that argued “after the ‘direct’ threat of a Soviet attack had gone, the ‘indirect’ threat to
peace and stability in Europe was the most important Danish security concern,” where the
European Union and NATO assumed greatest responsibility in providing a secure international
environment (Danish Defense Commission 1998, quoted in Rasmussen 2005: 77). The next
phase in Danish foreign policy, therefore, called for the development of a new vision where
activism would define the Danish response to regional and international security challenges as
well as the reassessment of the country’s relations with NATO and the EU in the new security
environment. This transformation was not out of sync with other NATO or EU members, where
“the focus on institutions was gradually replaced by a focus on capabilities” (Rasmussen 2005:
78).
In this new security environment, however, Danish foreign policy priorities aligned far
more closely with NATO than with the European Union. Larsen (2005: 87) argues that “although
the EU is presented as the organizational point of departure and frame for Danish foreign
policy…the bilateral relationship to the US/NATO remains crucial for the hardest security
threats,” suggesting that Denmark’s foreign policy preferences align more closely with the
US/NATO than the EU as far as security policies are concerned. This is unsurprising considering
the fact that Denmark is the only member-state that has opted out from the EU’s Common
Security and Defense pillar as early as 1992 by signing the Edinburgh Agreement (Danish
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Ministry of Defense 2013). Especially in the context of the 2003 Iraq war, Prime Minister
Rasmussen clearly expressed his preference for the American security capabilities over Europe’s
by arguing that “Denmark’s security is better guaranteed by a superpower in North America than
by the fragile balance of power between the UK, Germany and France” (quoted in Larsen 2005:
87). Ultimately, the EU has been a secondary resort for Danish security policies institutionally as
well as politically.
Danish foreign policy scholars agree that the first major step signaling the transformation
of Danish foreign policy in the 1990s was the participation in the naval blockade in the Gulf in
1990 with the naval corvette Olfert Fischer following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (Branner 2013,
Pedersen 2012, Rasmussen 2005, Olesen 2012). Indeed, it was a major historical moment for this
country considering the “period of wide-ranging shift in the international system” (Doeser 2013:
583), when the Cold War dynamics were still in place. This was followed by a series of
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, including those in Yugoslavia in 1992, Bosnia in 1995,
Albania in 1998, and Kosovo in 1999 (Pedersen 2012: 338).
The second major inflection point in Danish foreign policy after the end of the Cold War
came in 2001 following the September 11 terrorist attacks. By 2003, ‘soft activism’ was replaced
with ‘hard activism’ (Branner 2013) and “an acceptance of military force as an effective means
in its own right” (Rasmussen 2005: 82) was vociferously supported by Fogh Rasmussen and his
Liberal Party that came to power in November 2001. Some scholars referred to this shift as
“offensive Danish foreign policy,” which suggested that “Denmark should take a stance on, and
be directly engaged in, the big defining issues in international politics and security” (Larsen
2009: 220). Denmark’s offensive foreign policy was crystallized in the decision to join the war in
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Iraq as one of the first countries to sign the “Letter of Eight” and send military assistance to the
region in 2003 (Pedersen 2012, see also Larsen 2009).
In sum, Danish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era has undergone two major policy
shifts. The first shift took place at the turn of the decade in 1990 from cosmopolitanism to
activism, emphasizing international institutions as well as closer cooperation with the UN and
NATO toward international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The second shift came
with the September 11 attacks and stressed the importance of Denmark’s alliance with the United
States, promoting the active use of military capabilities to respond to the new international
security challenges (Pedersen 2012). The analyses below should therefore be read against this
historical backdrop.
Table 5.1 presents a summary of these cases.75

Government and opposition parties’ data come from the Inter-Parliamentary Union Database
on Denmark. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2087_arc.htm, accessed June 9, 2014.
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TIMEFRAME for GULF WAR 1990

IRAQ WAR 2003

December 1981 January 1984

January 1984 –
June 1988

June 1988 –
December 1990

November 2001 –
January 2005

Coalition parties

Conservatives (KF) –
Liberals (V) –
Centre Democrats (CD) –
Christian People’s Party
(KRF)

Conservatives (KF) –
Liberals (V) –
Centre Democrats (CD) –
Christian People’s Party
(KRF)

Conservatives (KF) –
Liberals (V) –
Social Liberals (RV)

Conservatives (KF) –
Liberals (V)

Coalition type

Minority

Minority

Minority

Minority

Opposition parties

Social Democrats (SD) –
Social Liberals (RV) –
Socialist People’s Party
(SF) –
Left Socialists

Social Democrats (SD) –
Social Liberals (RV) –
Socialist People’s Party
(SF) –
Left Socialists
Progress Party (FP)

Social Democrats (SD) –
Socialist People’s Party
(SF) –
Centre Democrats (CD) –
Christian People’s Party
(KRF) –
Progress Party (FP)

Policy incongruence
(Center is crossed)

0
(Pure right-wing
coalition, left-wing
opposition)

0
(Pure right-wing
coalition, predominantly
left-wing opposition)

1
(Center is
crossed)

Standing

Elected government

Elected government

Elected government

Elected government

Commitment intensity

‘Footnote policy era’: Danish partnership with NATO
is obstructed by the parliamentary opposition

Denmark sends naval
ship to the blockade in
the Gulf, initiated by
NATO members

Denmark signs ‘the letter
of eight’, sends ship to
participate in the war
coalition

Social Democrats (SD) –
Danish People's Party
(DPP) – Conservatives
(KF) – Socialist People's
Party (SF) – Social
Liberals (RV) – Unity
List (EL) – Christian
People's Party (KRF)
0
(Government cooperates
with the DPP, achieves
majority)

Table 5.1 Government Composition and Commitment Intensity in Denmark, 1982 – 1990 and 2003
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The End of the ‘Footnote Policy’ and the 1990 Gulf War
The most significant opportunity for Denmark to show foreign policy activism in the aftermath
of the Cold War came with the 1990 Gulf War. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the
subsequent trade embargo sanctioned by the UN in August 1990, several NATO members began
to prepare for a naval blockade. In the midst of a fierce debate among Danish political parties
about the necessity of a UN mandate to join the operation, the blockade was sanctioned by the
UN by the end of August 1990. The Danish government decided to send the Olfert Fischer to the
Gulf on September 12, 1990. The corvette remained in the region after the war broke in January
1991, but it did not actively participate in the armed confrontation (Doeser 2013: 589-592).
Denmark’s decision to participate in the naval blockade against Iraq in 1990 was possible
only because the Danish ‘footnote policy era’ had ended in 1988. It is therefore necessary to go
back to the 1980s and understand the politics of the ‘footnote’ era. The “footnote policy era’
began when a right-wing minority government that included the Conservatives, Liberals, the
Center Party and the Christian People’s Party came to power following the September 1982
elections (Doeser 2013). The government led by Prime Minister Poul Schluter occupied a total of
66 seats in the 179-seat Folketing, the Danish parliament, whereas the remaining seats belonged
to the parties on the left, including the Social Democrats, Social Liberals, Socialist People’s
Party and the Left Socialists. This government survived the 1984 elections and continued its term
until the elections in 1988.
The ‘footnote policy era’ is a great example to evaluate the ‘policy viability’ explanation
as it illustrates how an ideologically unified parliamentary opposition can obstruct the minority
coalition’s foreign policy behavior. During the six-year period between 1982 and 1988, the
government faced with an ‘alternative majority’ in the parliament (Doeser 2013, Pedersen 2012)
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that continuously opposed the former’s foreign policy agenda, particularly regarding its close
relations with NATO and the United States (Doeser 2011). The most notable way in which this
took place was in the form of “forcing the government to include dissenting footnotes in NATO
communiqués” (Doeser 2013: 587), a collective parliamentary opposition movement led by the
Social Democrats (Pedersen 2012). Doeser (2011: 228) notes that “the alternative majority
passed 23 resolutions between 1982 and 1988 that were inconsistent with NATO policies.” It is
argued that these footnotes not only caused the government to decrease its political role and
commitments in NATO but also invited backlash from the major players in the Organization
(Pedersen 2012: 344).
The constant tension between the right-wing government and the left-wing opposition
during the footnote policy era points to the significance of government composition in explaining
foreign policy behavior. First, the minority status of Schluter’s governing coalition in the
parliament put it at a mathematical disadvantage and limited the cabinet’s ability to pass
legislation towards building a stronger relationship with NATO. More importantly, however, the
ideological composition of the government as a pure right-wing coalition resulted in a similarly
homogenous opposition. Figure 5.1 below illustrates the distribution of parties in the Danish
parliament by 1982, with the parties’ left-right positions reported in parentheses. Governing
parties are displayed in black and the opposition parties are in gray.76

The left-right party position values are from 1984 and come from the Ray-Marks-Steenbergen
(Ray 1999; Steenbergen and Marks 2007) dataset. The original values vary from 0 to 1, where
0.5 denotes the center. To maintain consistency with the previous chapters and the data used in
Chapter 4, I multiplied the values by 10. The values now range between 0 and 10, 10 being farright, 0 being far-left and 5 denoting the center.
76
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Figure 5.1 Danish Folketing, 1982

To use Hagan’s (1993) terms, the ideological composition of the minority government in
Denmark created a parliament where the majority opposition seats were not controlled by parties
from different ideological backgrounds, as Figure 5.1 shows. Indeed, all opposition parties from
1982 until 1988 belonged to the left of the political spectrum and were NATO-skeptic (with the
exception of the far-right Progress Party that joined the parliament in 1984). The ideological
composition of the government resulted in an absence of policy viability and allowed the
opposition parties to easily come together and develop an even stronger response to the
government’s foreign policy towards NATO.
Ideological Composition: By 1988, the government led by the Conservatives and Liberals
since 1982 had been increasingly frustrated with the ability of the ‘alternative majority’ to block
foreign policy and impede the government’s willingness to commit, especially within the
framework of NATO. Indeed, the major reason behind the government’s call for elections that
year was yet another foreign policy deadlock regarding nuclear weapons in Danish waters
(Doeser 2011). The elections were held in May 1988 and resulted in a three-party government
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with Conservatives and Liberals, and more interestingly, with Social Liberals. Figure 5.2 below
illustrates the ideological distribution of parliamentary parties following the elections, where the
governing parties are displayed in black and the opposition parties are in gray. 77

Figure 5.2 Danish Folketing, 1988

The new minority coalition between the center-left Social Liberals and the right-wing
Liberals and Conservatives is central to explaining the end of the footnote policy era and the
subsequent decision to send the naval corvette to the Gulf: the then Prime Minister Poul Schluter
(1999) has later explained that “the only possibility for the Conservatives and the Liberals to
break up the parliamentary opposition and to put an end to the footnote policy was to create a
three-party government with the Social Liberals” (quoted in Doeser 2011: 230, emphasis added,
see also Doeser 2013).

The left-right party position values are from 1988 and come from the Ray-Marks-Steenbergen
(Ray 1999; Steenbergen and Marks 2007) dataset. The original values vary from 0 to 1, where
0.5 denotes the center. To maintain consistency with the previous chapters and the data used in
Chapter 4, I multiplied the values by 10. The values now range between 0 and 10, 10 being farright and 0 being far-left.
77
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The statement of the Conservative leader lends very strong support for the policy
viability hypothesis in explaining the government’s 1990 commitment in the Gulf: in order to
weaken the capacity of the majority opposition that continuously opposed the government’s
foreign policy agenda throughout the 1980s, the ruling parties knew that they had to reach across
the opposite side of the political spectrum and cooperate with at least one of the opposition
parties. Comparative Politics scholars also point out the ideological composition of this
government and argued that the Conservatives and the Liberals “succeeded in destroying the
alternative majority, especially in foreign policy issues” (Elklit 1999: 80, emphasis added).
The Conservatives and the Liberals acted strategically as they formed the coalition with
the leftist party that was still the closest to their respective ideological positions along the leftright political spectrum, as Figure 5.2 shows. The Social Liberals were also sympathetic to join
the coalition as their policy position on the footnotes evolved towards that of the Conservatives
and the Liberals over time. Social Liberal Party’s spokesperson said by 1988 that “the previous
years’ politicization of foreign policy had not been beneficial...the improved superpower
relations had created new opportunities for Denmark to act in the global arena” (Doeser 2011:
231), implying the Social Liberal convergence toward the Conservative-Liberal line.
Even though the coalition parties maintained agreement on the importance of Danish
activism at the international level, it was still not an easy decision for the Social Liberals to
accept the Conservative-Liberal proposal to join Gulf War in 1990. While the right-wing
members of the government argued for “the need to support the UN and the need to support the
US in its conflict with Iraq” (Olesen 2012: 27, emphasis in original), the Social Liberals
approached with skepticism and emphasized that “it was only due to the UN involvement that
the party could support it” (Olesen 2012: 28). When the blockade received UN sanction by
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August 1990, the Social Liberals joined their coalition partners in putting the proposal up for
parliamentary vote, even though the Party’s leader told that it was not an easy decision to make
(Doeser 2013: 591). In sum, even though the Social Liberals were still somewhat lukewarm
towards the idea of Danish participation in an overseas military operation even with the UN
mandate, they chose to support the proposal and send the corvette to the Gulf because they were
in government. In this sense, it is plausible to argue that the Social Liberal consent to Denmark’s
presence in the Gulf was enabled by logrolling, where the greatest incentive for the party was to
prevent a government crisis and continue their term in government.
In the opposition ranks, the Social Democrats fiercely opposed participating in the
blockade until the operation received the UN’s mandate (Olesen 2012). Once the UN sanctioned
the naval blockade, however, the Social Democrats cooperated with the Social Liberals in the
government and “emphasized the UN aspects of the operation” to garner votes from the other
opposition parties (Doeser 2013: 591).
Most importantly, the participation of the Social Liberals in the government helped the
Social Democrats find an ideologically familiar voice in the government with whom they could
work together in the run up to the parliamentary vote. While it is important to note that the
decision to send the Fischer to the Gulf was facilitated by the UN mandate, the ideological
composition of the minority government with parties from both the right and the left gave it
policy viability and allowed for a smoother dialogue between the government and the opposition.
This is critical especially given the recent, tense history between the two sides of the political
spectrum throughout the footnote policy era.
Public Opinion: Did the public opinion have any influence on the government’s decision
to participate in the Gulf War? It was known prior to the Gulf War that the public opinion was
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increasingly supportive of Denmark’s membership in NATO, which initiated the Gulf blockade
despite the lack of a UN resolution at first (Doeser 2013: 589). Those who disagreed with the
statement ‘We should leave NATO as soon as possible’ had increased from 54 percent in 1987 to
70 percent in 1988, signaling a clear and sharp upward trend in pro-NATO attitudes (Doeser
2011: 235, Table 1). More importantly, 50 percent of the voters who were affiliated with the leftwing, historically NATO-skeptic parties disagreed with the statement (Doeser 2011: 235),
indicating that the Danish public support for the footnote policy and for the tense relations with
NATO had declined. The increase in public support regarding continued Danish membership in
NATO likely gave the Social Liberals the public vote of confidence to contribute to the naval
blockade in the Gulf.
The elections of December 1990 and the resulting defeat of the Social Liberals, however,
might be indicative of the declining public support for Danish participation in the Gulf, at least
as far as the left-wing voters are concerned. Following the elections, the Social Liberals—who
voted for the participation in the Gulf as recent as three months ago—left the government and
joined the parliamentary opposition, which wanted the incoming Conservative-Liberal
government to withdraw the corvette if war broke out (Doeser 2013: 592). The leftist opposition,
in other words, was reunited by the end of 1990 when the rightist government lost its only leftwing ally.
This realignment among the government and opposition seats thus constrained the
former’s position and resulted in the decision to keep the corvette out of the war zone. In other
words, one can argue that the Danish public was initially supportive of the Gulf operation if their
increased support for NATO membership can be framed as an indirect gesture of support for
NATO’s initiation of the blockade in the Gulf. However, the evidence more strongly suggests
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that public opinion on participation in the Gulf was instead filtered through the parties, most
notably through the Social Liberal Party. Whereas the public support for NATO and the Social
Liberal’s shift away from the ‘footnote policy’ go hand in hand in explaining the Social Liberal
support for the September 1990 participation in the Gulf, the decline of the Social Liberal vote in
December 1990 and the increased likelihood of war discouraged the Social Liberal Party and led
them to withdraw their support away from its old coalition partners regarding the continuation of
Danish presence in Iraq. In either case, it can be argued that public opinion did not outweigh the
role of government composition in the intensity of Danish commitments in the Gulf. In fact, the
government’s room for maneuver regarding their foreign policy behavior in the Gulf was really
contingent upon the presence of the Social Liberals in the otherwise purely right-wing
Conservative-Liberal government, as the above analysis demonstrates.
Threat to National Survival: Did Denmark approach the Gulf operation to respond to a
threat to survival, outweighing the effects of government composition? The short answer is ‘no.’
Indeed, Olesen (2012: 14) contends that “compared to the earlier threat against Denmark
stemming from the Soviet Union...the 1990s were a period of remarkable lack of security threats
against Denmark.” As such, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was certainly not an existential threat
to Denmark that could have motivated the country’s response and sidelined the effects of the
decision-making dynamics imposed by the composition of the government.
Nevertheless, the smaller extremist parties in the Folketing did bring up the theme of
threat and approached the Gulf operation as a fight against terrorism to protect the Atlantic
Alliance. A former leader of the extreme-right Progress Party at the time stated that “there is no
doubt that terrorism is and remains enemy number 1 [sic] for the Progress Party and … we will
do anything to prevent such terrorism from approaching NATO’s southern flank” (quoted in
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Olesen 2012: 29). This was not picked up by the government, however, in making the decision to
commit the corvette to the Gulf operation.
Political Leadership: As argued earlier in Chapter 2, leaders are critical in the study of
foreign policy as their personal motivations, professional experience, or psychological
characteristics might drive them to sideline institutional constraints to achieve particular foreign
policy goals. In this sense, it is important to focus on the most significant political figure in this
period, Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen of the Liberal Party, to understand
whether the commitment decision in 1990 was a result of individual-level factors.
Studies in Danish foreign policy characterize Uffe Ellemann-Jensen as the foremost
supporter of Denmark’s foreign policy activism during the early post-Cold War years. Several
accounts suggest that Ellemann-Jensen made it his personal objective to not only end the
footnote policy period and demonstrate Danish commitment in the Gulf, but he also wanted to
transform Denmark’s foreign policy identity away from its social democratic, cosmopolitan roots
into an active international actor that can easily be placed on the map in the post-Cold War
international security environment (Branner 2013, Doeser 2013, Pedersen 2012).
With the Prime Minister Schluter choosing to focus on domestic politics, EllemannJensen was effectively the foreign policy tsar during the 1980s and the early 1990s (Doeser
2013: 588-589). To what extent Ellemann-Jensen was a game changer in the run up to the
decision to participate in the Gulf War, however, is open to debate. On the one hand, EllemannJensen was courageous enough to announce without receiving any formal support from his
government that Denmark would send a naval corvette to the Gulf. He therefore publicly
committed his government, “which infuriated the Social Liberals as well as the Prime Minister”
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(Doeser 2013: 590). In this sense, Ellemann-Jensen certainly seized the opportunity to define the
commitment behavior of the government.
On the other hand, the accounts suggest that even though he wanted his government to
make more intense commitments beyond the contribution of the naval corvette and enter into a
stronger alliance with the US and NATO, he had to back down as the Social Liberals in the
government and the Social Democrats in the opposition put significant constraints on his room
for maneuver (Doeser 2013, Olesen 2012). As a result, he had to first wait for the UN to issue the
mandate, and then seek support in the government and among the opposition parties for the
proposal to join the blockade. In sum, despite Ellemann-Jensen’s strong personality and interest
in changing Denmark’s international profile into an active citizen of the international
community, his efforts in pushing Denmark to participate in the Gulf War were only as decisive
as allowed by the Social Liberals and Social Democrats in the policy-making process.
To conclude, the case of the Gulf War and the preceding episode in Danish foreign affairs
known as the ‘footnote policy era’ demonstrate that the composition of the government was key
in explaining Denmark’s commitment behavior in the Gulf, at a critical moment of international
systemic change. While the assertive political leadership of Ellemann-Jensen was certainly
visible in this period and specifically in the decision to join the Gulf War, Denmark’s
commitment in the naval blockade was made possible primarily by the participation of the Social
Liberals in the right-oriented Conservative-Liberal coalition.
This new coalition achieved ideological heterogeneity and consequently, dismantled the
‘alternative majority’ in the parliament which had continuously blocked its foreign policy
agenda. By dividing the leftist parliamentary opposition, the government effectively ended the
footnote policy period, and ultimately sent Danish capabilities beyond its borders “for the first
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time in modern history” (Branner 2013: 146). The presence of the Social Liberals—a long-time
member of the left-wing ‘alternative majority’—in the government facilitated the cooperation of
the coalition with the opposition parties such as the Social Democrats. In the context of indirect
public opinion and non-existent threat to national survival, the ideological composition of the
government was central to explaining the Danish decision to send material resources to the Gulf
in 1990. On the other hand, the international context, specifically the UN mandate for the
blockade, further facilitated the decision.
Ultimately, the dissolution of the ‘footnote policy era’ during which the ideologically
cohesive left-wing parliamentary opposition had challenged the foreign policy commitments of
the right-wing government, followed by the formation of a new, hybrid left-right minority
coalition that decided on the Danish participation in the 1990 Gulf War together illuminate the
findings in Chapter 4. Particularly, the analysis lends strong support to the ‘policy viability’
explanation regarding the variation in the commitment intensity of minority coalitions with
respect to their ideological composition.
In Chapter 4, the findings demonstrated that all else being equal, the commitment
intensity of minority coalitions was contingent upon the ideological fragmentation of the
opposition, which the coalition would maintain by including parties from the opposite sides of
the political spectrum. The policy incongruence of the minority coalition measured as crossing
the center of the political spectrum, in other words, helps the coalition leave the parliamentary
opposition ideologically fragmented, therefore facilitating the increase in the intensity of foreign
policy commitments.
The case that is evaluated in this section has shown that the change in the policy
incongruence of the minority coalition was central to explaining the shift in the commitment
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intensity of Denmark as a participant in the Gulf War. While ‘reaching across the aisle’ was the
key factor in this shift, logrolling seems to be an explanation for why the early sporadic
disagreements among the governing parties on the Gulf operation were swept under the rug
along the way.
The ‘policy viability’ approach also maintained its explanatory power vis-à-vis the
alternative explanations such as public opinion, threat to national survival and political
leadership. At the domestic level, the necessity to seek parliamentary consensus prior to
international missions encouraged the left-right hybrid coalition to look for more allies from the
opposition seats. Finally, the foreign policy vision of Denmark in the immediate aftermath of the
Cold War to become an aspiring ‘activist’ at the international level and its perceptions toward the
UN’s capacity to legitimize international interventions further facilitated the deployment of the
corvette to the Gulf in 1990.
The next case analysis turns to a more recent incident of international commitment,
where Denmark joined the Iraq war coalition in 2003.

Offensive Danish Foreign Policy and the 2003 Iraq War
As argued earlier in this chapter, Danish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era towards
international activism was marked by two major turning points. One of these was the decision to
join the naval blockade in the Gulf in 1990, discussed above. The second major shift in Danish
foreign policy came with the country’s 2003 decision to join the US-led war in Iraq, with which
Denmark’s foreign policy activism took a “super-Atlanticist” turn (Mouritzen 2007). On March
18, 2003, the government represented by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Moller (2003)
proposed the Folketing the commitment of “a submarine, a corvette, a team of doctors as well as
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a small contribution of staff and liaison personnel.” This proposal was accepted on March 21st by
the government parties, namely the Liberals and the Conservatives as well as the extragovernmental right-wing Danish People’s Party, while the leftist opposition parties collectively
voted against it. Ultimately, the war bill passed with “a slim majority of 11 votes” (Mello 2012:
440, also see Kaarbo and Cantir 2013).
Ideological Composition: The government that asked the Folketing its support for Danish
participation in the 2003 Iraq war came to power in November 2001 by defeating the Social
Democratic minority government led by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. The incoming minority
government was led by the Liberal party leader, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and included the
Conservative Party as its partner. Ideologically, this partnership resulted in a pure right-wing
government unlike the 1990 cabinet that sent the corvette ship to the Gulf.
Even though the new minority government did not have the ideological composition to
divide the opposition as it happened after the 1988 elections, it was still successful at garnering
enough votes in the parliament without the need to cooperate with the left-leaning parties in the
parliament. The reason for this was the historical victory that the Danish right received in the
2001 elections: the Liberals won 56 seats in the 179-seat parliament, the Conservatives won 16,
and the Danish People’s Party won 22 seats. With the outside support from the DPP, the LiberalConservative minority coalition could enjoy a pure-right majority in the parliament. Indeed,
Pedersen (2012: 339) explains that “for the first time in 70 years, it was possible to find a
majority for foreign policy that did not have to include the Social Liberals and the Social
Democrats.”
The Rasmussen government “made activism the emblem of its foreign policy and equated
activism with a close alliance with the United States” (Rasmussen 2005: 81). The Liberals were
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particularly vociferous to support the United States in the war against terrorism first and
foremost through its leader, Fogh Rasmussen, while the Conservatives approached with more
caution at the earlier stages. Specifically, Foreign Minister Per Stig Moller of the Conservative
Party “argued in accordance with the traditional Danish foreign policy priorities when he
stressed institutional rather than military activism” (Branner 2013: 160). Nevertheless, the
Conservatives voted with the Liberals in support of the war bill in March 2003.
The Danish People’s Party was also supportive of the proposal to contribute to the war in
Iraq. The DPP leader argued that “I and the Danish People’s Party feel clearly that it is much
better to put our weight behind the US in connection with this mission, than France or Germany”
(quoted in Olesen 2012: 56).
The DPP leader’s statement was in response to the Social Liberal and Social Democratic
position: both parties first emphasized the need for a UN mandate for intervention (Pedersen
2012) and also argued for a multilateral response as opposed to aligning only with the United
States: “When the Prime Minister...chooses to join Washington’s dictates...rather than the
possibility of a dialogue through a joint response from Brussels, the term ‘activism’ becomes a
false mark,” said the Social Democratic leader, Mogens Lykketoft, criticizing the government’s
pro-US position (quoted in Branner 2013: 158).
In sum, the ad hoc majority that the Liberal-Conservative government maintained in the
parliament with the Danish People’s Party diminished the possibility of another left-oriented
‘alternative majority’ that emerged during the ‘footnote’ era. As the three parties that achieved
parliamentary majority maintained an agreement over Denmark’s participation in the war, the
government did not face any difficulty in passing the war bill in March 2003. In this sense, the
government achieved the “majority status in disguise” (Strom 1990).
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Logrolling: The government’s ability to pass the war bill in 2003 came at a price,
however. Since the government needed the parliamentary support of the Democratic People’s
Party for foreign as well as domestic policy, the latter used this vulnerability to its advantage by
asking for side-payments such as getting policy concessions on immigration and refuge laws,
which are the central pillars of the DPP platform (Economist Intelligence Unit 2002a: 14). As an
example, the government agreed to cooperate and passed more stringent legislation on
immigration and refuge as well as decreasing public expenditure and taxes (Economist
Intelligence Unit 2003a: 12) in exchange for the DPP’s support for the budgets in 2002 and 2003
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2002b, 2003a).
The close relationship that emerged between the government and the Democratic
People’s Party eventually found an ideational basis that facilitated further cooperation. The
‘values policy’ that the government emphasized with regards to education and environment, for
instance, soon spilled over to immigration precisely because of the DPP’s influence over
domestic policy (Branner 2013: 149). A member of the DPP once said that “the change in 2001
[was] not just a change in government, but a change of systems” (Branner 2013: 161), indicating
the Party’s confidence in closely identifying itself with the government and its policies even
though it formally remained outside of the cabinet. The leftist opposition parties and
international observers grew increasingly cautious of this relationship as it began to sharply
polarize Danish foreign and domestic policy (Economist Intelligence Unit 2002c).
The government’s cooperation with the DPP over a series of policy reforms ultimately
enabled the former to pass the war bill in the parliament in March 2003 with the latter’s votes.
Over time, the cooperation between the coalition and the opposition party over the Iraq policy
became much more apparent. Kaarbo and Cantir (2013: 471) explain that “the Danish People’s
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Party did indeed trade its votes for later deployment of peacekeepers in Iraq for concessions on
asylum policies” in May 2003, once the initial armed confrontation was over.
Public Opinion: Was the Danish electorate influential in the government’s decision to
join the war in Iraq alongside the United States? Jakobsen (2012: 4) argues that traditionally,
“the public at large favors Danish military participation in international operations.” As for the
Iraq case, polls and observations by the analysts show that while a notable proportion of the
public did not favor the government’s proposal, this opposition was still not overwhelming. A
Gallup poll conducted three months prior to the March 2003 decision shows that those who did
not approve Denmark’s participation in the war at all were a little more than 40 percent whereas
those who supported it either ‘in the form of a UN operation’ or as ‘carried out by the US and its
allies’ made up about 45 percent of the respondents, while some 10 percent had no answer
(Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004). Another EOS-Gallup poll in January 2003 asked about
“Danish participation in a military intervention without UN mandate,” where 83 per cent of the
respondents said such an intervention would be “unjustified” and “58 per cent even as
‘absolutely unjustified’” (Hummel 2007: 12).
Despite the dramatic variation in opinion polls, however, the combined public opinion
ratings for the government and the DPP stayed within the initial 50 percent range throughout
2001 and 2003, indicating that the public opinion for the government was not affected by the
parliamentary debate over Iraq. In fact, the opinion ratings were as high as 51.5 percent one
month after the war decision, which was only 0.8 points lower than the election results of
November 2001. In other words, even though the parliament was deeply divided over the Iraq
proposal and the polls showed public objection to it, there was no decisive public opposition
against Denmark’s contribution to the war that would politically harm the governing parties. It is
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likely that the consistent domestic support that the government parties and their parliamentary
ally, the Danish People’s Party, received until and during 2003 helped them vote for the bill with
confidence.
Threat to National Survival: Unlike the war in 1990, the war in Iraq was viewed by the
credible parties of the Danish right as an opportunity to respond to the new and more immediate
security challenges that emerged in the post-Cold War era such as international terrorism or
weapons of mass destruction. The Liberals and the Conservatives perceived the new security
threats as directly challenging Danish national security. In an opinion piece published in 2003,
Frank Laybourn, the foreign and security policy adviser to the Liberal Party, expressed that
“international terrorism is a threat to our peace and security, and can strike any country and any
population group--including Denmark and the Danes” (2003, emphasis added). Quoting an
earlier statement of George W. Bush, “we cannot let our enemies strike first,” Laybourn (2003)
stated, and that Fogh Rasmussen “share[d] the US assessment of the new threats,” implying the
government’s preference for a decisive and immediate response.
Similarly for the Rasmussen government’s ally in the parliament since November 2001,
the Danish People’s Party “the threat was real both as an international threat and as a domestic
one” (Olesen 2012: 45), suggesting that the Party viewed the participation in the war in Iraq as
an opportunity to promote Danish national security. The statements of the DPP leader Pia
Kjaersgaard in 2001 that compare the threat of religious terrorism to the threats posed by the
Nazi Germany (Olesen 2012: 46) also stand as powerful signals toward predicting the Party’s
position regarding the Rasmussen government’s March 2003 proposal to join the war coalition.
In sum, the major Danish political parties of the right shared a common perception of threat to
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national security, which was another reason why they were able to cooperate and eventually pass
the parliamentary resolution to contribute to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Parties on the left, especially the Social Democrats, were less certain about the notion of
threat or how to respond to it. The leader of the Social Democratic government at the time, Poul
Nyrup Rasmussen, stressed in the immediate aftermath of the 2001 attacks that while Denmark
was not under threat, though it was still important to see that “it is a different world we now live
in” (Olesen 2012: 42). While acknowledging the changes in international security, however, “the
Social Liberals and the Social Democrats refused to accept the threat perception expressed by the
Liberals and the Conservatives” (Olesen 2012: 57). Other accounts challenge this view, however,
by explaining how the Social Democratic leader, Nyrup Rasmussen, used to be more of a
hardliner during the November 2001 elections when he said that “we do not want to give up our
way of life, our democracy, our values, our safety … our future is common—our security is also
that of NATO and the US” (Larsen 2005: 85). The Social Democrats were clearly confused
about how to position themselves vis-à-vis the September 11 attacks and their aftermath. It is
likely that their inability to establish a position early on helped the Liberals, Conservatives and
the Danish People’s Party further strengthen their policy position in the political marketplace.
Political Leadership: Did leadership play any role in Denmark’s decision to join the war?
It is argued that the dynamic between the Liberals and Conservatives in the coalition had already
put the prime minister in a stronger leadership position. Some accounts portray the relationship
between the two governing parties as having “a big brother-little brother character” and argue
that while Rasmussen ‘delivered,’ the Conservative leader, Bendt Bendtsen, fell short of meeting
his election promises (Economist Intelligence Unit 2003a: 14-15), thus putting Rasmussen’s
political leadership skills ahead of his coalition partner.
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Furthermore, analysts agree that the leadership of Prime Minister Anders Fogh
Rasmussen was central in Denmark’s decision to join the US in the war in Iraq (Branner 2013,
Elkjaer 2004, Larsen 2009, Mouritzen 2007). Bo Elkjaer, an award-winning Danish journalist
who later revealed that the government introduced the war proposal based on evidence that was
less than fully supportive of the claim that Iraq had an active weapons program and was involved
in terrorist activity with Al Qaeda, reported (2004: 10) that Fogh Rasmussen was personally
convinced as early as September 2002: “I am not in the slightest doubt that he possesses weapons
of mass destruction and wishes to manufacture them,” Rasmussen said.
Mouritzen (2007: 160) also argues that the Prime Minister “himself took the decision,
after a phone call from President Bush,” indicating that the decision to join the war was his idea
since the beginning. Indeed, Henriksen and Ringsmose (2012) provide a detailed account of the
close personal relationship that Rasmussen and President Bush developed in the post-September
11 period and especially during the eve of the war to suggest that Rasmussen was personally
invested in the decision beyond the politics of national security.
Against this background, speculations abound as to whether Rasmussen’s appointment as
the NATO Secretary-General in 2009 should be seen as a token of good will in response to his
efforts in the early 2000s (Branner 2013). Some argue that it is impossible to tell this for sure
(Henriksen and Ringsmose 2012). Nevertheless, there is significant evidence that Rasmussen’s
convictions, personal interest and position on the issue contributed to the decision to join the war
in 2003.
In conclusion, the case analysis of Denmark in the 2003 decision to join the Iraq War
shows that the result—Danish participation in the war—fails to support the ‘policy viability’
hypothesis and the findings presented in Chapter 4 on minority coalitions. The expectation was
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that Denmark would not join the war since the minority coalition did not ‘reach across the aisle’
but included only right-wing parties, thereby allowing for an ideologically unified parliamentary
opposition to challenge its foreign policy agenda and impede its ability to make international
commitments. Despite the presence of this pure right-wing government, Denmark was still able
to commit resources in the US-led war in Iraq in 2003.
The analysis shows, however, that the Danish participation in the 2003 war was an overdetermined case where the several possible factors that would explain the decision actually
contributed to the outcome. The single most important reason for this outcome was that the
government had the opportunity to align with the right-wing Danish People’s Party in the
parliament and reach the necessary parliamentary majority to pass the war bill in March 2003.
The Danish People’s Party used their size advantage in the parliament by getting side-payments
from the government in the form of domestic policy reforms in immigration and refuge in return
for their support for the coalition’s foreign policy agenda towards Iraq.
Moreover, the DPP and the government shared common perceptions of threat to national
security caused by international terrorism (the most notable suspect being Iraq), which further
enabled their cooperation during the parliamentary vote alongside their logrolling relationship
towards immigration and refugee policies, described above. Finally, the lack of an overwhelming
public opposition against the war and the personal interest of the Prime Minister further
contributed to Denmark’s decision to join the war coalition in 2003.
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Conclusion
This chapter took a qualitative approach to provide an in-depth demonstration of how policy
incongruence mediates the commitment intensity of minority coalitions through fragmenting the
parliamentary opposition and offering the government ‘policy viability.’
To undertake this investigation, the chapter has first utilized an out-of-sample case from
Denmark and evaluated the effects of ideological composition, logrolling, public opinion, threat
to national survival and political leadership on the Danish decision to contribute a naval corvette
ship in the Gulf operation in 1990. This case study concluded that the major factor behind the
Danish commitment in the Gulf was the ideological composition of the government that included
parties from the left and the right of the political spectrum. The ideological heterogeneity of the
government gave it policy viability, which was the key explanatory factor behind the end of the
‘footnote policy era’ that stymied the foreign policy agenda of the right-wing governments
throughout the 1980s. Even though the incoming government in 1988 had minority status in the
parliament, its ideological composition made it possible to not only break the left-wing
‘alternative opposition’ in the parliament but to engage in a dialogue with the opposition parties
that facilitated the decision to commit resources in the naval blockade in 1990. This decision
took place in the absence of threats to Danish national security and furthermore, the assertive
political leadership of the Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen was influential only to the
extent allowed by the coalition parties.
The second case from Denmark has failed to support the ‘policy viability’ explanation.
Even though the government elected in November 2001 was a pure-right-wing minority
coalition, which, by implication, resulted in a parliamentary opposition that included several
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prominent left-wing parties, this government was still able to commit Denmark to the war in Iraq
not only by signing the ‘letter of eight’ but by deploying material resources to the region.
The case analysis revealed that a multitude of factors contributed to this outcome, making
the decision an over-determined case for the purposes of this study: for the first time in decades,
the right-wing parties secured a majority in the elections, which gave the minority coalition the
opportunity to enter into a logrolling relationship with the right-wing Danish People’s Party in
the parliament. As a result of logrolling on immigration and refugee laws, the DPP supported the
government’s proposal to contribute to the war in Iraq. In addition, the Iraqi regime was
interpreted as a threat to Denmark’s national security by several parties on the right and the left
of the political spectrum; the public opinion for the parties stayed consistently high despite the
early public opposition for the war itself; and the Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen
showed notable assertiveness in aligning Danish interests with those of the United States.
The results of this case have also shed light on the anomalous outcomes that were left
unexplained by the findings of Chapter 4. The results illuminate those instances where minority
coalitions can make more intense international commitments than it is expected by the majority
of the literature on Comparative Politics and the ‘policy viability’ theory. Even though minority
coalitions suffer from a constant ‘size disadvantage’ in the parliament, the Danish decision in
2003 illustrates that these coalitions also actively seek and adopt new strategies to circumvent
their disadvantaged position and tip the scale in their favor. One such strategy that the Danish
case reveals is policy-based cooperation with parties outside the government. Logrolling with
other parties in the parliament without entering into a formal coalition agreement not only allows
minority coalitions to garner ad hoc support for policy, but also makes sure that the government
is not obliged to make compromises in office payoffs. This is an important insight to explain the
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anomalous instances where minority coalitions—even when they do not fragment the opposition
ideologically—can still engage in international commitments.
Furthermore, the conclusions drawn from these cases also illuminate the country-level
results that were presented in the concluding sections of Chapter 4 and help us interpret why
Denmark stands out as the outlier country with the highest ‘baseline’ commitment value in the
concluding analyses of Chapter 4.
Indeed, as discussed previously in Chapter 4, the random-effects estimates of the
regression analyses show that when compared to the other European parliamentary regimes in
the dataset, Denmark—a country ruled exclusively by minority coalitions—displays one of the
highest baseline commitment intensity levels in the 1994-2004 period. This result is
contextualized extensively in the case analyses presented in this section. First, the historical
trajectory of Danish foreign policy towards ‘international activism’ in the immediate aftermath
of the Cold War, and the shift towards ‘offensive Danish foreign policy’ marked by the 2003
Iraq decision show that the country had already adopted a foreign policy ‘vision’ towards
increased international presence since the end of the Cold War. This vision has likely contributed
to the Danish governments’ ability to make more intense international commitments regardless
of the inter-party dynamics surrounding coalition governance. Second, the analysis of the 2003
Iraq decision reveals that the factors that were not accounted for in the regression analyses in
Chapter 4—logrolling, public opinion, threats to national security, political leadership—all
contributed to the commitment decision in 2003. In this sense, the outlier position of Denmark as
shown in Figure 4.4 of Chapter 4 is further contextualized by these alternative explanations that
remained latent in the statistical analyses.
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Overall, the case analyses presented in this chapter provide a far more comprehensive
evaluation of the variation in the intensity of international commitments, specifically for the
regimes that are predominantly governed by minority coalitions. The next chapter now turns to
minimum winning coalitions to investigate how they make foreign policy commitments under
similarly increasing levels of policy incongruence.
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CHAPTER 6

WHEN DISAGREEMENTS LEAD TO COMMITMENTS:
DUTCH FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR IN THE 2003 IRAQ WAR
As iterated throughout the dissertation, the central point raised in this project is the influence of
the mathematical and the ideological organization of parties in parliamentary governments on the
commitment intensity of these regimes at the international level. To that end, Chapter 4 has
offered a quantitative analysis of post-Cold War foreign policy behaviors of European
parliamentary regimes and demonstrated that the interactive effects of the type of government
and its policy incongruence indeed influenced their commitment behavior.
Chapter 5 has pushed this inquiry further by qualitatively demonstrating how government
composition affects commitment behavior in the context of minority coalitions. With a
structured-focused comparative case analysis of Danish commitments in the Gulf in 1990 and
2003, the chapter has uncovered the mechanism underlying the ‘policy viability’ explanation, as
well as the alternative factors at the domestic-, individual-, and international-levels which further
influence international commitments when minority coalitions do not enjoy ‘policy viability’ in
the parliament.
One other central argument raised in the dissertation has concerned the effects of policy
incongruence in minimum winning coalitions on their commitment behavior. The theoretical
expectations presented in Chapter 2 have alluded to the moderating effect of policy incongruence
on minimum winning coalitions. Since this type of government is mathematically fragile as it
is—where the withdrawal of any party causes the loss of parliamentary majority, the refined veto
players approach in Chapter 2 has hypothesized that minimum winning coalitions should be far
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more constrained in increasing the intensity of international commitments, especially when
policy disagreements grow among the governing parties. In other words, Chapter 2 has argued
that the fragility of minimum winning coalitions should be amplified at higher levels of policy
incongruence, leading to a moderation in the intensity of their commitments.
The results of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 have suggested otherwise, however.
The findings have concluded instead that minimum winning coalitions engage in more intense
commitments as their policy incongruence increases—a finding that does not support the refined
veto players hypothesis. What could be the mechanism that justifies this relationship?
The question that this chapter asks therefore concerns the commitments of minimum
winning coalitions: how does a minimum winning coalition increase its commitment intensity
under increasing levels of policy incongruence? What are the circumstances under which a
minimum winning coalition engages in more intense international commitments?
To answer this question, this chapter uses the Dutch decision to provide political support
for the 2003 US-led war in Iraq and its aftermath. As a country that has been historically ruled by
minimum winning coalitions, the Netherlands provides a great institutional setting to undertake
this inquiry. Furthermore, the 2003 Dutch case points to the fluidity of governments and its
influence in foreign policy. The fact that the 2003 decision to support the Iraq war had actually
spilled over to two minimum winning coalitions as well as a third coalition in-the-making
provides an interesting political setting that demonstrates how foreign policy cannot be isolated
from the dynamics of domestic politics. With an in-depth analysis of this case by the method of
structured-focused comparison, the chapter seeks to discover the mechanisms that link increased
policy incongruence in minimum winning coalitions to increased commitment intensity as well
as the other factors which could further influence this relationship.
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The chapter proceeds as follows. Following the format of Chapter 5 on Denmark, the
next two sections present a detailed background of the Dutch political system to highlight the
policy-making norms and processes, and how they influence coalition foreign policy in this
country. The chapter then offers a discussion of Dutch foreign policy in the post-Cold War era to
set the historical context against which the 2003 case should be evaluated. The following section
presents the analysis. The chapter concludes with a summary of the analysis and final thoughts.

From Consensus to Competition: The Dutch Political Landscape
Like Denmark, politics in the Netherlands is also characterized by the interaction of multiple
political parties in an electoral system based on proportional representation (PR). Andeweg and
Irwin (2005: 46) report that “since 1967, in any given election, 20 or more parties have generally
submitted lists at the elections and up to 14 parties were successful in getting candidates
elected,” dramatically capturing the plethora of parties represented in the Dutch political system.
Of these, however, only a handful “participates in governing coalitions or has ‘the power of
intimidation’ or ‘blackmail potential’” (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 46).
The Conservative-Liberals (VVD), the Christian Democrats (specifically the ARP, CHU
and KVP, which by the 1970s joined together to become what is known as the Christian
Democratic Appeal or the CDA) and the Labour Party (PvdA) have historically defined the
Dutch political landscape as the most “relevant” parties in a consensus-based system (Andeweg
and Irwin 2005: 53-67).
All of these parties participated in governments in some capacity as junior or senior
coalition members in the post-Second World War era as multiparty politics in the Netherlands
has invariably yielded coalition governments as its institutional outcome. The CDA, for instance,
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served as a coalition partner in every government except two (out of 12) between 1977 and 2007,
and was the party of the prime minister in all of them (Andeweg 2008: 259). The VVD had
enjoyed the ‘kingmaker’ status frequently by cooperating with the Christian Democrats as well
as the Labour Party, so much so that it was a junior coalition partner in 15 out of 27 governments
between 1945 and 2007 (Andeweg 2008: 259), and it is currently the senior partner in a majority
coalition with the Labour Party.
Finally, the Labour Party (PvdA) has been the first resort of the social-democratic
electorate in the Netherlands since the end of the Second World War and has been consistently
receiving votes within the 20-27 per cent range since 1994, excluding the dramatic drop in the
2002 elections after its eight-year incumbency (European Election Database, 2014). Like its
Christian Democratic counterpart, the PvdA has also frequently participated in coalition
governments since 1945, often as the senior partner (Andeweg 2008: 259).
The progressive-liberal Democrats ’66, the GreenLeft and the populist right-wing party
List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) join the aforementioned parties as the more recent additions to the group
of relevant parties in the Netherlands.78 The LPF formed a coalition government with the CDA
and the VVD in July 2002 though it survived only until the October of that year, owing to a crisis
within the LPF (Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2004). Indeed, it is the breakdown of the CDA-VVDLPF coalition, the elections that followed in January 2003 and the coalition talks that took place
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Of these, the LPF should receive particular attention as the party had shown unprecedented
success in the first general elections in 2002, mere months after its establishment under its
charismatic namesake, Pim Fortuyn (Mudde 2007: 210). Championing new issues such as the
cultural integration of ethnic groups with the “Dutch way of living” (Pennings and Keman 2002:
2), the party managed to win 26 seats in the Dutch parliament, the Tweede Kamer, despite
Fortuyn’s assassination less than two weeks prior to the elections in May 2002 (Van Holsteyn
and Irwin 2004).
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until the formation of a new coalition government in May 2003 that provide the political
background to the Dutch decision to participate in the US-led invasion of Iraq and its aftermath.
Consensus politics had been a foremost defining feature of Dutch politics until mid1960s. To fully understand and justify why the Netherlands provides a great contemporary
example of ‘politicized’ foreign policy despite its history of a consociational system, however, it
is important to spend some time on its political transformation, especially during the 1970s.
Voorhoeve explains that the leading Dutch parties listed above, namely the CDA, VVD
and the PvdA reflect the major “pillars” of the society: “Until the mid-sixties, the Netherlands
was characterized by religious or ideological sub-societies: Protestant, Roman Catholic,
Socialist, and Liberal. These sub-systems, called ‘zuilen’ or pillars, comprised not only the
churches and political parties, but also the schools, trade-unions, voluntary associations,
hospitals, broadcasting corporations, newspapers, etc.” (1979: 59). As such, they represent the
major political cleavages in the Netherlands, namely “the Left-Right continuum and the
Progressive-Conservative divide,” which “are known to be the most salient conflict dimensions
in the Dutch context” (Pennings and Keman 2002: 6).
Andeweg and Irwin (2005: 123) explain that “collegial and collective government has
long historical roots in the Netherlands,” attesting to the cooperation among the sub-systems,
which was “constantly reinforced by the coalition character of Dutch politics.” The conventional
wisdom that emphasizes the crisis-prone nature of multiparty governance in parliamentary
regimes had thus been defied in the Dutch context, thanks to pillarization.
This tradition, known as “the politics of accommodation in a ‘consociational
democracy’” (Voorhoeve 1979: 60), began to change by 1967 with the process of
“depillarization,” namely “the erosion of the consociational system of separate social, religious,
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and political blocs” (Kaarbo 2012: 73). The most significant political outcome of depillarization
has been the change in the “apolitical, technocratic” nature of the Dutch cabinets (Andeweg and
Irwin 2005: 125) towards more politicization. Some of the ways in which politicization occurred
include the growing importance of coalition agreements among parties and the increasingly
frequent interactions between the ministers and the party leaders (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 127,
see also Andeweg 2008: 269) to more closely monitor and maintain party-minister consistency in
policy-making. The authors also report that “between 1967 and 2003 the proportion of ministers
with prior parliamentary experience rose to 65 per cent” (2005: 126), suggesting that the
technocratic nature of governing cabinets was being replaced with a preference for ministers
with greater exposure to politics, which would undoubtedly result in more politicized and
competitive coalition governments.
Depillarization has thus set the tone of coalition governments in this country since 1967
as inter-party politics moved away from consensus towards competition. Furthermore, as
increased politicization has led to more polarization, political parties opted for forming
minimalist governing coalitions. Looking at the period between 1967 and 2007, Andeweg (2008:
258) argues that “the decline of the surplus-majority coalition is indeed a real and significant
change in line with the hypothesis that non-consociational coalitions are less inclusive than
consociational coalitions.”
Andeweg’s (2008) observation attests to the more polarized nature of the political
system. It has been shown, for instance, that “between 1946 and 1967 the country was governed
86 per cent of the time by larger-than-necessary [surplus majority] coalitions; between 1967 and
2003 this percentage declined to around 26 per cent” (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 121). Pennings
and Keman (2008: 159) also report that all Dutch governments have been minimum winning
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coalitions since the 1970s except for one minority government in the early 1980s and the second
‘purple coalition,’ which was an oversized government, that ruled between 1998 until 2004.79
The consistency of minimum winning coalitions throughout the past four decades of Dutch
politics therefore provides an exceptional institutional setting to test the influence of the variation
in policy incongruence on foreign policy behavior, specifically on the intensity of commitments.
Paralleling politicization and polarization among political parties, intra-party cohesion
within parties had also begun to increase (Andeweg 2008: 272), minimizing the ideological
factions inside party blocs that may spill over to policy-making.80 Rochon (1999: 114) argues
that “surveys of Second Chamber [Tweede Kamer] members show that they view themselves
primarily as representatives of their party’s voters, and consequently feel bound to vote the party
line under most circumstances,” exemplifying party discipline.
Furthermore, Andeweg (2008: 272) hints at the close relationship between the party in
the parliament and in the government by arguing that “if a minister is forced to withdraw from
the Cabinet, his party is likely to withdraw from the coalition.” This is a critical observation that
demonstrates party discipline, especially given the constitutional rule in the Netherlands that
once appointed to the cabinet; the ministers must vacate their parliamentary seat (Andeweg and
Irwin 2005: 115). In other words, even though the party and the minister are legally disconnected
from each other, both actors not only remain in close interaction through weekly meetings as
mentioned earlier, but the party line is upheld by its members as well as the ministers, who are
technically not affiliated with any political party. This dynamic contributes to the politicization
79

Pennings and Keman (2002: 1) explain that the nickname ‘purple’ comes from the colors of
the parties, as “it combines the ‘red’ of the PvdA and the ‘blue’ of the VVD,” alongside their
third partner, the D66.
80
“Already in 1979, 68 per cent of all MPs interviewed in a survey agreed with the statement
that ‘Government policy is formed in close consultation and cooperation with the parliamentary
parties in the governmental majority’” (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 140).
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of foreign policy and maintains ideological cohesion among the members of the party as well as
between the party and the minister.81
In sum, minimum winning coalitions remain “the game in town” in the Netherlands since
the early 1970s with the onset of depillarization, leading to more competition between and more
cohesion inside political parties. To the extent that minimum winning coalitions have been the
default political outcome of parliamentary elections with highly cohesive political parties in this
country, it provides additional confidence in my observations and conclusions pertaining to the
dynamics of foreign policy decision-making and the behavioral outcomes, which will be
discussed in the next sections. Clearly, the key domestic political institutions show strong
consistency across the last four decades.

Coalition Politics and Foreign Policy in the Netherlands
Certainly, Dutch depillarization was not only a matter of domestic politics. To the contrary, the
politicization of politics in this country quickly spilled over to foreign policy. Whereas foreign
policy had been assumed to be an elite affair for decades (Baehr 1980, see also Verbeek and Van
der Vleuten 2008: 361) and was immune from public attention or domestic political infighting,
the shift from consensus to competition at the domestic level also affected the ways in which the
public and political parties began to develop opinions and compete over issues of foreign policy.
“Security and defense policy-making has become more politicized and domesticated,”
Kaarbo (2012: 73) explains—a trend that continues to this day. Most recently, for instance, the
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It is nevertheless important to acknowledge that intra-party disagreements on foreign policy,
domestic and foreign alike, certainly take place in the Netherlands. Kaarbo (2012: 76, emphasis
added) mentions that “the basic conflicts in Dutch politics are between and within parties,”
though the mechanisms described above certainly help alleviate the conflicts within parties,
especially in the foreign policy realm—a second-order issue area in terms of the electoral stakes
of the MPs.
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Christian Democrat-led coalition collapsed in February 2010 precisely because one of the junior
partners, the Labour party, had a firm position against continuing the Dutch mission in
Afghanistan (Der Spiegel 2010a). For the purposes of this dissertation then, the domesticization
and politicization of foreign policy through depillarization provides a valuable opportunity to
investigate whether and how domestic political competition among coalition parties is projected
on the processes and behavioral outcomes of Dutch foreign policy.
Baehr (1980: 235) contends that the main actors of Dutch foreign policy can be rank
ordered from most to least “influential” as “the Cabinet, the Second Chamber, high officials and
diplomats and the political parties.” The fact that the bureaucrats—and indeed the main
executives—of foreign policy come only after the cabinet and the parliament in their ability to
influence the country’s international affairs is also indicative of the politicized nature of foreign
policy in the Netherlands.

Dutch Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Era
The international standing of the Netherlands is characterized by the “the greatest of the smaller
powers, or the smallest of the great powers” dichotomy (Herman 2006: 859), implying the
visibility of the Netherlands on the world stage despite its size. As Kaarbo (2012) also maintains
in her book, the foreign policy of the country stands on three grand notions, “peace, profits and
principles” (Voorhoeve 1979). Specifically, these notions respectively pertain to the country’s
‘neutralist abstentionism’ in dealing with foreign affairs; its historical dependence on ‘maritime
commercialism’ as an international economic actor; and its ‘internationalist idealism’ (Andeweg
and Irwin 2005: 205-6) or “the long-standing Dutch commitment to international law” (Kaarbo
2012: 67). Indeed, Wijk (2007: 150) provides a brief list of organizations including the
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International Court of Justice and the International Criminal court to argue that “this legal
tradition explains why successive governments promote The Hague as the world capital of
international law” (see also Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 215).
While the Dutch foreign policy has continued to champion international law and trade,
the third historical cornerstone described above—neutralism—gave way to Atlanticism with the
end of the Second World War when the Netherlands joined NATO in 1949: “joining the Atlantic
Alliance has been interpreted as an unequivocal abandonment of the neutralist tradition”
(Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 206). Thirty years after joining NATO, Baehr’s (1980: 242) study on
the Dutch foreign policy elite concludes that “there exists a broad consensus with regard to the
desirability of NATO membership.” In fact, within the NATO framework, the US was perceived
as “absolutely reliable” for Dutch security interests (Baehr 1980: 242) and the country “prided
itself always during the Cold War of being ‘a loyal ally’ of the United States” until 1991 (Everts
2010: 3).
The European Union, on the other hand, has been largely perceived as an economic
partner by the Netherlands in this period (Baehr 1980: 241, 245; Everts 2010: 3). Andeweg and
Irwin (2005: 207) contend that “the Dutch government long objected to plans for European
rather than Atlantic defence [sic] arrangements, and served almost as an American proxy in the
European Union.” The one brief period when the Netherlands adopted a pro-European outlook
on security and defense matters took place during the two consecutive ‘purple’ coalitions led by
the Labour Party (Verbeek and Van der Vleuten 2008: 374).82 By 1999, this Labour-led coalition
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Wijk (2007: 153-4) explains that the Netherlands showed remarkable support for the EU’s
1998 St. Malo process, as a result of which the European Rapid Reaction Force was established
to promote a common European defense framework.
200

“even concluded that European defense should be emphasized” (Wijk 2007: 154), suggesting a
notable break from the Atlanticist tradition.
One has to go back to the early 1990s, however, to understand the actual systemic change
in Dutch foreign policy. With the end of the Cold War, the Netherlands felt the international
systemic earthquake that had also struck Denmark, as Chapter 5 has explained. Verbeek and Van
der Vleuten (2008: 358) emphasize that one of the key factors behind the structural change in
Dutch foreign policy by the early 1990s was “the disappearance of communism as the long time
enemy.” With the end of bipolarity, the country had to redefine its security and defense priorities
just like Denmark, and focus on the new “international context where humanitarian interventions
were becoming a major topic” (Verbeek and Van der Vleuten 2008: 363; see also Andeweg and
Irwin 2005: 210). Indeed, the Netherlands had participated in a series of multilateral
humanitarian missions in the Balkans and in Africa throughout the 1990s (Kaarbo 2012: 69).
Some authors have argued that these missions were part of a broader Dutch “strategy to gain and
exercise soft power” (Verbeek and Van der Vleuten 2008: 366) in the new international system.
In doing so, however, the accounts suggest that the Netherlands had to maintain a
balancing act between the United States and the European Union (Van der Meulen and Soeters
2005: 548). For instance, the government “sided with the Americans by objecting to a lastminute mediation effort of the EU” in the run up to the 1991 Gulf War (Andeweg and Irwin
2005: 214), though when it was time to decide on how to participate in the war itself, it
ultimately committed ships and navy units under the Western European Union’s umbrella as
opposed to actively participating in the war alongside the US (Verbeek and Van der Vleuten
2008).
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More recently, the balance seems to have favored Atlanticism even more.

The

Netherlands participated in the NATO bombing in Kosovo with F-16s in 1999 (Andeweg and
Irwin 2005: 209); in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001; and of course decided
to politically support the 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq, all of which attest to the pro-Atlanticist tone
in Dutch security and defense commitments in recent years (Everts 2010). Politically, successive
governments in the early 2000s pronounced support for NATO at their formative stages “as the
cornerstone of foreign policy” (Wijk 2007: 156), thus reinforcing the Atlanticist undertones of
Dutch foreign policy. The next section analyzes the 2003 Iraq decision and its aftermath against
this backdrop.

Commitment, but How? The Dutch Decision on the 2003 Iraq War
The decision to provide ‘political, but not military’ support to the US-led war in Iraq and the
subsequent commitment of the Dutch government to deploy 1,100 troops to the Iraqi province of
Al Muthanna is a unique case for the purposes of this study as it spills over to three (or rather,
two-and-a-half) governments between the period July 2002 to June 2003, allowing for a
comparative study of government composition and foreign policy behavior. To set the stage for
the analysis, Table 6.1 below summarizes the structures of governments and their commitment
behavior across time.
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TIMEFRAME
for 2003IRAQ WAR
Coalition parties
Coalition type
Policy incongruence
(St. dev. measure)

July 2002 –
January 2003

January 2003 –
April 2003

April 2003 –
May 2003

CDA-VVD-LPF

CDA – PvdA
(in-the-making)

CDA-VVD-D66

Minimum winning

Minimum winning

Minimum winning

1.15

1.48

1.40

Government
Government
negotiations;
negotiations;
Elected government
CDA-VVD-LPF is
Standing
formed May 27,
caretaker since
2003
October 2002
Political support
Political support
Political support
(Declared March
(Stabilization force
2003,
Commitment intensity (First contemplated
deployed in June
November 2002)
material assistance
2003)
also provided later)
Table 6.1 Governments and commitment intensity in the Netherlands, July 2002 – May 2003

The process leading up to the commitment decision to provide political, but not military
support for the war in Iraq began as early as August 2002, weeks after the CDA-VVD-LPF
minimum winning coalition was formed under the premiership of Jan Peter Balkenende of the
Christian Democrats (Everts 2010). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), also held by the
CDA, agreed at first that “war was unavoidable and that, if and when it came, the Netherlands
should side with the American politically as well as militarily” (Everts 2010: 7).83
The official request from the United States to the Netherlands to join the war coalition
came in November 2002 (Davids Commission 2010: 524)—a month after the tripartite coalition
fell apart and began its term as caretaker due to the infighting between the LPF ministers.
Despite the original willingness displayed by the MFA to side with the Americans militarily, the
83

An Economist Intelligence Unit report from March 2003 argues, however, that Balkenende
never wanted to sign the letter of eight in an effort to become a bridge between the pro-war ‘gang
of eight’ and the anti-war block in the EU, namely France, Germany and Belgium (2003b: 15).
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Davids Commission report84 concludes that “from the outset, the government stated there could
be no offensive contribution to the US plans by the Netherlands” unless independent
investigations could prove that Iraq was not fulfilling its obligations mandated by the UN (2010:
524).85 By December 2002, Balkenende “announced that the Netherlands would ‘support the US’
if it came to a war” though he “did not in this context mention military support specifically”
(Everts 2010: 8).
New elections were held in January 2003. The two winners CDA (44 seats) and the PvdA
(42 seats) began coalition talks,86 which continued until April 2003 but ultimately failed
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2003c). In the meantime, the final statement from the interim
government regarding their position on the war came on March 17, 2003. Prime Minister
Balkenende declared that “the absence of a further SC [UN Security Council] resolution has
consequences for the national support (draagvlak) for further Dutch involvement. Consequently,
the Netherlands will not give an active military contribution with respect to Iraq” but that it
84

The Davids Commission was formed in 2009 to independently investigate the foreign policy
decision-making process surrounding the Dutch decision to support the war in Iraq. The
Commission was proposed by Balkenende himself, who had opposed to such an inquiry for years
(Davids Commission 2010: 519).
85
Dissenting opinions exist on the ‘real’ Dutch intent. Wijk, for instance, implies that the
government’s original intention was to officially join the war coalition like Denmark and argues
that “during the [Iraq] crisis the country was run by the outgoing Cabinet which lacked the power
to make firm policy decisions. As a result, the government was unwilling, probably politically
incapable to co-sign the letter of the ‘gang of eight’” Wijk (2007: 157).
Although being a caretaker government might have a hand-tying effect in some cases, this view
is not sustainable in the Dutch case for several reasons. First, the Davids Commission report
quoted above clearly suggests that actively participating in the war militarily had never been a
viable option for the government anyway. More importantly, an Economist Intelligence Unit
report on the Netherlands stated in December 2002 that the country “seem[ed] prepared to
provide military hardware to support the US in the region” (2002d: 7), alluding to the possibility
of participation despite the caretaker position of the coalition. This suggests that the government
was still politically capable to prepare for military support at that time, but chose not to pursue
that option. In sum, the Dutch decision to give political but not military support cannot be
interpreted in this case as a direct consequence of the government’s caretaker position.
86
The Dutch parliament has 150 seats.
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would support the war politically (Everts 2010: 9).87 This position passed the parliament on
March 18, 2003 (Davids Commission 2010: 522).
Following the collapse of the coalition talks between the CDA and the PvdA, CDA began
to pursue VVD and D66 as possible coalition partners in a right-wing government. The
negotiations began in April 2003 and ended on May 27th with success (Economist Intelligence
Unit 2003c: 12). On June 6th, the new Balkenende cabinet “accepted participation of a
Netherlands’ contingent in the US-led coalition occupation force (SFIR) of 1100 men, which,
under British command, were to keep the peace in the southern province of Al Muthanna”
(Everts 2010: 10). The next sections analyze the effects of the key explanatory factors of these
commitments.
Ideological Composition leads to Logrolling: As Table 6.1 above also shows, the three
coalitions across the volatile 2002-2003 period were noticeably different in their ideological
composition. These differences had to be worked out for parties’ common political gains, and
therefore they are expected to have a profound effect on the commitments made regarding the
US-led war in Iraq.
First, consider the short-lived Balkenende government (CDA-VVD-LPF) that came to
power in July 2002. All parties are located in the right of the political spectrum and all carry
strong Atlanticist tones in their foreign policy priorities, a reliable signal in itself to expect that
they would be willing to commit the Netherlands in the war alongside the United States and
Britain. For instance, “the leader of the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) said that Holland would leave its
87

Regarding the political necessity for a renewed UN mandate in Iraq, the Davids Commission
report (2010: 524) finds that “from the outset, the administration took the view that a new
Security Council mandate for the use of force was politically desirable, but not legally
indispensable. The basis for this stance was the so-called ‘corpus theory’: the belief that, taken as
a body, the various Security Council resolutions on Iraq passed since 1990 constituted a mandate
for the use of force, which was still valid in March 2003.”
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most important ally, the United States, isolated by refusing military support” (Beunderman
2003). The Liberals (VVD) are “by tradition transatlantic” (Wijk 2007: 153) and along with the
LPF, they “wanted nothing less than full military support” for war (Everts 2010: 10). The CDA,
on the other hand, “suggested that the Netherlands should seek to replace US forces elsewhere”
(Everts 2010: 10), still offering military support for the war, albeit in its own, rather risk-averse
way. In sum, all parties in government were in support for some kind of Dutch military role in
the war, though by March 2003, they declared “political, but not military” support.
What compelled this government to commit less than it envisioned was the election
results and the possibility of a new government between the CDA and the Labour Party (PvdA).
Indeed, Wouter Bos, the leader of the PvdA, repeatedly stated that his party was opposed to the
war and that “the Netherlands should not give ‘political support’ to the Americans” to which “the
parliamentary leader of the CDA, Maxime Verhagen” responded “as ‘sad’” (Beunderman 2003,
see also Kaarbo 2012: 105). Still, Everts (2010: 26) emphasizes the CDA’s position in
anticipation to have the PvdA in the government by arguing that “Mr Balkenende could have
insisted and persisted in his real conviction that Netherlands’ clear interest was to fully join the
‘coalition of the willing’. The fact that he did not should (also) be seen in the light of his wish to
keep the door open to the PvdA as a new coalition partner.”
This line of analysis strongly supports the ‘compromise’ thesis, that is, coalitions yield
‘middle-of-the-road’ (Elman 2000: 99) foreign policies as policy preferences among coalition
partners diverge. This is also the line of argument that Kaarbo (2012) makes in her recent book.
What remains overlooked, however, is that when the future payoff is large enough, compromises
on foreign policy could become so lopsided that commitment intensity can increase despite the
level of policy incongruence among parties. This brings us to logrolling, or the mechanism that
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explains how commitment intensity increased despite a government-in-the-making (CDAPvdA), whose policy incongruence was even greater than its predecessor (CDA-VVD-LPF).
The coalition negotiation process that took place between the CDA and PvdA attest to
this dynamic. The talks began as early as February 5th (Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2004: 162). By
March 2003, the PvdA leader argued that “given the absence of a UN mandate, the PvdA would
not support the war” (Everts 2010: 22). The Economist Intelligence Unit report from the same
month argues that in the process of negotiations “the parties [CDA and PvdA] have clashed
several times over the Iraq issue, which could prove a breaking point in the event of a US-led
war against Iraq without UN authorisation [sic]” (Economist Intelligence Unit 2003b: 3).
The most remarkable instances of increased commitment intensity occurred by April
2003 when the Netherlands “provided military hardware to support the US in the Gulf region”
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2003d: 1). This was a clear evidence of the increase in commitment
intensity from political support to material support, while the CDA was continuing to negotiate
with the PvdA. Everts (2010: 10) accounts that by this time the PvdA “accepted the war (as a fact
of life) but rejected any military participation of the Netherlands,”88 and that the parties “agreed
to disagree over the issue” (Economist Intelligence Unit 2003d: 1).
Even more dramatically, Kaarbo (2012: 106) explains that when the government
“deployed a submarine and frigate to the Middle East under US military command,” thus
explicitly making resource commitments, “Labour balked, arguing that this action violated the
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The Netherlands also sent Patriot missiles to Turkey in February 2003 to defend this NATO
ally against the possibility of escalation (Everts 2010: 8), which “the government labeled these
weapons ‘defensive’” (Der Spiegel 2010b) to respond to criticisms framing weapons deployment
to an ally as active military participation in the Iraq war. The PvdA, on the other hand, eventually
agreed on the missile deployment once the French, Belgian and German governments also
“dropped their objections” in response to Turkey’s official request (Economist Intelligence Unit
2003b: 15).
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agreement because it went beyond political support.” The accounts suggest that the PvdA neither
rejected any of these moves nor left the negotiation table in protest. To the contrary, “within a
week [of deployments], Labour seemed to soften its stance when Balkenende and Bos agreed
that the Netherlands was part of the US-led coalition and that the US intervention was justified
under UN resolution 1441” (Kaarbo 2012: 106).
Notice that the initial position of the outgoing government, ‘political, but not military
support’, which arguably was taken in anticipation of a possible PvdA partnership in
government, evolved into a position where the CDA-led administration openly provided material
capabilities and more explicit support for the Iraq war, while negotiating with a party whose
original position was to oppose either political or military involvement. What explains the
increase in commitment intensity in the face of such high levels of policy incongruence between
the key parties?
Put simply, the PvdA was eying the executive office. Van der Meulen and Soeters (2005:
557) suggest that the interaction of the PvdA with the CDA despite the deep disagreements over
Iraq “did leave open their [PvdA’s] chances of participating in a new center-left government.”
Several pieces of evidence suggest that the PvdA continued the negotiations despite the
intensification of commitments in Iraq in an effort to participate in the next government. The
party did not give up on negotiations earlier even though it was opposed to the deployment of the
Patriot missiles in Turkey (Everts 2010: 8), and it “dodged the issue” when the CDA almost
playfully criticized it for being “ambiguous” on Iraq a week before the negotiations formally
began (Everts 2010: 20). Furthermore, it was revealed months later (Economist Intelligence Unit
2003e: 15) that the PvdA had even agreed with the CDA at the time of government negotiations
to send Dutch marines to Iraq after the war!
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The logrolling trend continued with the progressive-democrat D66 when the coalition
talks collapsed between the CDA and the PvdA later in April 2003 due to disagreements over
government spending (Kaarbo 2012: 106). The D66 was originally opposed to Dutch
involvement in Iraq. During the final parliamentary debate on Iraq on March 18, the D66 leader
Boris Dittrich stated “This is not our war. We think that the government should give neither
political nor military support” (Everts 2010: 23). The D66 position changed within merely two
months when they formed a new government with the CDA and the VVD, however. Kaarbo
(2012: 106, emphasis added) refers to her interview with Jan Hoekema, a member of the D66, to
argue that the party “had strongly opposed the war but agreed to concede the issue in exchange
for a role in the government.” By August 2003, 1100 Dutch peacekeepers were sent to southern
Iraq to replace the US marines in the region (The New York Times 2003) with the consent of this
new tripartite minimum winning coalition.
In conclusion, the deep ideological divisions between the Dutch political parties that
spilled over to their policy positions regarding the Iraq war were mitigated by their greater
expectations concerning the executive office. Aspiring to participate in a new governing
coalition, both the PvdA and the D66 dropped their vociferous opposition against Dutch
involvement in Iraq and conceded to steps taken by the CDA and the outgoing government
toward greater involvement and intensified commitments in Iraq.
Public Opinion: Was the public opinion influential in the Dutch decision to support the
war politically? Did public opinion have a large enough explanatory power to outweigh the
effects of government composition? Polls suggest that the public opinion was noticeably against
the war in Iraq: the findings of one study (Everts and Isernia 2005: 316-317) reflect that by
March 18—the day of the parliament’s decision on Iraq—those who supported the war were 33
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per cent while 63 per cent were opposed to it. The same study reports that the polls showed that a
dramatic 51 per cent of all respondents were entirely opposed to the Netherlands’ military
participation in the war, including the option to “replace American troops elsewhere” (Everts and
Isernia 2005: 316-317), which, as argued earlier, was a possibility that had been considered by
the CDA in the run up to the final decision (Everts 2010: 10).
Clearly, the public was adamantly opposed to Dutch participation in the war. Not even
the public perceptions of threat, which would have had a ‘rally ‘round the flag’ effect, provided
enough justification for it: scholars have suggested “that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq constituted a
threat” across several European countries including the Netherlands,” though “much more
diverse was the range of opinions on the question of what to do about that threat” (Everts and
Isernia 2005: 273). Among those possibilities, direct military involvement was not an option.
Did the public opinion against Dutch participation influence the commitment behavior of
the government? Whereas isolating the effect of public opinion from other factors could be a
difficult task in itself, it is much easier to identify the direction of influence when politicians
refer to the mood of the public to make their point. Everts (2010: 19-20) offers a smart way to
measure the effect of public opinion on foreign policy by looking at the frequency with which
the political parties in the parliament referred to the low public opinion ratings to communicate
their positions opposing Dutch involvement in the war. Using this measure, he concludes that
“public opinion did not act as a direct constraint” for the governing parties but it “was
interpreted, mediated, and instrumentalized by the various parties in parliament” (Everts 2010:
25) to limit the commitment options of the government. Public opinion was against Dutch
involvement in the war, and it was utilized by the political parties in the opposition frequently to
justify their preferences.
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The indirect effect of the public opinion on the Dutch decision to provide political but not
military support can be best observed by Prime Minister Balkenende’s statement on March 17,
2003, when he declared the official position of his cabinet: “Nationally there is no broad support
for active participation by the Netherlands in actions against Saddam,” Balkenende said. “I am
referring to the feelings in society, as well as to the level of support within parliament. Therefore
the cabinet has decided that it can politically back-up action against Iraq, but that it will not
provide any military contribution” (Van der Meulen and Soeters 2005: 548, emphasis added).
When we look at the level of public support for deploying Dutch troops for peacekeeping
purposes after the war, “some 60 percent of the Dutch supported participating in peacekeeping
and nation building” by April 2003, four months before the deployment took place. Following
the news of a Dutch casualty in southern Iraq by “May 2004, a majority of around 55 percent did
not want to prolong the mission, not because of the first casualty, but rather because of a
negative judgment about how things were going in Iraq” (Van der Meulen and Soeters 2005:
557). Despite the increase in public opposition towards the Dutch mission in Iraq, the mission
did not officially end until March 2005 (Agence France Presse, 2005). In other words, the Dutch
public opinion somewhat correlated with the troop deployment but there was no direct link
between public opinion and the extent of the mission.
To conclude, public opinion clearly had a role in the commitment decision of the
government by March 2003, most noticeably through those political parties which utilized the
poll results to justify their positions against war. More critically, however, the fact that the
commitment behavior (namely, providing political support to the US) remained consistent across
the period that saw a caretaker government, a possible grand coalition, and a new center-right
coalition that roughly stretched between September 2002—when the Minister of Foreign Affairs
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delivered the initial statement to the Parliament—and May 2003, when the new coalition was
struck between the CDA, VVD and D66, shows that public opinion fails to provide a consistent,
sustainable explanation for the Dutch political support for war. Furthermore, public opinion
against Dutch participation in the war cannot explain the incremental commitments during
February-April 2003, when the government negotiations continued to take place between the
CDA and the PvdA.
Threat to National Survival: To what extent were the Dutch commitments in the US-led
war motivated by perceptions of national threat? A ‘national threat’ explanation expects that
partisan differences will be put aside in making commitment decisions to protect the nation, or in
other words, that commitment decisions would be entirely driven by national security concerns.
The evidence of high threat perception posed by Iraq or its WMDs against the Dutch national
security is slim to support this hypothesis. Unlike the political atmosphere in Denmark, there was
no overwhelming rhetoric of national threat in the Netherlands regarding the Saddam regime to
justify military contribution, as the above analysis of the Dutch public opinion also suggests.
Some Dutch politicians still empathized with the ‘free world against the tyranny’ rhetoric
and adopted broader frameworks such as ‘international sources of threat’ and ‘terrorism’ to
contextualize the intervention and to stand in solidarity with the US, however. To that end, a
Washington Times op-ed by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time is informative:
“the world is a dangerous place, and we can only deal with these dangers by working together,”
wrote Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (CDA) in June 2003 and argued that “to effectively counter the
threats facing us, coalitions of the willing may be sometimes necessary” (De Hoop Scheffer
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2003; see also Wijk 2007: 156).89 Nevertheless, there did not exist any overwhelming rhetoric of
national threat comparable to the scale observed in Denmark to garner political and public
support to commit Dutch capabilities for the war in Iraq.90
Political Leadership: As argued earlier, the influence of key actors in foreign policy
decision-making processes may also drive governments toward behavioral choices that are not
predicted by their ideological composition. In his analysis of 12 foreign policy cases from the
Netherlands since the end of the Second World War, Everts (1990: 132) finds that personal
involvement matters in foreign policy behavior as a motivating factor, if not as a direct
explanation of commitment. Specifically, he argues that “it does help, but it is not essential if the
minister is personally committed to the issue in question” to see the implementation of a foreign
policy initiative. I focus on the Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende and the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, to test these expectations.
First, it is necessary to understand where the Prime Minister is located in the Dutch
foreign policy decision-making environment. Several authors contend that the prime ministers in
the Netherlands are institutionally weak compared to their European counterparts (Andeweg and
Irwin 2005; Kaarbo 2012). It is also argued more recently, however, that “the position of the
Prime Minister has been strengthened,” while the extent of her prime ministerial power could be
contingent upon personal as well as situational factors (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 123).
89

Note that Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’s statement is one of the most significant political
declarations of Dutch support for NATO’s role in international stability and peacekeeping;
clearly communicating the pro-Atlanticist orientations of the country’s foreign policy
framework. It also echoes the historical trajectory of Dutch security and defense priorities
described earlier.
90
The rhetoric of threat somewhat resonated with the Dutch public following the war. Despite
the decrease in public support for the post-war Dutch presence in Iraq as explained earlier,
“politicians and public opinion were especially adamant about the impossibility of shortening (let
alone immediately ending) the deployment” because “that would be “giving in to terror” (Van
der Meulen and Soeters 2005: 549).
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Despite domestic institutional limitations, the “presidentialization of politics” (Fiers and
Krouwel 2005) across parliamentary regimes accelerates the speed with which the prime
ministers become central figures, including the Netherlands (Andeweg 2008: 267). A more
recent dynamic that reinforces this trend in the Dutch context is the role of the prime minister in
the European Union as head-of-government. “The Treaty of Amsterdam also gives the Prime
Minister a formal position with regard to the formulation of the common foreign and security
policy of the EU,” Andeweg and Irwin (2005: 123) explain, thereby alluding to the increased
foreign policy visibility of the prime minister vis-à-vis the governing cabinet. Kaarbo (2012: 78)
concludes that in the post-Cold War era, this visibility “result[ed] in competition with the foreign
minister and more politicization of foreign policy.” For these reasons, it is meaningful to expect
that the leadership of the Dutch Prime Minister would have an influence on the Iraq war
decision.
Evidence suggests, however, that the role of the Dutch Prime Minister, Jan Peter
Balkenende, in the 2003 decision to join the Iraq war was insignificant and even non-existent,
particularly when compared to his Danish counterpart, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. The most
important statement to support this claim comes from the Davids Commission report on the Iraq
War, which concludes that “the Prime Minister took little or no lead in debates on the Iraq
question. He left the matter of Iraq entirely to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Only after January
2003 did the Prime Minister take a strong interest in the issue. However, by that time, the stance
defined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was firmly established as government policy” (Davids
Commission 2010: 529, quoted in Pijpers 2009: 50). In other words, neither the decision-making
process that technically began in the last quarter of 2002 nor the deliberations on the possibility
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of Dutch commitment in the war had been driven by Mr. Balkenende, even when he became a
more central actor in the process by early 2003.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, therefore remains as the only
key player in the decision-making environment in this period, whose personal motives could
have played into the decision to give political support for the war. If the Ministry was able to
‘lock-in’ the government to this particular level of commitment as the Davids Commission report
suggests, it could very well be that the personal interests of the Minister himself had played a
role. The institutional strength of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in the Dutch political system
further provides the bureaucratic means for Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to pursue this possibility.91
The Commission Report states that the Minister began to inquire about the Iraq war as early as
August 2002—three months before the US officially asked the Dutch to assist them in Iraq
(Pijpers 2009: 53)—and by the time he gave the first statement on the issue to the Parliament in
September 2002 “neither the Cabinet, nor Prime Minister Balkenende, nor Defence Minister
Korthals were previously consulted about [its] content” (Davids Commission 2010: 529; quoted
in Pijpers 2009: 50).92
To what extent the personal motivations of the Foreign Affairs Minister played a role in
the Dutch decision to commit politically to the Iraq war is open to debate. On the one hand,
scholars such as Wijk believe that the decision to support the US politically but not militarily
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Baehr (1980: 226) argues that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is a dominant actor in the
Netherlands, from whom “most initiatives in the realm of foreign policy originate.” In human
rights foreign policy issues, for instance, “the members of the parliament tend to give the Foreign
Minister considerable political freedom” (Baehr 2000: 9). Furthermore, “as long as he assures
himself of the overall support of his colleagues in the (coalition) cabinet,” Baehr continues
(1980: 226), “it is very difficult even for a parliamentary majority to challenge his position.”
92
This observation runs against the insights of Sobel and Shiraev (2003: 290) who write that “in
the Netherlands, important foreign policy decisions will not be taken by the minister of foreign
affairs, but rather by the cabinet as a whole.”
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“turned out to be a brilliant move which helped clear the way for Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
becoming NATO’s new Secretary General” (2007: 158), suggesting that career motives were
critical in explaining the commitment decision.
The fact that the executive branch was sidelined in the early stages of decision-making
clearly supports claims on the bureaucratic and political influence of the Foreign Ministry and by
that token, the Minister himself. On the other hand, the report of the Davids Commission
concludes that despite the political influence of the Ministry in the decision-making process,
there were no personal motivations on the part of Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to pull the country into
giving political support for the war (Davids Commission 2010: 533, quoted in Pijpers 2009: 54)
at the expense of the preferences of the government at the time. In sum, the individual-level
factors focusing on the Prime Minister or the Minister of Foreign Affairs remain insignificant in
explaining the Dutch decision to provide political support in the 2003 Iraq war.

Conclusion
The 2003 Dutch behavior towards participating in the war in Iraq provides critical insights on the
foreign policy behavior of minimum winning coalitions. As hypothesized in Chapter 2, the
expectation was that when policy incongruence increased among the parties in minimum
winning coalitions, their commitment intensity would decrease. This expectation was in line with
the veto players explanation in Comparative Politics as well as the several studies in the
literature that have argued for the propensity of minimum winning coalitions to arrive at
compromise solutions and “middle-of-the-road” (Elman 2000: 99) behavior in their foreign
policies. However, Chapter 4 has shown that contrary to the expectations, commitment intensity
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increases when policy incongruence increases among the parties that make up a minimum
winning coalition.
First and foremost, the case analysis presented in this chapter illuminates this surprising
finding regarding the commitment intensity of minimum winning coalitions. The case has
revealed that the most important reason why higher levels of policy incongruence lead to higher
levels of commitment intensity in minimum winning coalitions is logrolling: as political parties
anticipate in being in government—a major ‘side-payment’, they yield and go along with the
more intense foreign policy preferences of their partners. Logrolling remains the strongest
explanation for the incremental resource commitments that the Dutch provided to the war in Iraq
during the government negotiations that took place between two ideologically distant parties, the
Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Labour Party (PvdA), in 2003.
In other words, the prospect of securing office seats is a major incentive for political
parties to engage in logrolling and agree on making international commitments even when we
expect the ideological differences among these parties to predict otherwise. In this sense, the
qualitative analysis of the Dutch decision has made an important call to look beyond the
decisional ‘moment’ delineated by the composition of the government as analyzed by the
regression models presented in Chapter 4. The Dutch case study has revealed that it is necessary
to capture the long-term policy, or in this case, office, preferences of the parties. These long-term
factors help predict whether the level of policy incongruence caused by the parties’ ideological
differences could be mitigated by guaranteeing future political gains, therefore facilitating more
intense international commitments.
The analysis has also found that assertive political leadership, public opinion, and threat
to national survival were either insignificant or inconsistent factors in explaining the Dutch
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behavior in Iraq. Contextually, the competitive policy-making context of Dutch politics
encouraged all political parties to include the Iraq issue as a top agenda item.
Furthermore, the domestic-level explanation based on the inter-party dynamics of
coalition politics presented in this chapter has revealed that international-historical factors did
not overwhelm the Dutch government’s decision to make commitments in regarding Iraq. At
best, they provide a hospitable context that facilitates the decision. Even though the Netherlands
has generally favored the United States and the transatlantic alliance as their partner at the
international level, their domestic political dynamics, most importantly the ideological
composition of their multiparty governments, played a major role in influencing the ways in
which they dealt with the decisions to join the war in Iraq.
The Dutch case has also highlighted the interaction between domestic and international
politics. Foreign policy does not take place in vacuum. To the contrary, governments that follow
each other are invariably confronted with the foreign policy issues that they inherit from their
predecessors. The interaction between the change in government and the continuity in foreign
policy compels the scholars of Comparative Foreign Policy to scrutinize the fluidity of this
relationship. This case analysis was therefore informative as it has investigated two governments,
an outgoing government and an incoming government, as well as a government in-the-making,
to demonstrate how the domestic political changes influence the ways in which these
governments behave at the international level. It has shown that the decisions to engage in
international commitments turn out to be contingent on the dynamics of government formation.
This chapter has complemented the empirical contributions of Chapters 4 and 5 by
providing an in-depth look at the mechanism and the alternative explanations that further
illuminate how minimum winning coalitions engage in international commitments. As such, this
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chapter has joined Chapters 4 and 5 by helping to bridge the ‘quantitative-qualitative gap’ in the
study of coalition foreign policy. The next chapter brings together these empirical discussions to
visualize the ‘coalition politics framework’ offered in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 7

NUANCE AND PARSIMONY IN COALITION FOREIGN POLICY:
WHAT DO WE KNOW, WHERE DO WE GO?

In her recent book on coalitions and foreign policy choices, Kaarbo (2012: 14) makes a
compelling point by arguing that “while the research on coalition formation and termination is
voluminous, considerably less is known about the life of coalitions between birth and death and
the effects on government policy.” Kaarbo is not alone. Many other scholars have raised similar
concerns in the past (Bueno de Mesquita 1975, Laver and Shepsle 1990; 1996), pointing out the
lack of studies on the policy processes and the outcomes that take place during the life of
multiparty governments. More recently, Warwick (2001: 1213-14) has argued that this weakness
in the literature is due to the understanding that policy-making is not as “readily measurable” as
government formation and termination are. Ultimately, the consensus has been that we lacked an
understanding of the factors that drove policy-making in coalitions. For scholars of international
politics, this puzzle has bloomed into a new research avenue on coalition foreign policy.
The extant literature on coalition foreign policy, including some of Kaarbo’s recent work
(Kaarbo and Beasley 2008, Kaarbo 2012), however, has considered coalitions as a
“homogenous” (Clare 2010: 967) category that could be compared to single-party governments
to explain foreign policy behavior in parliamentary democracies. Furthermore, most
contributions in this area have taken the foreign policy-making capacity of minority coalitions
for granted, arguing that their size vulnerability in the parliament would lead to moderate foreign
policies at best. Despite the earlier research on the foreign policy influence of critical junior
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parties as well as the Comparative Politics research on coalitions, these studies have therefore
largely dismissed the effect of the mathematical organization of parties in these governments and
how it would lead to a variation in their foreign policy outputs. Ultimately, the empirical findings
of these efforts have been inconclusive.
More recent work on coalition foreign policy has factored in another source of variation
in these types of governments to explain their international behavior: party ideology. They have
argued that parties enter into coalitions with distinct sets of preference by way of their
ideological backgrounds, which leads to a multitude of viewpoints on foreign policy that must be
negotiated before the government takes a position at the international level (Rathbun 2004, Clare
2010). Most studies, however, have focused on how the overall ideological placement of the
coalition affects their belligerence, instead of showing how ideological cohesiveness leads to
foreign policy choices in general. As a result, the role of ideology in coalition foreign policy has
largely remained understudied. We have continued to lack an understanding of how the
ideological composition of all parties in a government—not just the critical ones in majority
coalitions—influenced foreign policy behavior.
This dissertation has pushed this debate toward three new directions by asking one
research question: how does the mathematical and ideological composition of parliamentary
governments affect their foreign policy behavior—specifically, their international commitments?
With the help of this question, the project has first illustrated how political parties contribute to the

strength and stability of coalition governments to argue that the dichotomous understanding of
single- and multi-party governments is inadequate to capture the variation in the foreign policy
behavior of parliamentary regimes. Second, it has highlighted the importance of ideological
cohesion as a key dimension of coalition governments to make the case that in order to explain
their foreign policy one must also consider their ideological composition, majority and minority
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alike. Finally, the project has offered to go beyond international conflict—a sliver of
international occasions that democracies engage in daily—or, for that matter, beyond the more
controversial terms such as ‘extreme’ or ‘aggressive’ to define foreign policy behavior. Instead,
it introduced a much more comprehensive definition, commitment, which captures the
governments’ use of resources and binding verbal behavior that increases the constraints on their
future behavior by generating expectations in the eyes of others.
As a result, the dissertation has offered a ‘government composition’ approach by
unpacking coalitions along mathematical and ideological dimensions toward developing a
‘coalition politics framework’ to explain the intensity of international commitments in
parliamentary democracies. To establish the theoretical foundations of this contribution, it has
relied extensively on the Comparative Politics theories, namely the veto players and clarity of
responsibility approaches, as well as the ‘policy viability’ explanation. As Chapter 2 has
discussed, these theories have framed the research puzzle and have been further refined to test
the government composition explanation across a series of quantitative and qualitative empirical
analyses.
Indeed, to undertake this research puzzle, the dissertation has introduced a multi-method
research design by employing quantitative and qualitative methodologies. As discussed in
Chapter 3, the goal of the multi-method approach was three-fold. First, it would help provide the
big picture by revealing the statistical relationships between government composition and
commitment intensity with a quantitative component. Second, it would justify the ‘government
composition’ explanation by uncovering the mechanisms that link coalitions to their commitment
behaviors with a qualitative component. Third and by the same token, it would situate these
relationships within the greater domestic-, international-, and even individual-level contexts to
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test the performance of the ‘government composition’ approach against a series of alternative
explanations on these levels, such as public opinion or political leadership, that are often utilized
in foreign policy analysis.
Ultimately, the vision of the dissertation has been to offer a multilevel, multicausal
analysis of foreign policy behavior in parliamentary regimes as advised by the long pedigree of
scholarship in Comparative Foreign Policy—the home field of this project. To accomplish this,
the dissertation has limited its explanatory scope to European parliamentary regimes, where
coalitions have been the dominating institutional outcome for decades. It has also chosen to
focus on the post-Cold War period, when international systemic factors no longer overwhelm the
foreign policy decisions of states—not least the smaller ones that are observed across Europe.
The overview of the project presented above brings us to its conclusions and hence the
purpose of this concluding chapter. This chapter provides a discussion of the findings from this
project and presents the ‘coalition politics framework’ that is derived from the quantitative and
qualitative analyses offered in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Next, the chapter builds on these conclusions
to discuss the contributions of the project. Undoubtedly, science is a cumulative endeavor, where
the end of an inquiry invariably calls for the need to start anew. To that end, this chapter
concludes by reflecting on the limitations of the project and suggesting some future research
trajectories.

What Do We Know? Theoretical Contributions and the ‘Coalition Politics Framework’
The introductory chapter of this dissertation has asked: “Is the ‘single-party versus coalition’
dichotomy emphasized by Kaarbo (2012) and others enough to capture the variation in
parliamentary governments to explain their international behavior?”
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The quantitative empirical findings of the dissertation have established that the answer is
a firm “No.” The results of the multilevel regression analyses presented in Chapter 4 have
concluded that, once unpacked, the types of coalition governments and their ideological diversity
together affects the commitment intensity of their regimes in different directions. Theoretically,
this conclusion was possible through the refinement of the veto players and the clarity of
responsibility theories, as well as with the systematic testing of the ‘policy viability’ and
‘fragmented opposition’ explanations. In this sense, the project has made an important
contribution to the study of foreign policy by bridging the gap between the puzzles of
International Relations and the analytical tools of Comparative Politics.
First, the quantitative analyses have demonstrated that while the clarity of responsibility
mechanism explains the increase in the commitment intensity of oversized coalitions all else
being equal, the subsequent analyses have also shown that this explanation cannot be sustained
once new, ideologically diverse parties join an oversized coalition and increase its policy
incongruence. In other words, the results have shown that the diffusion of responsibility in
oversized coalitions does not provide a constant source of political opportunities to engage in
high levels of commitments. Instead, a high level of ideological diversity in oversized coalitions
reverses the advantages of responsibility diffusion and leads to a decline in their commitment
intensity. Therefore, the ideological composition of oversized coalitions imposes a mediating
effect on their foreign policy behavior.
This, in fact, was precisely the mechanism that played out in Israel, a parliamentary
democracy that incidentally remains outside of the scope of this study, in the run up to the 2005
territorial disengagement in Gaza. Even though the government led by Ariel Sharon at the time
was an oversized coalition that included several right-wing parties such as the Likud (40 seats),
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secular Zionist Shinui (15), the ultranationalist National Unity – Yisrael Beitenu (7), and the
religious Zionist NRP (6) parties (Spruyt 2009: 29; Diskin and Hazan 2007: 707) in the 120-seat
parliament, the severe ideological disagreements among these parties led to a government crisis
caused by Sharon’s plan to dismantle the Israeli settlements in Gaza. As a result, all three of the
coalition partners resigned between June and December 2004 (Spruyt 2009), leaving Likud
alone. In other words, the oversized coalition ended up far away from enjoying the benefits of
responsibility diffusion owing to its acute ideological diversity. To the contrary, the policy
incongruence among the parties in the government inevitably spilled over to foreign policy
preferences, ultimately leading to its dissolution.
Moving forward, the results of the regression analyses presented in Chapter 4 have shown
that minimum winning coalitions engage in more intense international commitments than singleparty majority governments at increasing levels of policy incongruence. This is a surprising
finding that runs contrary to the expectations of the veto players explanation. While the
hypothesized relationship, presented in Chapter 2, called for a decrease in the commitment
intensity of these governments at higher levels of ideological disagreements, the quantitative
analysis has offered results in the opposite direction, therefore requiring further investigation as
to the mechanisms that yield this relationship.
Finally, Chapter 4 has demonstrated that contrary to the existing view in the literature,
minority coalitions do engage in more intense international commitments than single-party
majority governments, as long as they leave the parliamentary opposition ideologically
fragmented. The quantitative analysis has reached this finding through the use of a third variant
of policy incongruence, center is crossed, which builds on the ‘policy viability’ theory (Laver
and Budge 1992) as well as the ‘fragmented opposition’ explanation (Hagan 1993) to measure
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whether the government includes parties from both the left and the right of the political
spectrum. The underlying notion here is that the minority coalitions which include parties from
both the left and the right of the political spectrum—in other words, minority coalitions that are
ideologically more diverse than those which are purely-right or purely-left—leave the opposition
parties ideologically away from each other. As a result, the ideological composition of the
minority coalition effectively rules out the formation of ‘alternative majorities’ among the
parliamentary opposition parties, which would otherwise have the political upper-hand to block
or impede the commitment behavior of the government by commanding a majority of votes.
Table 7.1 below provides a summary of findings from the quantitative component of the
dissertation. They conclude that neither the veto players nor the clarity of responsibility theories,
even in their refined adaptations, provides a unified explanation to decipher the effects of
government composition on commitment intensity. To the contrary, the results suggest that
different explanations frame the relationships between government composition and the intensity
of international commitments among the types of majority as well minority coalitions, especially
when we take into account their policy incongruence.
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Hypotheses

Policy
Incongruence
Excluded

Tables 4.2
(Standard
Deviation)

Tables 4.3
(Ideological
Range)

Tables 4.4
(Center
crossed)

(1) Due to their size vulnerability, minority
governments will be negatively associated
with commitment intensity.

Yes

-

-

-

(2a) All coalition governments will be
negatively associated with commitment
intensity

Yes

-

-

-

(2b) All coalition governments will be
positively associated with commitment
intensity in their international behavior

No

-

-

-

-

Only
oversized
coalitions

Only
oversized
coalitions

No

-

No

No

No

-

Yes

Yes

Yes

-

No (positive
relationship)

No (positive
relationship)

No (positive
relationship)

Yes

No

No

Yes

-

No

No

Yes

(3a) After controlling for ideological
differences, both oversized coalitions and
minimum winning coalitions will have a
positive relationship with commitment
intensity.
(3b) After controlling for ideological
differences, oversized coalitions will
engage in more committed behavior than
minimum winning coalitions.
(4a) At increasing levels of ideological
disunity inside the government, oversized
coalitions will be negatively associated
with commitment intensity compared to
single-party majority governments.
(4b) At increasing levels of ideological
disunity inside the government, minimum
winning coalitions will be negatively
associated with commitment intensity
compared to single-party majority
governments.
(5a) Minority coalitions will be negatively
associated with commitment intensity
regardless of the ideological differences
among the coalition parties.
(5b)
If
minority
coalitions
can
ideologically fragment the parliamentary
opposition, they will be positively
associated with commitment intensity
compared to single-party majority
governments.

Table 7.1 Summary of Findings from Chapter 4
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The results of the quantitative analysis clearly demonstrate the influence of the
government composition variables on commitment intensity by particularly highlighting the size
and the direction of the relationships. What the quantitative analysis still does not provide,
however, is the mechanism behind these relationships. How does the composition of coalition
governments lead to a variation their international commitments? Furthermore, how does this
relationship perform against alternative explanations of foreign policy behavior? These questions
intend to go beyond the statistical associations to scrutinize the empirical vigor of the
‘government composition’ explanation.
In an effort to respond to these questions, the dissertation has taken a qualitative approach
in Chapters 5 and 6. The objective of these chapters is to respond to the above questions as well
as to contextualize these relationships by situating them in their international and domestic
political contexts. To do this, the chapters have utilized two sets of findings from the quantitative
analysis. First, they have focused on the results concerning the policy viability of minority
coalitions (Hypothesis 5b). Next, they studied the surprising results regarding the minimum
winning coalitions (Hypothesis 4b), where the increasing levels of policy incongruence lead to an
increase in commitment intensity, contrary to expectations.
To undertake these inquiries, Chapters 5 and 6 have presented three case analyses from
Denmark and the Netherlands, where the predominant government type is minority and
minimum winning coalitions, respectively, using the method of structured-focused comparison.
Specifically, the chapters have evaluated the Danish decisions to participate in the 1990 Gulf
War and the 2003 Iraq War, and the Dutch decision to support the 2003 war in Iraq. The case
analyses have looked at a number of alternative explanations, including the logrolling dynamics
among parties, public opinion, threats to national survival, and political leadership while
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considering the mathematical and ideological composition of their governments at the time. The
case studies further situated these commitment behaviors within their greater domestic and
international political context.
First, the analysis in Chapter 5 regarding the Danish commitment in the Gulf blockade in
1990 through the contribution of military resources (namely, the naval corvette ship Olfert
Fischer) has revealed that this behavior was primarily the result of the change in the ideological
composition of the minority coalition in 1988. Therefore, it has provided empirical support for
the ‘policy viability’ and the ‘fragmented opposition’ explanations.
The chapter has argued that as a result of the 1988 elections, the new government was
formed as a hybrid minority coalition that ‘reached across the aisle’ and included parties from
both the right and the left of the political spectrum, shifting Denmark away from the pure rightwing minority coalitions that had ruled the country since 1982. Indeed, this shift ended the sixyear period known as the ‘footnote policy era’ in Danish foreign policy, where the pure rightwing ideological composition of the minority coalitions led to the establishment of a left-wing
‘alternative opposition’ in the parliament that stymied the government’s foreign policy activity,
particularly its relationship with NATO. In other words, the ideological composition of the 1988
government effectively fragmented the parliamentary opposition, dissolved the ‘alternative
opposition’ and ultimately led to the Danish decision to join the Gulf blockade two years later.
This analysis has revealed this mechanism in the absence of threats to Danish national
survival, explicit logrolling among political parties to garner specific side-payments, or a
decisive public opinion to influence the policy-making process. To be fair, international
developments, specifically the UN mandate for the blockade, provided a context that further
facilitated the decision. However, the fact that the assertive political leadership of the Foreign
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Affairs Minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, who had so adamantly supported activism in Danish
foreign policy, was noticeably impeded by the dynamics of his minority coalition attest to the
explanatory power of government composition on commitment behavior in this case.
A second analysis in Chapter 5 has looked at the Danish contribution in the 2003 Iraq
War to observe how minority coalitions, even when they do not fragment the parliamentary
opposition ideologically, can still engage in foreign policy commitments. Indeed, contrary to the
expectations of the ‘policy viability’ explanation, the right-wing minority coalition led by Anders
Fogh Rasmussen was able to commit Denmark in the Iraq war.
The analysis of the 2003 decision has revealed, however, that this was an overdetermined case where the outcome was influenced by multiple factors. Most central to the
outcome was that the Liberal-Conservative minority coalition managed to engage in a logrolling
relationship with the right-wing Danish People’s Party to get its support for war in return for new
immigration and refugee policies that the DPP had asked for. The logrolling relationship simply
pushed the minority coalition over the 50 per cent threshold in the parliament and helped garner
the majority of votes to join the war. In addition, threat to Denmark’s national security posed by
the Saddam Hussein regime was perceived across the board in the country’s political
environment; public opinion for the parties remained high in the process and the lack of any
significant public opposition to the war itself helped the government maintain their confidence;
and the assertive personal involvement of the Prime Minister Rasmussen in the war together led
to the conclusion that nothing stood in the way of the commitment decision.
Finally, the Dutch behavior in the 2003 war in Iraq was utilized in Chapter 6 to uncover
the mechanisms that lead minimum winning coalitions towards more intense commitments—
even when they suffer from increasing levels of policy incongruence. This case study has
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revealed that ‘logrolling to gain office seats’ was the central mechanism that explains why
minimum winning coalitions continue to commit more intense than expected even when the
parties in these governments grow ideologically farther away from each other. As a major ‘sidepayment’ in most parliamentary systems, the prospect of participating in government outweighs
the negative effects of all other ideological differences on policy-making. As a result, parties
yield to each other’s willingness to make stronger commitments at the international level. For
instance, the analysis has found out that even though the D66 was originally opposed to
providing Dutch support for the war, it eventually agreed with the Christian Democrats and the
Liberals on sending troops during the post-war stage in Iraq in return for government seats.
Table 7.2 below presents a summary of these findings. The results suggest that even the
most dramatic instances of foreign policy behavior, such as the decisions to participate in
military operations, can be explained primarily by factors pertaining to the composition of the
governments in these regimes as opposed to international power constellations. In effect, the
qualitative and quantitative analyses together lend more confidence to expect that the ordinary,
everyday affairs of these regimes on the world stage should be far more influenced by their
domestic political structures than the international systemic concerns.
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DENMARK
Independent
Variables

1990 Gulf War

THE NETHERLANDS

2003 Iraq War

2003 Iraq War

1. Minimum winning
coalition among
Christian Democrats
(CDA), Liberals
(VVD) and List Pim
Fortuyn (LPF)
2. M.W. coalition in-themaking with CDA and
Labour (PvdA)
3. M.W. coalition among
CDA, VVD,
progressive-liberal
D66

Minority coalition
includes both left
(Social Liberal) and
right (Liberal,
Conservative)
parties

Minority coalition
includes Right-wing
parties (Liberal,
Conservative) but
maintains parliamentary
majority with ad hoc
support from the rightwing Danish People’s
Party

Logrolling

No

Yes (with the Danish
People’s Party)

Yes (first with the PvdA and
then with the D66)

Threats to
Survival

No

Yes

No

Varied, filtered
through parties

Somewhat
supportive

Not
supportive

MFA EllemannJensen assertive and
personally invested
to commit,
constrained by
government and
opposition parties

PM Anders Fogh
Rasmussen is assertive
and personally invested
to support Danish
participation

PM has no role in the
planning stages of the
decision, Foreign Affairs
Minister’s personal
motivations open to
speculation

Government
Composition

Public
Opinion

Political
Leadership

Commitment
Behavior

The Netherlands decides to
support the war ‘politically
Denmark joins the
but not militarily’ at first, but
naval blockade in
makes incremental resource
the Gulf
commitments later to
militarily support the war
Table 7.2 Summary of Findings from Chapters 5 and 6
Denmark signs ‘the
letter of eight’ and
sends military
resources, participates
in the war
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The results of the comparative case studies in Table 7.2 contribute to the findings of the
regression analyses presented in Chapter 4 in a number of ways. First and foremost, the findings
of the case studies highlight those areas where ‘policy incongruence’ is most important in
explaining the change in the commitment intensity of foreign policy behavior in coalition
governments. Whereas the ideological disagreements within the parties that make up the
opposition—measured by the government’s ideological composition as a left-right hybrid
coalition—is key to understanding the commitment behavior of minority coalitions as the Danish
decision regarding the 1990 Gulf War has shown; when it comes to majority governments such
as the minimum winning coalitions of the Netherlands, the focus shifts to the ideological
disagreements within the parties that make up the government. Therefore, the findings presented
Chapters 5 and 6 reiterate the conclusions of Chapter 4, as well as the theoretical framework
introduced in Chapter 2.
Furthermore, the case analyses of the 2003 Danish and Dutch decisions to join the Iraq
war have revealed that logrolling has often provided the mechanism that explains the abnormal
outcomes vis-à-vis the hypothesized relationships. Specifically, while the Danish minority
coalition used logrolling as an ad hoc mechanism to garner support for involvement in the USled war in Iraq in exchange for domestic policies that mattered to its extra-governmental partner
(the Danish People’s Party), the political parties in the Netherlands engaged in logrolling to
secure office seats in the process of government formation in return for their support—or simply
their ‘absence of resistance’—towards providing political and incremental resource commitment
to the war. In other words, the ideological composition of the minority coalition in Denmark in
2003 and the minimum winning coalitions in the Netherlands which would otherwise lead to a
decrease in the commitment intensity of these governments actually resulted in increased
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commitments because the relationship between policy incongruence and commitment intensity
has been explained primarily by logrolling among the political parties.
Second, the case analyses highlight the merits of contextualizing foreign policy behavior
beyond statistical relationships by accounting for the international-historical setting that these
decisions take place. For instance, Chapter 5 has shown that it is crucial to assess foreign policy
behavior within the context of the state’s foreign policy ‘vision’: in Denmark’s case, this vision
entailed international activism, which was incorporated in the case analysis as a contextual
factor. The role of this factor on Danish foreign policy commitments was most visible in the
country’s 2003 commitment regarding the Iraq war.
Indeed, the contextualized discussion of foreign policy commitments in the qualitative
component of this dissertation has further contributed to our understanding of the baseline
commitment levels that each country exerted on the statistical relationships, demonstrated in the
concluding sections of Chapter 4. As suggested above, revealing Denmark’s activist foreign
policy strategy throughout the post-Cold War period was useful towards justifying why this
country stood as an outlier at the end of the quantitative tests with regards to its international
commitment intensity when compared to the other European parliamentary democracies included
in the dataset.
Moving from the international to the domestic context, the case analyses also reveal how
the competitiveness of the political environment influences foreign policy. As Chapter 6 has
discussed, the historical shift that occurred in the Netherlands with the process of
‘depillarization’ at the domestic level led to the politicization of foreign policy in this country.
The 2003 Iraq case has shown that the Dutch political parties from diverse ideological
backgrounds explicitly fought over the possibility of Dutch involvement in the military
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operation. Therefore, this case study has helped conclude that the competitiveness of the policymaking environment is a factor that reinforces the influence of government composition on
international commitments.
Ultimately, the attention to context and detail displayed in the case analyses have
strengthened the conclusions drawn from statistical analyses reported in Chapter 4 by pointing
out the mechanisms that justify the relationships between government composition and
international commitments as well as situating these relationships vis-à-vis the contextual factors
at the international, domestic, and individual levels.
The qualitative and quantitative components of this project therefore complement each
other towards developing a ‘coalition politics framework.’ Introduced in the opening of this
dissertation as its final goal, the framework brings together the contextual factors and the
systematized relationships in order to explain the intensity of foreign policy commitments. In this
sense, the framework should allow us to make more informed expectations about the
international behaviors of coalition governments in European parliamentary regimes, given the
information on the composition of these governments as well as the contexts that they are
situated in. In the light of the discussion provided above, Figure 7.1 presents this framework
below.
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Figure 7.1 A Framework of Coalition Politics

As Figure 7.1 suggests, the composition of the government sits at the core of the
framework, where the types of coalitions and their policy incongruence are presented in detail.
The arrows suggest the mechanisms that explain the commitment intensity for each combination
of government composition and denote the direction of this relationship. As the figure suggests,
the only direct comparison between single- and multiparty governments can be made vis-à-vis
oversized coalitions, in which more parties exist than necessary to maintain the majority status in
the parliament.

236

Next, the figure zooms out to the contextual factors at the individual, domestic and
international levels that could further influence the core ‘government composition’ explanation.
The gray-scale of each factor suggests its explanatory power: as the analyses have shown, factors
pertaining to leadership are often open to debate, and therefore their explanatory capacity cannot
be ascertained. On the other hand, the domestic political factors, such as the perceived threats to
national survival, the competitiveness of the regime, and public opinion to the extent that it is
filtered through parties exert a stronger contextual effect on commitments. Ultimately, the
historical foreign policy orientations of the state provide an overarching context to frame these
relationships. In other words, these contextual factors delineate the possible range of behaviors
that a government could engage in. Once the range is delineated, however, the framework
implies that the specific form of behavior is determined primarily by the composition of the
government.
Together, the quantitative and the qualitative findings provide the central explanatory
factors and mechanisms, as well as the facilitating conditions that take place at the domestic,
individual and international levels. As a result, they equally contribute to the coalition politics
framework and illuminate the theoretical contributions of the dissertation. The dissertation
therefore powerfully demonstrates the dynamism of coalition foreign policy that is above and
beyond the dichotomous understanding of governments in parliamentary regimes, which has
been suggested by the Comparative Foreign Policy literature for nearly two decades.
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Methodological Contributions of the Study
Clearly, this framework could not have been deciphered with quantitative or qualitative analysis
alone. This brings us back to the merits of multi-method research designs in Comparative
Foreign Policy, and more specifically, to the methodological contributions of this study.
The dissertation has stressed early on that a chronic weakness in the field of Comparative
Foreign Policy has been the dilemma between an aspiration for “grand unified theories” of
foreign policy and the need for “microlevel detail” to explain why nations behave the way they
do in their international endeavors: “To what should we aspire: the richly detailed,
comprehensively researched microanalyses of a few cases or the conceptually abstract,
statistical/mathematical renderings of thousands of events?” asked Hudson and Vore (1995: 220)
to reflect on the methodological underpinnings of this dilemma. Either alternative pushes the
researcher toward the opposite ends of the methodological spectrum: whereas large-N research
designs in foreign policy analysis enable scholars to test and predict the domestic and/or
international causes of state behavior along spatial and temporal dimensions toward discovering
parsimonious relationships, small-N case study designs help uncover the nuances that often go
unnoticed and explicate the mechanisms that contextualize these relationships. The question we
should ask ourselves is whether we really have to choose one of these methodological
alternatives over the other.
Given the advantages of each methodological route for producing empirical analysis, the
art of the scholarship therefore lies in the extent to which these two approaches—nuance and
parsimony, context and generalizability—are brought together meaningfully without having to
compromise on one for the other. This is precisely the aspiration that has driven this dissertation
toward introducing a multi-method research strategy—nuance and parsimony do not have to be
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treated like oil and water; they can be nicely blended by utilizing multiple methodologies. While
quantitative and qualitative methodologies are certainly equipped with their own unique
advantages for empirical analysis, their competitive characteristics should not preclude the
possibility to utilize them in an interactive fashion. In other words, researchers, especially in the
field of Comparative Foreign Policy, should not feel compelled to compromise on parsimony
over nuance or vice versa.
This dissertation therefore contributed to the field of Comparative Foreign Policy by
demonstrating that with meticulous research designs, we can achieve both. Indeed, each
methodological component of the study was designed with a common goal that has driven the
vision of the dissertation itself—to maintain the balance between parsimony and nuance. At
every stage of the research design regardless of its quantitative or qualitative characteristics—
from conceptualization to data collection and ultimately assessment—attentiveness to context
and detail has been key.
Some examples of this effort included variable specification and the choice of
quantitative and qualitative methods of assessment. As the theoretical and methodological
discussions of this dissertation have shown, for instance, the key independent variables were
designed to capture the more nuanced differences in government composition than the previous
studies have achieved—and these refined variables were incorporated in both quantitative and
qualitative designs. For example, conceptualizing and operationalizing a key independent
variable, policy incongruence, in three different ways brought out the more refined
understandings of ‘ideological diversity’ in multiparty governments and therefore also
contributed to the discussion on the ideological cohesion of coalitions in parliamentary regimes.
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The choice of specific methods for the quantitative and qualitative components has also
followed from this methodological vision of the dissertation. For instance, an important
argument raised earlier in this study concerned the merits of using multilevel (also known as
“hierarchical linear”) modeling in regression analysis, which helps account for the biases that
might be introduced by the context from which the observations are drawn. Indeed,
differentiating the effects of context from the effects of intra-contextual factors is vital especially
for studies such as the present dissertation, which adopts a cross-country approach to test an
intra-country dynamic such as government composition.
The choice of the qualitative method was also driven with a similar understanding. Even
though the major purpose of the qualitative component has been to stimulate the quantitative
findings with alternative explanations using contextual evidence and detail, choosing ‘the
method of structured-focused comparison’ (George 1979) helped maintain the systematic inquiry
of foreign policy behavior as standardized questions are developed to assess the effect of each
alternative explanation on the government’s commitment behavior. Ultimately, in each empirical
component of the project, quantitative and qualitative alike, it has been demonstrated that
maintaining the balance between systematization and generalizability on one hand and attention
to detail and context on the other provided exceptional rigor and depth to the analyses.

Where Do We Go? Limitations of the Study and Future Research
Despite its theoretical and methodological contributions, it would be immature to argue that this
dissertation concludes the debate in our field on coalition foreign policy. While it certainly
aspires to be a step towards expanding our knowledge in this area, it does not provide
explanations for several other puzzles that still fall into its scope. For science is an iterative,
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cumulative journey, what this contribution can offer now is a reflection on these limitations and a
discussion of the pathways for future research.
For instance, looking at the ‘coalition politics framework’ presented in Figure 7.1, one
can argue that one of the limitations of this study is that it does not respond to a key explanatory
framework in foreign policy analysis—the bureaucratic-organizational approach (Allison 1971).
The bureaucratic-organizational model concerns the ways in which policy-makers “are driven by
the competing interests of their respective organizations” (Brummer 2013: 1) instead of partisan
predispositions. In a recent study that utilizes this framework, Brummer (2013) argues that
Germany’s decision to participate in the EU’s military operation in the Congo was reached at the
end of a bargaining process between the Chancellor Merkel (CDU), the Defense Minister Jung
(CDU) and the Foreign Minister Steinmeier (SPD) of the Christian Democrat-Social Democrat
minimum winning coalition. The analysis demonstrates that it was not the party positions of
these actors per se, but their organizational positions as the chancellor, the defense and the
foreign ministers that influenced the decision to choose among the four alternatives to commit in
this operation—“political support,” “military support,” “co-leadership” with France and
participation with a “battlegroup” (Brummer 2013: 9). Indeed, due to their organizational
interests, Brummer (2013) explains that Merkel and Jung supported entirely different
commitment alternatives, even though they belonged to the same political party.
Clearly, the ‘coalition politics framework’ fails to answer this puzzle. Therefore, a future
avenue of research for this project concerns the extent to which the bureaucratic-organizational
interests of cabinet actors outweigh the partisan sources of policy preference in coalition
governments. It is now time to reach beyond the ‘party dynamics’ of coalitions and zoom in on
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their ‘ministerial dynamics’ following the footsteps of the recent contribution by Oppermann and
Brummer (2013).
Another key puzzle that the ‘coalition politics framework’ fails to solve concerns the role
of membership in international organizations and how it influences foreign policy behavior. For
instance, the quantitative analysis in this dissertation has failed to capture the effect of European
Union membership on the international commitments of its member states. We know from a
plethora of studies on EU foreign policy, however, that the Union does affect national foreign
policies and behaviors (Larsen 2005). Daehnhardt (2011) demonstrate, for example, that
Germany’s foreign policy towards the Middle East is increasingly shaped by and aligned with
the EU. In this sense, this project has yet to discover novel ways to measure the effect of
international memberships on national foreign policy behaviors. This goes particularly for the
role of the EU, given the scope of the project.
Indeed, moving beyond the limitations of the study, one future research implication of
this project has to do with its geographical reach. Even though the dissertation has compellingly
demonstrated that it is the first study to introduce so much finesse to the analysis of governments
and their international behavior, the question that remains unanswered is whether the framework
introduced here has the capacity to travel beyond Europe.
This question, as a matter of fact, concerns many scholars in our field. In March 2014, a
group of prominent Comparative Foreign Policy scholars (many of whom have been referred to
in this dissertation) convened for a workshop on coalition foreign policy at the International
Studies Association Annual Meeting in Toronto, Canada. Following a series of debates on the
current and future research projects in this field, the foremost question that emerged was whether

242

our collective efforts to explain the effects of government composition on foreign policy
behavior can travel beyond the advanced industrial democracies of the West.
Indeed, the variables that are employed in the field—such as party ideology, a variable
that is central to the analysis presented here—primarily measure a policy dimension whose
evolution has roots deep entrenched in the history of Western European political development.
That is to say, “the left–right ideological dimension may not be a relevant predictor of
international behavior in non-European democracies, where party identity might be defined more
in terms of regional orientation, ethnic or religious background instead” (Oktay 2014: 879). The
evidence regarding the Israeli disengagement from Gaza discussed earlier in this chapter
suggests that the explanation provided in the dissertation can certainly travel to regions outside
of Europe, and thus gives us hope for the future. Still, providing geographical mobility to this
study as a future avenue for research first and foremost depends on ensuring that the party
ideology variables correctly capture the dimensions along which political competition takes
place in the countries employed for empirical testing.
A second avenue for future research concerns the role of individual political actors in
these governments and how they influence foreign policy behavior. The qualitative analyses
presented in this dissertation remain at best speculative about the role of prime ministers and
foreign affairs ministers in these cabinets toward making decisions of international commitment.
As a result, the ‘coalition politics framework’ visualized in Figure 7.1 characterizes political
leadership as a vague component in explaining international commitments.
To scrutinize the explanatory power of leadership on foreign policy behavior further, it is
necessary to go back to our quantitative toolbox and design more systematic studies to test the
ways in which political leadership and government composition interact to influence
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international commitments. The seminal works by Hermann (2005) and Kaarbo and Hermann
(1998) provide the starting point for this inquiry. These studies, among others, have frequently
emphasized the need for bridging the gap between individual and domestic-institutional factors
in studying government behavior at the international level. To this date, however, no quantitative
framework exists to systematically examine the relationship between the psychological
orientations of leaders and the constraints of their institutional environments, and how this
relationship leads to foreign policy outputs. To that end, Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis
offers a rigorous quantitative approach, whose findings can be incorporated into existing models
of government composition to test how leadership traits feed into government politics, which
then translate into foreign policy behavior.
Last but not least, the theoretical framework introduced in this dissertation has a broader
implication regarding the possible perverse effects of the ‘clarity of responsibility’ thesis for the
international behavior of oversized coalitions. The dissertation has concluded that parties in
oversized coalitions, ceteris paribus, benefit from the diffusion of responsibility in government,
which helps them circumvent the electoral consequences of their policy failures. Little has been
said, however, on whether the diffusion of responsibility also discourages coalitions from
achieving major policy outcomes at the international level. For instance, could the IsraeliPalestinian conflict have already reached a resolution if single-party governments ruled Israel
instead of oversized coalitions? Since the credit for success is expected to diffuse among the
governing parties just as much as the blame would for failure, coalitions might choose to settle
for moderate policy outcomes instead.
Therefore, moving forward, we should also begin to tackle the ‘credit-taking’ and
‘blame-shifting’ processes in coalition foreign policy, particularly among oversized coalitions.
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Studying the major foreign policy issues such as territorial dispute resolution or European Union
membership negotiations, where successful outcomes can lead to electoral gains, should reveal
whether responsibility diffusion could also act as a disincentive for parties in oversized coalition
governments.
As always, much work remains. The implications of this dissertation, however,
encourage us to continue studying the foreign policy behavior of parliamentary democracies in
the future—now with a rejuvenated interest.
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APPENDIX A - WEIS Event Types and Categories
Code

Event Type

01

Yield

02

Comment

03

Consult

04

Approve

05

Promise

Event Categories
(011) Surrender, yield to order, submit to arrest, etc. This
category requires explicit statement of surrender, or yield
to a command or an order, or of submission to arrest
(012) Yield position, retreat; evacuate. This category
involves actual physical movement.
(013) Admit wrongdoing; retract statement.
(021) Explicit decline to comment. This category is
reserved for an expressed "decline to comment" statement
by an official spokesperson. This category does not
include a reported "failure to comment."
(022) Comment on situation--pessimistic. This category is
used only when the actor explicitly expresses the feeling
that the situation is adverse or foreboding.
(023) Comment on situation--neutral.
(024) Comment on situation--optimistic. This category is
used only when the actor explicitly expresses the feeling
that the situation is favorable.
(025) Explain policy or future position. This category is
used when governments express their goals, hopes,
policies, or future plans to others.
(031) Meet with at neutral site, or send note. This
category is used for meetings at an unspecified or neutral
site, or between a resident ambassador and the host
country. This category applies, in addition, when notes are
sent between nations but their content is unknown.
(032) Visit; go to.
(033) Receive visit; host.
(041) Praise, hail, applaud, condole. This category
includes the "politeness" events such as expressions of
gratitude, condolences, and ceremonial salutations..
(042) Endorse other's policy or position; give verbal
support.
(051) Promise own policy support.
(052) Promise material support. This category specifies
men and/or resource aid forthcoming.
(053) Promise other future support action.
(054) Assure; reassure. This category is used for
expressions or reiterations of earlier pledges.
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Code

Event Type

06

Grant

07

Reward

08

Agree

09

Request

010

Propose

011

Reject

012

Accuse

013

Protest

014

Deny

015

Demand

Event Categories
(061) Express regret; apologize.
(062) Give state invitation.
(063) Grant asylum. This category includes both the
announcement of a policy and reported cases of granting
of refuge to nationals of other countries.
(064) Grant privilege, diplomatic recognition; DE FACTO
relations (sic), etc.
(065) Suspend negative sanctions; truce.
(066) Release and/or return persons or property.
(071) Extend economic aid (as gift and/or loan).
(072) Extend military assistance. This category includes
both men and material, in addition, joint military training
exercises are coded in this category.
(073) Give other assistance
(081) Make substantive agreement.
(082) Agree to future action or procedure; agree to meet,
to negotiate. This category includes the acceptance of
invitations from other states.
(091) Ask for information.
(092) Ask for policy assistance.
(093) Ask for material assistance.
(094) Request action; call for. This category includes bids
from United Nations membership and requests for
asylum.
(095) Entreat; plead; appeal to; help me. This category
applies to requests made from a distinctly suppliant
position, the actor nation pleading for aid or support.
(101) Offer proposal.
(102) Urge or suggest action or policy.
(111) Turn down proposal; reject protest demand, threat,
etc.
(112) Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow.
(121) Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove
(122) Denounce; denigrate; abuse. This category often
applies when derogatory adjectives embellish the
accusation.
(131) Make complaint. (not formal)
(132) Make formal complaint or protest . Protests are
assumed to be formal unless otherwise stated.
(141) Deny an accusation.
(142) Deny an attributed policy, action role or position.
(150) Issue order or command; insist; demand
compliance, etc.
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Code

Event Type

016

Warn

017

Threaten

018

Demonstrate

019

Reduce Relationship

020

Expel

021

Seize

022

Force

Event Categories
(160) Give warning. Occasionally the words "demand" or
"threaten" are used in news items which should be coded
as warnings.
(171) Threat without specific negative sanctions.
(172) Threat with specific non-military negative
sanctions.
(173) Threat with force specified.
(174) Ultimatum; threat with negative sanctions and time
limit specified.
(181) Non-military demonstration; to walk out on. This
category applies to activities such as marching, picketing,
stoning, etc., when they are performed by citizens of one
nation against another nation. The category also includes
occasions when representatives to international meetings
walk out in protest.
(182) Armed force mobilization. Exercise and/or display
routine ceremonial displays such as weapons parades and
"fly bys" are not included in this category.
(191) Cancel or postpone planned event.
(192) Reduce routine international activity; recall
officials, etc. Events coded in this category must be
connected with some on-going international problem, thus
the usual rotations of foreign service officers or normal
changes in foreign aid are not regarded as "reduction of
relations." Embargoes, bans, and smaller activities do fall
within this category.
(193) Reduce or halt aid.
(194) Halt negotiations.
(195) Break diplomatic relations.
(201) Order personnel out of country. This category
includes the expulsion of foreign individuals and the
declaration of individuals as PERSONA NON GRATA
(sic).
(202) Expel organization or group.
(211) Seize position or possessions. The category may
also be used when a nation militarily takes or occupies
another's territory.
(212) Detain or arrest person(s).
(221) Non-injury obstructive act. When actual physical
destruction is reported, demonstrations are coded in this
category.
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Code

Event Type

Event Categories
(222) Non-military injury-destruction. This category also
includes acts not committed by organized military forces
such as terrorist bombings.
(223) Military engagement. Notice that this category may
often be "double-coded" because when two nations battle,
each is an actor and each is a target of force.
Source: McClelland, C. (1978) WEIS Dataset Codebook. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research.
Table A.1 WEIS Event Types and Categories
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APPENDIX B – A Brief History of Measuring Commitments in Foreign Policy

Attempts to measure commitment in foreign policy behavior go back to the 1970s. In a study to
explain the differences of international behavior between small and large states, for instance,
East (1973: 566) has introduced a scale that distinguishes “low-cost” behavior from “high-cost”
behavior by focusing on resource allocation—a key component of conceptualizing commitment,
as Chapter 1 has argued. Specifically, East (1973) defines low-cost behavior as verbal behavior
in general, which “involves no actual commitment of a state’s resources” and include “situations,
threats, accusations, proposals, denials, promises,” whereas nonverbal behavior “always involves
the actual commitment or utilization of resources” (East 1973: 567, emphasis in original).
Utilizing the CREON events dataset (Hermann, Salmore and East 1971), East’s (1973) 8point scale ranges from cooperative deeds to conflictual deeds, where categories 1 through 4
indicate cooperative intent, desire, and evaluations, respectively, and categories 5 through 8
indicate conflictual actions with increasing intensity than go from evaluations to desires,
intentions, and ultimately, deeds.
Despite being the first systematic study to categorize foreign policy events along a
commitment intensity spectrum, East’s (1973) operationalization of commitment is limited as the
interactive relationship between verbal and nonverbal behavior is significantly censored. The
scale suggests that high-cost behavior only involves those at the extremes, deeds, which come
about as a result of resource use, while all verbal behaviors, regardless of the variation in their
intensity, are understood as low-cost. We know, however, that the literature on credible
commitments has frequently shown that threats—a form of verbal behavior—are important
components of state behavior in international relations. Leaders “often have strong incentives to
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express threats or promises to act in order to generate support inside and outside the regime”
(Hagan 1993: 94-95), which make threats a critical tool for leaders and thus a costly one should
they fail to fulfill these inherently verbal behaviors. Despite acknowledging the increasing
intensity of commitments from evaluations to desires to intentions, East’s conceptualization
therefore still falls short of realizing the potential of studying the variation in the intensity of
verbal action. Furthermore, ordering cooperative and conflictual behavior along the same scale
with increasing values is hardly intuitive, making it more difficult to manipulate the values for
analysis, especially from a quantitative viewpoint.
Following East’s (1973) initial attempt, Callahan’s scale of commitment intensity
(1982a) can be understood as a corrective in this sense. He revises East’s (1973) scale to create a
new 8-point scale that reorganizes the WEIS event categories, with the intention to
operationalize commitment intensity with more finesse. Unlike its predecessor, the scale now
ranges from -4 to +4, where the more negative values indicate more intense conflictual
commitments and the more positive values indicate more intense cooperative commitments.
Table B.1 below presents the revised East (1973) scale; the bolds indicate the additions by
Callahan (1982a).
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VERBAL
Evaluation
Desire
Intent
(-1)
(-2)
(-3)
Deny
Demand
Threaten
Accuse
Protest
Warn
Comment (Neg.) Propose (Neg.)
Reject
Request (Neg.) Intend (Neg.)

Conflict

Cooperation

(+1)
Comment (Pos.)
Approve
Consult

(+2)
Request (Pos.)
Propose (Pos.)
Negotiate

(+3)
Intend (Pos.)
Offer
Promise
Agree

Increasing Commitment to Action

NONVERBAL
Deeds
(-4)
Force
Demonstrate
Inc. Mil. Capability
Aid Opponent
Reduce Relationship
Seize
Expel
Subvert
(+4)
Yield
Grant
Decrease Mil. Capability
Consult
Carry Out Agreement
Reward
Increase Relationship
Action

Source: Replicated from East, M. (1973). Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models,
World Politics 25(4), pp. 569-570.

Table B.1 East’s (1973) Operationalization of Foreign Policy Event Actions
and Callahan’s (1982a) Modifications (in bold)
Callahan’s modifications to the original East scale also have weaknesses, however. First
of all, my numerous rounds of discussions with events data experts have revealed that it is hard
to establish consensus on the intensity level of several event categories due to Callahan’s
revision of the WEIS codes. The discussion on the intensity scores of offers to mediate,
negotiate, or peace proposal is one example—are they intentions (+3) or desires (+2)? In other
words, the Callahan scale raises conceptual challenges, which spill over to the ways in which
intensity is measured. Furthermore, the event categories listed in Table B.1 hardly capture the

252

full range of the 63 event categories that were initially introduced by McClelland’s (1978)
framework. For these reasons, this project does not use Callahan’s scale as its main measure.93

93

Nevertheless, the events in the dataset used in the quantitative component of this project were
coded with the Callahan scale as well as with the Goldstein scale, the latter of which is the one
used in this study. Reliability tests show that both measures are significantly similar to each other
(Cronbach’s alpha: 0.89). The tests suggest, in other words, that the results are not driven by
scale preferences.
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APPENDIX C – List of Events in the Dataset
List of events that appear in the dataset, along with their descriptions and event codes. IDEA
codes come from the original King and Lowe (2003) dataset.
Class
<ADIS>
<AERI>
<AGAC>
<AGRE>
<ALER>
<APOL>
<ARES>
<ASKE>
<ASKH>
<ASKM>
<ASKP>
<ASSA>
<ASSR>
<ATSE>
<BANA>
<BEAT>
<BFOR>
<BLAM>
<BLAW>
<BREL>
<BVIO>
<CALL>
<CLAR>
<CLAS>
<COLL>
<COMP>
<CONC>
<CONS>
<DECC>
<DEFY>
<DEII>
<DEMA>
<DENY>
<DERI>

IDEA code WEIS code
1621
2239
82
8
161
44
212
931
933
93
95
2232
54
824
1121
2221
1822
121
1133
195
2112
94
26
2231
83
13
226
3
21
113
151
15
14
159

16
22
8
8
16
4
21
9
9
9
9
22
5
8
11
22
18
12
11
19
21
9
2
22
8
13
22
3
21
11
15
15
14
15

Event Name

Goldstein
Score

Armed force air display
Missile attack
Agree or accept
Agree
Alerts
Apologize
Arrest and detention
Ask for economic aid
Ask for humanitarian aid
Ask for material aid
Request protection
Assassination
Assure
Agree to settlement
Impose restrictions
Beatings
Border fortification
Criticize or denounce
Break law
Break relations
Armed force border violation
Call for action
Acknowledge responsibility
Armed battle
Collaborate
Complain
Crowd control
Consult
Decline comment
Defy norms
Demand information
Demand
Deny
Demand rights

-3
-9
3
4.8
-3
3.5
-4.4
1.6
1.6
3.4
3.4
-10
2.8
4.8
-4
-9.6
-6.8
-2.2
-4
-7
-6.8
-0.1
-0.1
-7
4.8
-2.4
-9
1.5
-0.1
-4
-4.9
-4.9
-1
-4.9
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Class
<DISC>
<DMOB>
<DWAR>
<EASS>
<EEAI>
<EESB>
<EHAI>
<EMAI>
<EMPA>
<EMSA>
<ENDO>
<EVAC>
<EXIL>
<FCOM>
<FORG>
<GASY>
<GRAN>
<GRPG>
<HAID>
<HALO>
<HALT>
<HIDE>
<HOST>
<HTAK>
<ICOM>
<IMPR>
<INCC>
<INVI>
<MALT>
<MDEM>
<MDIS>
<MEDI>
<MOCC>
<MONI>
<NEGO>
<NMFT>
<OCOM>
<OPEN>
<PASS>

IDEA code WEIS code
31
654
198
65
71
657
73
72
43
658
4
632
20
132
45
631
6
2235
1932
194
1941
1131
33
2132
131
64
1613
62
1611
182
162
311
2111
214
312
175
24
1132
222

3
6
19
6
7
6
7
7
4
6
4
6
20
13
4
6
6
22
19
19
19
11
3
21
13
6
16
6
16
18
16
3
21
21
3
17
2
11
22

Event Name

Goldstein
Score

Discussion
Demobilize armed forces
Declare war
Ease sanctions
Extend economic aid
Ease economic sanctions
Extend humanitarian aid
Extend military aid
Empathize
Ease military blockade
Endorse
Evacuate victims
Expel
Formally complain
Forgive
Grant asylum
Grant
Artillery attack
Reduce or stop humanitarian assistance
Halt discussions
Halt negotiation
Political flight
Host a meeting
Hostage taking and kidnapping
Informally complain
Improve relations
Security alert
Extend invitation
Armed force alert
Armed force mobilization
Armed force display
Mediate talks
Armed force occupation
Covert monitoring
Engage in negotiation
Other physical force threats
Optimistic comment
Disclose information
Physical assault

1
2.2
-4.5
2.9
7.4
2.2
7.6
8.3
3.4
2.2
3.5
2.2
-5
-2.4
3.5
-1.1
2.2
-10
-4.5
-3.8
-4.5
-4
2.8
-6.8
-2.4
5.4
-3
2.5
-3
-7.6
-3
1.9
-6.8
-6.8
1.9
-6.4
0.1
-4
-9.6
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Class
<PCOM>
<PDEM>
<PEXE>
<POAR>
<PRAI>
<PRME>
<PRMH>
<PRMM>
<PRMS>
<PROM>
<PROO>
<PROP>
<PTME>
<PTMN>
<PTRU>
<RAID>
<RALL>
<RATI>
<REDA>
<REDR>
<REJC>
<RELE>
<REQS>
<REWD>
<RFIN>
<RIOT>
<RPMD>
<RPRO>
<RRPE>
<RSAN>
<RWCF>
<SAID>
<SANC>
<SEEK>
<SEZR>
<SHEP>
<SOLS>
<SRAL>
<STRI>

IDEA code WEIS code
22
181
2234
2121
41
521
523
522
52
5
51
10
104
103
101
223
112
46
193
192
11
66
9
7
934
224
1115
111
661
653
936
2
19
91
211
63
92
74
196

2
18
22
21
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
10
10
10
10
22
11
4
19
19
11
6
9
7
9
22
11
11
6
6
9
2
19
9
21
6
9
7
19

Event Name

Goldstein
Score

Pessimistic comment
Protest demonstrations
Small arms attack
Political arrests
Praise
Promise economic support
Promise humanitarian support
Promise military support
Promise material support
Promise
Promise policy support
Propose
Offer to mediate
Offer to Negotiate
Offer peace proposal
Armed actions
Refuse to allow
Ratify a decision
Reduce or stop aid
Reduce routine activity
Reject
Release or return
Request
Reward
Request an investigation
Riot
Reject proposal to meet
Reject proposal
Return, release person(s)
Relax administrative sanction
Request withdrawal or ceasefire
Comment
Sanction
Investigate
Seize possession
Provide shelter
Solicit support
Rally support
Strikes and boycotts

-0.1
-5.2
-10
-4.4
3.4
5.2
5.2
5.2
5.2
4.7
4.5
0.8
0.7
0.7
1.5
-10
-4
3.5
-5.6
-2.2
-4
1.9
1.6
7.4
1.6
-8.3
-4
-4
2.2
2.2
1.6
0.1
-4.5
0.1
-9.2
2.2
3.4
7.6
-4.5
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Class
<THEN>
<THRT>
<TUNS>
<ULTI>
<VETO>
<VISI>
<WARN>
<YIEL>
<YORD>

IDEA code WEIS code
1721
17
171
174
1123
32
16
1
11

17
17
17
17
11
3
16
1
1

Event Name

Goldstein
Score

Threaten to halt negotiations
Threaten
Non-specific threats
Give ultimatum
Veto
Travel to meet
Warn
Yield
Yield to order

-6
-6.4
-4.4
-6.9
-4
1.9
-3
1.1
0.6

Table C.1 List of Events Included in the Dataset
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